Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

CORNWALL COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [Lords] (By Order)

Order for consideration, as amended, read.

To be considered upon Thursday 7 June.

COUNTY OF LANCASHIRE BILL [LORDS] (By ORDER)

Order for consideration, as amended, read.

To be considered upon Tuesday 5 June.

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [Lords] (By Order)

Order for further consideration, as amended, read.

To be further considered upon Thursday 7 June.

TEES AND HARTLEPOOL PORT AUTHORITY BILL
(By Order)

DARTMOOR COMMONS BILL (By Order)

PIECE HALL (HALIFAX) (No. 2) BILL (By Order)

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (MONEY) (No. 2) BILL (By Order)

Orders for Second reading read.

To be read a Second time upon Thursday 7 June.

Oral Answers to Questions — NORTHERN IRELAND

Young Offenders

Mr. A. Cecil Walker: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland how many young offenders were detained at the Secretary of State's pleasure in prison establishments in Northern Ireland in each of the years 1972 to 1975, inclusive; and how many of them, respectively, have been subsequently released.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. Nicholas Scott): Twenty young persons were convicted and sentenced to be detained during the pleasure of the Secretary of State during this period: one in 1972, three in 1974 and 16 in 1975. Three have been released on licence, of whom two served nine years and four months and the third served 10 years four months.

Mr. Walker: Does the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State agree that this type of sentence causes great psychological suffering to such young men, who have no

means of knowing when they will be released, especially when they are aware that prisoners given fixed sentences have already been granted their freedom? Does he accept that such an anomaly is not in the interests of British justice?

Mr. Scott: By definition, all those sentenced in that way have been convicted of very serious crimes. Before releasing them we have to take account of the gravity of the offence, ensure that they have served a suitable period, and consider their behaviour in prison and the continued safety of the public.

Mr. Peter Robinson: Does the Minister agree that such a step could benefit prison administration, in that a prisoner who knows the date of his release and can work towards it is less likely to behave badly, knowing that it could affect his release date?

Mr. Scott: We are anxious to ensure that prisoners are told of their release date some time before they are released, so that they have that assurance and can take part in some sort of pre-release scheme to fit them for life outside prison.

Mr. Maginnis: Does the Minister agree that many of these young people were inveigled into serious crime at a time when tempers in Northern Ireland were running particularly high? Will he re-examine the review procedure for these young people and make a special case on their behalf?

Mr. Winnick: What about the IRA?

Mr. Maginnis: We have not sought in our questions to differentiate between the types of prisoner detained at the Secretary of State's pleasure.

Mr. Scott: I welcome that comment. I am satisfied that we have the right machinery for keeping such cases under review. Youth at the time of a crime is one of the factors that I take into account when advising my right hon. Friend about release dates.

Rev. Martin Smyth: Does the Minister accept that some crimes, which cannot be excused, sometimes involve people who have only a low-key role in them but who are subjected to indeterminate sentences, while others involved in equally dastardly crimes are being released after remission?

Mr. Scott: Such matters are for the courts to decide. People convicted of murder are usually given an indeterminate sentence. We must be sure that the sentence served is commensurate with the gravity of the crime.

Mr. Soley: Will the Minister review sentencing practices in Northern Ireland, particularly for non-paramilitary offences? Is he aware of the concern about certain aspects of the criminal justice system as it relates to non-paramilitary offences?

Mr. Scott: That does not arise out of the question. I am not convinced that sentencing policy in Northern Ireland is out of line with that in the rest of the United Kingdom.

Security

Mr. Maginnis: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on the security situation in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Peter Robinson: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on the security situation in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Farr: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on the current security situation.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. James Prior): Since I last answered questions on 26 April there have been nine deaths in incidents arising from the security situation in the Province. Three of those killed were civilians, one of whom was a member of the Territorial Army, two were part-time members of the Ulster Defence Regiment, two were members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and two were soldiers. These last four were killed in two separate incidents on 18 May.
The security forces have continued their efforts to prevent terrorist activity and to bring those responsible for terrorist crimes to justice. Since the beginning of 1984, 214 people have been charged with serious offences, including 17 with murder and 22 with attempted murder. In the same period 97 weapons, 14,236 rounds of ammunition and 5,353 lb of explosives have been recovered. The very large quantity of explosives includes approximately 2 tonnes of home-made explosives discovered by the security forces in a terrorist hide in County Tyrone yesterday evening.

Mr. Maginnis: Does the Secretary of State agree that although he may continue to give us meaningless statistics, it is worth remembering that over 9,000 weapons have been captured in the last 12 years? Will he bear in mind that weapons continue to be available to terrorists who want to murder people along the frontier? Will the Secretary of State now change his mind—we know that he is capable of doing that frequently—and deploy more security forces along the frontier across which the weapons of war are brought into Northern Ireland?

Mr. Prior: I do not think that the statistics are meaningless. They speak volumes for the immense efforts made by the security forces, whether they are members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the British Army or the Ulster Defence Regiment. The Government's security policy is clear and firm. The security forces will continue to deal vigorously with all those who break the law in any way. If sometimes I change my mind, I am in good company with the Ulster Unionists.

Mr. Robinson: In the light of the security statistics, is the Secretary of State aware of public opinion in Northern Ireland that a new initiative on security is necessary? Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware of the deep apprehension in the Province at the prospect of a five-month period during which the Secretary of State says that he has nothing more to offer? Does he believe that in that time he can make some contribution by starting a new initiative on security?

Mr. Prior: There is widespread anxiety in the Province, as there has been for some time, on the question of security. I respond to that in any and every way that I can. I must tell hon. Members on both sides of the House that the problems in Northern Ireland will not be overcome by the security forces alone.

Mr. Farr: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the House sends its sympathy to the members of the security forces and police in Northern Ireland, who have done such a

wonderful job? Is he absolutely sure that there is not more that the Government could do about many of the crimes that have occurred fairly near the border? Quite often, bombs are planted or exploded and those who do the deeds disappear across the border. Will my right hon. Friend look again at the Government's policy to determine whether a fresh approach should be made to Dublin with a view to tightening up cross-border security?

Mr. Prior: We are constantly looking for ways to do more, and we are constantly seeking to improve our cooperation with the Republic of Ireland, its police force and army. I lose no opportunity to discuss these matters with my opposite numbers in the Republic.
It is a difficult border—like no other border—in both its terrain and the fact that, for generations, people have been used to crossing it.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Does the Secretary of State consider that the officials in the Northern Ireland Office, whose disastrous advice he has followed with characteristic self-satisfaction and obtuseness for the past two and a half years, contemplate with any degree of satisfaction the bloody consequences of their achievements?

Hon. Members: Disgraceful.

Mr. Prior: I find it almost impossible to reply to the right hon. Gentleman's words. They are so utterly disgraceful that, in a distinguished parliamentary career, he does himself no credit.

Mr. Hayes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of my hon. Friends admire the fortitude with which he has carried out his duties in Northern Ireland? We wish him well in the next few months in trying to secure peace for the two communities and in attempting to bring them together.

Mr. Prior: I am grateful for the support of my hon. Friend and others of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I dare say that over the years I have made many injudicious remarks, but I have always thought that frankness and candour were respected by the people of Northern Ireland. As such, I shall continue to be frank and candid.

Mr. Nicholson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the serious concern in my constituency about the continuing murder of civilians and members of the security forces? Is he further aware that two members of the Territorial Army and two members of the RUC were recently murdered in my constituency and that three members of the RUC mercifully escaped a murderous attack on them outside Armagh last week? What assurance can he give to me and my constituents today that the same will not occur this weekend?

Mr. Prior: The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that I can give no such assurances. I hope he recognises, as his hon. Friends showed they recognised in their supplementary questions to the first question today, that the position in Northern Ireland, although a very long way from being normal, is a lot better than it was. We shall continue to do all that we can.
Hon. Members have rightly drawn attention to the fact that we have not been able to achieve total security. However, they should give credit to our forces, especially during the past few days, when they have suffered severe casualties, for the fact that they have had enormous successes. We must not forget that.

Mr. Holt: Does my right hon. Friend accept that we all congratulate the security forces on reducing the amount of explosives available to the terrorists? Can he give the figures for last year and this year? Has he had any indication whether the Libyans have carried out their threat to supply further arms to the terrorists in Northern Ireland?

Mr. Prior: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I cannot offhand give the figures for this year and last year, but we have had great successes in recent days, especially with explosives, which, perhaps more than anything, are causing us great concern.
I have no further evidence about the Libyan position, other than what I have already said.

Mr. McCusker: Can the Secretary of State tell us of another country in the world where the Government allow their citizens so little protection while they wait for their turn to be murdered? I cite Sergeant Hillen of the UDR. Everyone in Northern Ireland, including the Government, knew that he would be murdered, but nothing was done to prevent it.

Mr. Prior: That is totally unfair and unworthy of the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Skinner: Did not this lame duck Secretary of State effectively resign from his position when he made his statement at the weekend? Would not any Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, regarding security or any other matter, have been rather more circumspect before engaging in a row with the Prime Minister—which can only detract from the job that the right hon. Gentleman is supposed to be doing?

Mr. Prior: I am certain that I have the confidence of the Government, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. I suspect that that is more than the hon. Gentleman can say about his leader.

Mr. Archer: Does the Secretary of State agree that the Government have had ample time to consider the report of Sir George Baker? Does he accept that even those of us who would like to see more extensive improvements than those recommended by Sir George regard this as a serious and careful report deserving of an early debate? Will he discuss that possibility with the Leader of the House?

Mr. Prior: I regard Sir George Baker's report as an important document which the House will wish to debate. I hope that in due course time will be made available for such a debate, and I shall convey the right hon. and learned Gentleman's request to my right hon. Friend.

New Ireland Forum

Sir John Biggs-Davison: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland what talks he has had with political leaders in Northern Ireland since the publication of the report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. Latham: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland what representations he has received from political parties in Northern Ireland regarding any further political initiative by him since the publication of the report of the New Ireland Forum; what reply he has sent; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Flannery: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he plans to hold discussions with the

Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Ireland concerning the implications for Northern Ireland of the recently published report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. Yeo: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland what representations he has received on the implications for Northern Ireland of the New Ireland Forum report.

Mr. Maclennan: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland what discussions he has had about the report of the New Ireland Forum; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Prior: During the past three weeks I have met the leaders of each of the four main constitutional political parties in Northern Ireland to discuss a variety of matters. They and others I have met or who have written to me have expressed a range of views about the implications of the Forum report.
I expect to meet the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Ireland tomorrow during the course of a visit he is paying to London, and expect to meet him and other Irish Ministers from time to time to discuss matters of mutual concern within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: Noting the return of Official Unionists to the Northern Ireland Assembly, may I ask my right hon. Friend to give special consideration to the Ulster Unionist Assembly party's discussion paper, well-named "The Way Forward", and not dismiss it as he has sometimes dismissed similar ideas when put forward from the Benches behind him?

Mr. Prior: I have certainly not dismissed this report, which I regard as being encouraging both in its language and in the ideas that it puts forward. I shall never dismiss any suggestion or policy document which in any way starts, and helps to keep going, a political dialogue in the Province.

Mr. Latham: Will my right hon. Friend, who has many friends in this House, confirm that, while he will always listen politely to the views of friendly nations about United Kingdom matters, the paramount consideration of this House will always be the democratically expressed views of the people of Northern Ireland?

Mr. Prior: Yes; and I would make that absolutely plain at all times. The wishes of the people of Northern Ireland, in regard to their sovereignty and to whom they wish to belong, must be respected at all times.

Mr. Flannery: Is it not a fact that very little is moving politically on the question of Northern Ireland? That fits in with what the right hon. Gentleman said about security not being everything and about there being other things as well. Does he agree that to be dismissive about a political attempt to try to solve the problem is useless, because at some time, as in any discussion, all the parties concerned must get round the table? Does he further agree, on reconsideration, that when he said that changing his mind made him similar in some ways to the Ulster Unionists, that was utter nonsense, for they do not change their minds; they are utterly intransingent and do not want to discuss the issues at all?

Mr. Prior: I long for the time when the parties in Northern Ireland get round the table, discuss these matters among themselves and come to an agreement. That has so far proved to be very difficult to achieve.

Mr. Yeo: Does my right hon. Friend accept that the moderate, middle-of-the-road views tend less often to be represented directly to him and that such views are held by a substantial majority of people in this country and certainly in my constituency? Does he further accept that the New Ireland Forum report is at least a well-meaning attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation in Northern Ireland and that any failure to take it seriously would not only be condemned at home but would bring about justified criticism in the international community?

Mr. Prior: We are taking the report seriously and giving it proper consideration. In so far as it impinges on the sovereignty of Northern Ireland, we could not accept it. As the report recognises, any change must be made with the consent and agreement of the Northern Ireland people. We know that any change of that nature will not be forthcoming. We must, therefore, take that aspect into account in framing an answer to this serious document representing the views of the nationalist parties of Ireland.

Mr. Maclennan: Does the Secretary of State accept that when, earlier this week during a radio broadcast, he said that the time had come for a fresh mind to be brought in, many hon. Members recognised his frankness and candour and shared his judgment? Does he further accept that it is not possible to give any kind of leadership in this new situation in Northern Ireland when he is so undecided about what he has to offer?

Mr. Prior: It is not a question of whether I am decided or undecided. I must make it absolutely clear at all times that the policies pursued in Northern Ireland are those of the whole Government, not just of the Secretary of State. I know that the hon. Gentleman has wanted to get rid of me for some time—he may be right—but, while I am in this position, I shall do everything I can to help the sides in Northern Ireland to see a way forward for themselves.

Mr. Stanbrook: As all the proposals in the New Ireland Forum report are based on a single objective—a united Ireland—which is anathema to the majority of the people in Northern Ireland, is the Forum not already a dead duck?

Mr. Prior: The word "duck" seems to have been used a lot this afternoon. I do not believe that the Forum is a dead duck. Parts of the Forum report go further, than any nationalists have gone before, in showing a much greater understanding of the Unionists, position in Northern Ireland. I believe that this is reciprocated to a certain extent by the Unionists' document, which shows a much greater understanding of the nationalist position than has been shown before. That should give us some ground for believing that we can make some progress.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: How could anyone who is not a fool imagine that the prolonged and public flirtation of the Government with the irredentist operation in Dublin, known as the New Ireland Forum, could have any effect but to encourage the IRA in its terrorist and murderous activities?

Mr. Prior: When will the right hon. Gentleman realise that the IRA needs no encouragement? The IRA will take

what action it can when it can. The right hon. Gentleman is under a total misapprehension if he believes that, simply by saying that Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom for all time, the IRA will go away. It will not.

Mr. Peter Robinson: Does the Secretary of State agree that the solution to Northern Ireland's problems will come not from the Forum in Dublin, nor from London, but only from Northern Ireland people sitting down and discussing the problems? Does the right hon. Gentleman not feel that the best opportunity for doing that lies within the Assembly and its Report Committee? Will he join me today in appealing to the SDLP to join the other parties which are now prepared to sit down and discuss the problem? What support can the right hon. Gentleman offer to the Report Committee?

Mr. Prior: The hon. Gentleman has made an important and sensible comment. The best people to make an approach to the SDLP are those in the Unionist parties of Northern Ireland. If they will show a willingness to understand the SDLP and its particular difficulties, we could make some progress. I am willing to do all that I can to help.

Mr. Beggs: Will the Secretary of State undertake, when he next meets Dr. FitzGerald in London, to encourage him to ask the Government of the Irish Republic to remove their claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland from the Irish constitution and so assist the discussions presently taking place within Northern Ireland?

Mr. Prior: I often mention that subject to anyone from the Republic of Ireland whom I meet, and it would do much good if it were carried out.

Dr. Mawhinney: When my right hon. Friend met the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) in his capacity as leader of the SDLP, and bearing in mind that Northern Ireland will remain a part of the United Kingdom, did he encourage the hon. Gentleman to spend more time in this House presenting the case of those he represents as the best way forward to help to increase the understanding of the legitimate concerns of the minority community in Northern Ireland?

Mr. Prior: It might be more appropriate if my hon. Friends, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Dr. Mawhinney), did that, rather than me. I think that I have offered enough advice on this subject.

Mr. John Fraser: Will the Secretary of State recognise that while the unity of Ireland may be anathema to some people in Northern Ireland, it is certainly not anathema to the rest of the United Kingdom? Once the long-term aim of unity of Ireland is recognised, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is sufficient in the New Ireland Forum to provide for the preservation of the separate identity and cultural and religious traditions of Northern Ireland within that united Ireland?

Mr. Prior: The hon. Gentleman must also realise that his own party's policy is that there can be no change in the constitution of Northern Ireland without the consent of the people. He knows as well as I that that consent is simply not forthcoming. Therefore, we must work for structures within Northern Ireland which give to the minority community a fair share both in the arrangements that are made for the government of Northern Ireland and in the recognition of their Irish identity.

Mr. Silvester: Is it not encouraging that the Official Unionist party has returned to the Assembly, despite the advice that it may Well have received in the tones that we have heard today, that it was foolish to do so? Is it possible to ask the Assembly whether it would be willing to take part in a discussion on the reaction to the Forum?

Mr. Prior: I very much welcome the return of the Unionist party to the Assembly even if, as I am sometimes told, it was brought about by my indiscretions. If that is the case, perhaps I had better create a few more. Let us hope that the Report Committee will go out of its way to try to recognise the legitimate rights of the minority, as the Unionist document has begun to do.

Mr. Archer: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that his remarks on Norfolk radio will have given comfort to many people who simply want to preserve the status quo? Are they not a broad indication that any attempt on his part to initiate discussions on the report will he lacking in authority and Cabinet support? Are not any talks beginning now likely to be concluded under a Secretary of State who will be much less sympathetic to progress? If that is not the proper construction to be placed on the right hon. Gentleman's remarks, will he seize this opportunity to say what inference should be drawn?

Mr. Prior: That certainly not the proper construction to be placed on my remarks. I reaffirm that the policy that the Secretary of State is asked to pursue is that of the Government. During my period of office I shall do all that I can to promote that policy. I see no earthly reason why that policy should not be one of continuity.

Mr. Winnick: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on the Government's response to the report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. Marlow: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on Her Majesty's Government policy toward the report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. Nicholas Baker: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement about the conclusions of the report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. David Atkinson: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on the Government's policy towards the recent report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. McCusker: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he has anything to add to his initial response to the report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. Bellingham: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on Her Majesty's Government's policy on the report of the New Ireland Forum.

Mr. Prior: I have nothing to add to the statement I issued on 2 May, copies of which are available in the Library.

Mr. Winnick: Will not all the paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland be delighted if the British Government reject the Forum's report? Is there not a danger that the right hon. Gentleman's successor could well take a simplistic view and adopt the negative and dismissive attitude of the Ulster Unionists towards the Forum's report?

Mr. Prior: I reject the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question. The people who will object most strongly to any closer relationship with the Republic, particularly over security, are the IRA. That must always be borne in mind in everything that we say or do.

Mr. Marlow: What are my right hon. Friend's views on the remarks of the distinguished commentator, Conor Cruise O'Brien, who said that any move towards an Irish aspect would be seen as a sign that the British will to remain in Northern Ireland was cracking under sustained IRA pressure and "Keep it up, boys"?

Mr. Prior: I quite understand the views which Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien put forward. That is one of the great difficulties in making any sensible arrangement wth the Republic of Ireland, whether over security or any other matter. I say again that I believe that it is the people of Northern Ireland who must always make up their own minds about this matter and that they will do so regardless, perhaps, of the legislation 'we pass in this House.

Mr. Nicholas Baker: Will my right hon. Friend remind unionists of all parties that there are some matters, particularly security, that should be dealt with on an all-Ireland basis? Will he also avoid any political initiatives that endanger the main objective, namely, that people and parties, dare I say, in Northern Ireland should learn to live together?

Mr. Prior: My hon. Friend's question illustrates only too well the tightrope that has to be walked the whole time in trying to deal wth matters in Northern Ireland, but I agree with his points.

Mr. David Atkinson: Is my right hon. Friend prepared to accept the allegations contained in the report of continued discrimination against Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland?

Mr. Prior: I do not think there is any discrimination against Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland. The record of successive British Governments has been completely honourable in Northern Ireland, and one of which we can be justly proud. What we have done there for all sections of the community has been of immense benefit and has brought about immense change in Northern Ireland over the last few years.

Mr. McCusker: Why should the Secretary of State or I take the report of the New Ireland forum seriously when none of its authors now agrees about the contents, when the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic and the Leader of the Opposition there disagree publicly about it, when the Leader of the Opposition in the Irish Republic has sacked one of his front benchers because he disagrees with him, and when the leader of the SDLP publicly disagrees with the deputy leader of the SDLP? As none of the participants seems to know precisely what the Forum was about, why should I or this House take its report seriously?

Mr. Prior: There is always a problem both in the north of Ireland and in the south in getting anyone to agree about anything.

Mr. Bellingham: Does my right hon. Friend agree that generally the response in the United Kingdom to the Forum report has been positive and constructive because many people see it as a blueprint for a closer dialogue with the South? Does he also agree that last week's tragic killings have overshadowed the report? Does he not think


it is sad that those killings were carried out by faceless gunmen who have never believed in dialogue and democracy?

Mr. Prior: Yes, Sir. Of course, the purpose of all these dreadful murders is to prevent the making of any satisfactory arrangement that would bring peace to the people of Northern Ireland.

Mr. Freeson: Will the Secretary of State accept that while it is right to be cautious—indeed, he has to be cautious in his response to the New Ireland Forum report —the report provides, if not a blueprint, at least an agenda for a process that is long overdue of genuine political dialogue about the future of Northern Ireland in relation to the Republic as well as to this country? Secondly, does he agree that the people of this country as a whole need to be represented in these matters and that it would be useful to establish a parliamentary forum as well as intergovernmental discussions and to use the Forum report as its agenda?

Mr. Prior: I think that the Forum report is an agenda that must be taken seriously. Whether it will lead to a parliamentary tier or grouping of any sort is a matter for Parliament. However, we must take it, examine it carefully and come forward with suggestions to meet it.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the politicians and parties who have blocked all constitutional initiatives are in danger of losing the sympathy and respect of the House? Is my right hon. Friend aware that he has the respect, support and confidence of this party in undertaking those initiatives?

Mr. Prior: There is an overwhelming desire in this Parliament, which I think is also portrayed in Northern Ireland by the people, that we should make every effort to arrive at a political solution which, while preserving the right of the people of Northern Ireland to decide for themselves to whom they wish to belong, gives proper recognition to the various needs of the two communities.

Mr. Maclennan: When, on Wednesday, the Secretary of State—apparently recognising his responsibilities—said that he owed it to the people of Northern Ireland to speak out plainly, what did he have it in mind to say? Did he not rather resemble the crumbling and self-absorbed King Lear when he spoke of doing such things that would be the "terrors of the earth" without knowing what they were?

Mr. Prior: I have never been a great expert on King Lear. However, I tell the people of Northern Ireland, as I tell the House, that everyone in Northern Ireland wants peace, but they all want it on their own terms. If we are to get peace, everyone must give up a little of his cherished views, because the end result is greater than the differences.

Ms. Clare Short: Does the Secretary of State agree that the real lesson to be learnt from his frustration during his time in office in Northern Ireland and the failure to get agreement on the New Ireland Forum report is that there is no way out of the present circumstances if we accept that the consent of the small majority in Northern Ireland is a veto to all progress? Is not the lesson that we must look to the opinion of the people of the whole of Ireland and the whole of the United Kingdom to reunify Ireland, with its consent, just as Ireland was partitioned without the consent of the majority of the Irish people?

Mr. Prior: If the hon. Lady's policy were ever accepted, she would start a process of terrorist activity and civil war which she would certainly live to regret.

Mr. Soley: Does the Secretary of State intend to pursue his well-leaked suggestion for an all-Ireland approach to agriculture, the economy and some aspects of security?

Mr. Prior: That is pure speculation and has no regard to my view.

Dairy Industry

Mr. Nicholson: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will consider introducing a scheme in Northern Ireland to purchase, and then redistribute, milk quotas from those who wish to retire from the industry.

The Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office (Mr. Adam Butler): Yes. A number of suggestions have been made by and on behalf of the industry, and we are considering them urgently.

Mr. Nicholson: I welcome the Minister's answer. Does he agree that the present quota system is biting deep for dairy farmers in Northern Ireland? Does he agree also that something must be done urgently to alleviate that, as those farmers must cut production, not by 9 per cent., but by 14 to 15 per cent.? Will something be done to relieve the problem quickly?

Mr. Butler: It is exactly because of the special problems of Northern Ireland that we are considering the type of measures to relieve some of the difficulties to which I have referred. I can go no further than that at this stage.

Local Government (Devolution)

Mr. Hal Miller: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he is now prepared to consider devolving responsibility for local government in Northern Ireland to the Province; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Prior: The Government remain ready to look at any proposals for devolving powers which have the support of both parts of the community.

Mr. Miller: Does my right hon. Friend agree that it would be difficult to introduce such proposals until parties in Northern Ireland, including the SDLP, the absence of which is noted, came to some agreement among themselves about what should be done, instead of using us and the Government as an excuse?

Mr. Prior: I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. I long for the day that he described. I believe that the Official Unionists re-entry into the Assembly is a move and a sign in the right direction.

Northern Ireland Consumers Body

Mr. Clifford Forsythe: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if any discussions have taken place regarding the position of chairman of the proposed new Northern Ireland Consumers Body.

Mr. Butler: No, Sir.

Mr. Forsythe: Will the Minister assure me that no improper influence will be brought to bear in filling this position, in view of the suggestion that a certain member of a political party is being considered for it?

Mr. Butler: The choice of chairman will be made in the normal way—that is, after full consultation. I am certain that no special influence will be allowed to be brought to hear.

Inward Investment

Dr. Mawhinney: asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland what studies have been made by his Department of the effect of terrorism on inward investment in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Butler: There is no doubt that the image of Northern Ireland as a place beset by terrorism, however exaggerated or erroneous, is the biggest obstacle to investment from overseas. The most comprehensive and recent study on Northern Ireland's image was conducted for the Industrial Development Board in 1982 by MORI among British, United States and German business men and journalists. It showed that anxiety about political stability, with connotations of terrorism, was a major negative influence among potential investors. The findings from that survey were used in the development of the board's promotional strategy.

Dr. Mawhinney: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply, which I shall read in the Official Report tomorrow. Will he redouble his efforts to impress upon the people of Northern Ireland and the political parties that terrorism kills jobs as surely as it kills people, and that they cannot continue to seek ever-increasing economic support unless they are willing to make a political contribution to the defeat of terrorism, so that inward investment can flourish?

Mr. Butler: I agree with my hon. Friend, and further give my view, which is that the Provisional IRA and other groups who commit acts of terrorism are the enemies of the unemployed.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Ql. Mr. Terry Davis: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 24 May.

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House I shall be having further meetings later today.

Mr. Davis: In view of the breakdown in talks yesterday between the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mineworkers, will the Prime Minister shoulder her responsibility to reach a settlement in the national interest?

The Prime Minister: Towards the end of the meeting yesterday the NCB offered talks at senior level between the two s ides to discuss "Plan for Coal". I understand that the offer was followed up by a letter today which confirmed the statement made by Mr. Cowan at the meeting that talks with no conditions or prior commitments by either side could now take place about the principles of "Plan for Coal" in relation to the future of the industry. I understand that words were used to the effect that such talks might offer the prospect of finding a solution to the present problems, and that Mr. Cowan's

offer to talk at any time without preconditions about these problems was confirmed. I understand from the news at lunchtime today that that offer was taken up. That is good news.

Mr. Skinner: It is a victory.

The Prime Minister: I also understand that from the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner), who is muttering below the Gangway. He confirms it, but whether that means it must be right, I do not know.

Mr. Skinner: It means that we have won.

Mr. Renton: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the events of the last 24 hours in the House show Labour's leadership to be at best non-existent, at worst an utter shambles and that the phrase "in-out" applies not only to Labour's Common Market policy but to whoever happens to be jumping in and out of their place at the Dispatch Box.

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. With regard to what happened yesterday, the Opposition made a muck of it.

Mr. Kinnock: I welcome the change in the Prime Minister's attitude towards conciliation in the coalmining dispute. I hope that she will do all she can, since she has extensive powers in these matters, to promote constructive discussions about the dispute.
In a spirit of conciliation and humanity, may I ask the Prime Minister to instruct the Department of Health and Social Security not in any way to inhibit the supply of support to miners' wives and families, or to withdraw support that is necessary for those who are in great domestic difficulty?

The Prime Minister: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the rules for supplementary benefit are set out in legislation, and there is a right of appeal to independent statutory authorities on any decision. The legislation is not waived, but is carried out exactly as it has always been.

Mr. Kinnock: That was a stiff answer of extraordinary insensitivity to families in real difficulties. Does the Prime Minister understand that discretion can be exercised to support expectant mothers, to ensure that people receive their Girocheques on time, and to ensure that those who receive food parcels do not lose their entitlement to supplementary benefit? I ask her again: will she ensure that the discretion that exists under the law is exercised in favour of people who are destitute?

Mr. Shore: The discretion is in the law.

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman does not have the fundamental facts. The law on supplementary benefit is set out in orders passed by the House. Politicians cannot determine how much an individual receives, and it would be completely wrong if they could. Appeals can be made to independent statutory authorities, which then determine the case if anyone expresses dissatisfaction with the amount he has received. If the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting that a politician can bend the law at will, chat is the end of the law.

Mr. Heffer: It is the right hon. Lady's law.

Mr. Kinnock: The right hon. Lady sounds like a bureaucratic tape recorder. She knows very well that, within the law and with no politician bending it, it is possible for local officers to help people in need, including


pregnant women, the elderly and the poor. Will she act like a human being and say that she wants that discretion to be exercised so that people in need can be helped?

The Prime Minister: Shouting from the Dispatch Box will not alter the law. The law is not my law, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) said from the Front Bench, but the law passed by the House as it applies to supplementay benefit. Provision is made for an appeal in any case. What the right hon. Gentleman shows is that he neither understands the law nor wishes it to be applied.

Mr. Michael Howard: In the light of fresh reports today of mass picketing in the coalfields, does my right hon. Friend recall that in March 1974 the right hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot), as Secretary of State for Employment, commended to the House the rules on picketing laid down by the National Union of Mineworkers in the 1974 dispute, which limited the number of pickets at any local dispute to six? Would it not help to reduce the conflict between police and pickets in the present dispute if in 1984 the union laid down rules similar to those that it laid down in 1974?

The Prime Minister: My hon. and learned Friend is correct. The number of pickets, by agreement and by code of practice, was limited to six. I agree that it would help if that code of practice were applied.

Mr. Steel: As the Prime Minister—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I called the Leader of the Liberal party.

Mr. Steel: As the Prime Minister sets such store by the law, will she explain the extraordinary view taken by he Government before the European Commission of Human Rights that any British Government may nationalise the property of British citizens without compensation?

The Prime Minister: The case is before the Court of Human Rights and if the judgment is against what we have done, the right hon. Gentleman knows that we shall adhere to that decision. It is nice to see the right hon. Gentleman back in his place. I understand that he voted once yesterday.

Mr. John Townend: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 24 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Townend: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a growing feeling in some quarters that the progressive reduction of inflation to zero is no longer the Government's number one priority? Will she confirm that this is not correct, and will she spell out the advantages to the economy, industry and the creation of jobs of sound financial strategy?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend and I commend to him the speech of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the CBI yesterday, in which he said that we remain firmly committed to the objective of stable prices. The policy of honest money is the only one for a sound Government to follow.

Mr. Eadie: As the National Coal Board has obviously had a re-think as a consequence of its walking out of the meeting with the NUM yesterday—and those talks are about to be resumed—will the Prime Minister give the

House the assurance that she and her Government will do everything in their power to make sure that the talks come to a satisfactory conclusion, as conciliation and consultation should be in the political knapsack of any Government and they have been sadly lacking in this Government as of late?

The Prime Minister: I realise that the hon. Gentleman was probably at the meeting yesterday—

Mr. Eadie: I was there.

The Prime Minister: —although, when I last answered questions at the Dispatch Box, he shouted from his seat that the meeting had been cancelled because I had put a veto on it. Neither allegation was correct. The meeting took place. As the hon. Gentleman knows, at that meeting the NCB offered talks at senior level between the two sides to discuss "Plan for Coal". He also knows that at that meeting officials of the NCB made four presentations, one on progress on "Plan for Coal", one on the market prospects for coal, one on the deterioration of coal pits and faces if the dispute drags on, and one on the financial prospects. On all these, the NCB asked if there were any comments from the NUM, but there were none.
It was after that that the NCB offered talks at senior level between the two sides to discuss "Plan for Coal". That was a wise offer and it is the kind of offer that should be made between management and the work force. I most earnestly hope that the talks will succeed, because the Government have done their part in providing for investment in the future of the coal industry.

Mr. Hal Miller: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 24 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Miller: Will my right hon. Friend give a warm welcome to the announcement of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services yesterday removing an injustice to people who leave company pension schemes when changing jobs, thus promoting mobility and giving us encouragement that there will be more news to come on the pensions front?

The Prime Minister: Yes, we are very much aware that a number of peopel who left their jobs to go to others felt that they had a considerable grievance about their pension provision. The consultative document is meant to cure that and to consult about how best to do it. I believe that it will be generally welcomed and that it will improve mobility, particularly on the part of those at management level whose services are needed if we are to get enterprise up to the level that we need for success and expansion.

Mr. Geoffrey Robinson: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 24 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Robinson: Is the Prime Minister aware that the long agenda that was discussed yesterday is wholly irrelevant to the real issues that have to be discussed? Is it not surprising to her that the NCB chairman has already volunteered out of any further negotiations? Does that not prove to her what a bad appointment that was? Will she


take the initiative that lies with her and put forward a realistic agenda for proper discussions in order to obtain a settlement to this terrible dispute?

The Prime Minister: No, Mr. Speaker. If the hon. Gentleman reflects on that agenda he will find that each and every item is highly relevant. He is failing to observe that the letter has gone out and been accepted as a result of consultation between management and work force, who, as he knows full well, will have to co-operate for the future. I wish the talks every success.

Mr. Dennis Skinner: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman jumps up nearly every day on a point of order. We have a heavy day ahead of us. Does his point of order concern Question Time?

Mr. Skinner: No. It is concerned with the debate on cruise missiles later.

Mr. Henry Bellingham: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask for your guidance? Do you not agree that it is damaging to the morale and reputation of the House when one or two Labour Members turn up looking like football hooligans?

Mr. Speaker: There are no dress regulations for the House, but we should dress appropriately.

Abbeystead Pumping Station (Accident)

Dr. John Cunningham: (by private notice) asked the Minister of State, Department of Employment if he will make a statement about the explosion yesterday at the Abbeystead water treatment plant in Lancashire.

The Minister of State, Department of Employment (Mr. John Selwyn Gummer): As the Minister with immediate responsibility for the Health and Safety Executive, I have been asked to reply.
The House will be aware that at about 7.30 yesterday evening there was an explosion at a North West water authority installation at Abbeystead in Lancashire whilst a party of local people were being shown round.
I have to inform the House with great regret that the number of people who have died is now nine, including three employees of the authority, and the total number of injured, several seriously, is 34. Most of the dead and injured come from the small village of St. Michael's. They had been invited to see how the plant controls transfers of water from the river Lune to the river Wyre. That is necesary when water supplies to Blackpool need to be augmented.
The Lancashire emergency services were quickly on the scene and I would like to pay tribute to them and all those who toiled continuously to recover the injured and the dead. The work of medical staff on site and in the local hospitals deserves special commendation. The authority chairman and the two local managers who went to the scene remained there and assisted emergency services throughout the night.
I am sure that the House will want to join me in expressing its deep sympathy with the bereaved and the relatives of those who are injured. It is particularly tragic that the visit should have ended in such a terrible disaster for a local rural community. Our thoughts and prayers today in this House are with this small parish to which this has come as a terrible blow.
I have to tell the House that the cause of the accident is at present unknown. That means that any theories about the cause are at this stage speculation.
What is of the utmost importance now is that there should be a full inquiry into the causes of this accident so that we can know what happened and take action. Action is needed to ensure that there will be no repetition. I understand that inspectors from the factory inspectorate, including specialists in fire and explosion matters, were at the scene of the accident within hours, and that their investigation is already under way.
Hon. Members may already know that the Health and Safety Commission has this morning announced that it is asking the Health and Safety Executive to conduct an urgent, special inquiry under section 14(2)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 into the causes of the accident. The report of the executive to the commission will, of course, be published. I am sure the House will welcome this. Mr. Rimington, the director-general of the Health and Safety Executive, has himself gone to the scene of the accident, and will be overseeing the progress of the investigation by the area director and the staff of the Health and Safety Executive. The important objective now is to ensure that those with the required technical expertise can

discover the cause of the accident and make the facts public as rapidly as possible. A special investigation by the executive, drawing on the expertise of the factory inspectorate and the mines and quarries inspectorate, can be expected to achieve this.
My right hon. Friend the Minister for Housing and Construction, who is responsible for the water industry, has flown to Abbeystead today. I have spoken to him this afternoon. He has visited the outfall, and the Royal Lancaster hospital, and is now on his way to the village of St. Michael's. I shall be visiting the site and the village myself as soon as possible. I am keeping my hon. Friends the Members for Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman) and for Wyre (Sir W. Clegg) fully informed.
I am sure the House will join me in expressing our deep concern for the village community of St. Michael's struck by this terrible blow, and in affirming our determination to ensure that the cause of this disaster will be speedily uncovered.

Dr. Cunningham: I thank the Minister for his very full statement, and associate my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and my right hon. Friends and myself with the expressions of condolence to those families who have been bereaved, and to those councillors, workers and others who have been injured in this appalling tragedy.
May I ask the Minister to be a little more specific about the kind of inquiry that he is suggesting? May I put it to him that there should be a full public inquiry about this explosion? Is it the case that under section 14 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act powers exist for an investigation to be held in the form of a full public inquiry with the approval of the Secretary of State, and is that not the proper way to proceed in this matter, as was the case with the Flixborough disaster in 1974? Will the Minister please be specific in his response?
Will the Minister also confirm that the structure—the mechanisms, the chamber in question—was completed only as recently as 1980 as part of a £60 million scheme, and that it is typical of several other schemes in the United Kingdom? Will he therefore arrange, as a matter of urgency, for those other similar systems to be inspected immediately?
May I, like the Minister, associate my right hon. Friends and myself with the tributes to those in the rescue and emergency services who acted so promptly to bring help and relief to the injured, and to the workers, nurses, doctors and others in the hospitals who have been involved? This has been an appalling tragedy to a small rural community, and to an industry with an excellent record of safety and productivity among the work force.

Mr. Gummer: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is right in saying that this is a particularly serious tragedy to so small a community, and in an industry where tragedies of this kind are almost unknown.
On the question of a public inquiry, we need to get the information as quickly as possible. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State would be happy — if, in the circumstances, that is the right word—to order a public inquiry if that appears necessary after the immediate investigation has taken place. Under section 14(2)(a) an investigation can be held and under section 14(2)(b) a public inquiry can be held. Of its nature, a public inquiry would take longer, so the results would be less readily available.
The commission is the independent body that gives advice on such matters, and it has ordered an inquiry under the first of those two sections. That seems sensible. Once we have the results from that, it may still be open for us to have a full public inquiry. My right hon. Friend will take very careful note of any representations put to him. I think that the hon. Gentleman will agree that our main purpose now must be to find out what happened as quickly as possible, consonant with accuracy.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the typicality of the system. The installation was unique; there is no exact equivalent. However, I have already insisted that the half dozen or so installations that might be thought parallel—I put it like that, because they are not parallel, but might be thought to be so—should immediately cease to allow any visitors to them. Most of them are, of course, unmanned stations. The one in question was, indeed, an unmanned station.
One of the terrible things about the disaster was that, contrary to the comment that we so often read that people would not have been hurt if they had been there only two minutes later, in this instance an explosion would not, in almost any other circumstance, have led to loss of life. It is very rare for there to be people there, other than those few who visit from time to time, to check operations. Thus, it is particularly serious and sad that the explosion should have happened at that moment. I am told that there are fewer than half a dozen similar installations, and until we know the reason for the disaster they will not admit any visitors.

Mr. Robert Atkins: On behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman), who was unavoidably detained in Europe and who is now, of course, with her constituents—and I express her apologies to the House for her absence from the Chamber—and as a fellow Lancashire Member of Parliament who lives very close to the village of St. Michael's on Wyre, may I express my sorrow at the tragedy and offer my sympathy to the relatives of the deceased and to the injured? On behalf of my hon. Friend, may I ask whether the Government will immediately make available to the North West water authority any extra funds that are necessary to expedite the work to relieve the anxiety of the village of St. Michael's on Wyre, which has suffered so much as a result of this tragedy?

Mr. Gummer: As my hon. Friend knows, my hon. Friend the Minister for Housing and Construction is at present on the site, probably in the village of St. Michael's. I can assure my hon. Friend that my hon. Friend will be discussing such matters now. Obviously the North West water authority has made no such request so far, but if it did, the request would be considered most carefully.

Mr. Jack Straw: May I associate myself with the remarks of the hon. Member for South Ribble (Mr. Atkins), and also express my personal sorrow at the appalling tragedy? Although there is a deep sense of shock throughout the country, I know that it is all the deeper among all communities in Lancashire. Those who live in both urban and rural parts know that area well and share a sense of loss with the villagers of St. Michael's on Wyre over those who lost their lives.
Although I understand the Minister's point about the need for an immediate investigation, will he and his

colleagues bear in mind that the scale of the tragedy and the uncertainty of its cause in an installation whose safety was not in doubt until yesterday argue very strongly for a public inquiry? Even though a public inquiry might take longer, it is essential that public confidence in such installations should be restored, and that is possible only through the fullest inquiry, held under the public gaze.

Mr. Gummer: There is nothing that would stop us from having a public inquiry except trying to solve the immediate problem of why the tragedy happened. We do not know why it happened. It was not anything that anybody could possibly expect in such circumstances. Had we asked yesterday the wisest men in the field they would have said that the incident was impossible. We have to investigate carefully and quickly.
It has not always been the custom to hold public inquiries into very serious matters, but if the public needed such an inquiry to set minds at rest I am sure that my right hon. Friend would take the necessary action. As the Minister responsible, my desire is to ensure that no other installation is set at risk because we do not have the information quickly enough.

Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd: I associate myself personally and on behalf of my constituents with everything that has been said about the incident. Is my hon. Friend aware that the horror that we all feel about the tragedy is compounded by the incredulity that such an incident could have happened at a plant which posed no danger? Are such plants visited regularly, or at all, by the Health and Safety Executive? Should not that aspect be considered in the forthcoming inquiry?

Mr. Gummer: My hon. Friend is right to say that the incredulity adds to the horror. The plant was visited in 1981 by the Health and Safety Executive. All hon. Members would regard it as a low-risk plant. No one would expect anything of this kind to happen and no one suggested it. It is important to discover urgently what happened. When we have done that, we can take the necessary action—and we shall do so.

Mr. Simon Hughes: May I associate my hon. Friends in the Liberal and Social Democratic parties with the condolences expressed by the Minister to the people of St. Michael's on Wyre which I visited only last year? My hon. Friends from the north-west wish to be associated with the Minister's remarks.
I am grateful to the Minister for the information. Obviously speed is most important, but, if the result of the initial inquiry is inconclusive, will there be a public inquiry? Does the Minister agree that the arguments for water authority debates on health and safety matters to be open to the public are now considerably enhanced?

Mr. Gummer: I do not think that the House would wish me to go into that last point now, but it will want me to assure the hon. Gentleman that the report of the inquiry will be published and that that inquiry will be open to the public. I want no one to think that it will be an internal inquiry. The North West water authority will want to make its own internal investigations, so that does not run counter to the hon. Gentleman's desire. If the inquiry was unsatisfactory in any way, my right hon. Friend would take the matter seriously. In such circumstances, I should


expect a further inquiry to take place. I want to know what happened. At the moment no one can tell us what happened. The quicker they can, the better.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I have to bear in mind the subsequent business before the House—an emergency debate which lasts for three hours and then an Opposition day for which there is no injury time. It must end at 10 o'clock. I therefore propose to limit business questions to a maximum of 15 minutes before I consider one Standing Order No. 10 application.

Business of the House

Mr. Neil Kinnock: Will the Leader of the House state the business for the first week after the recess?

The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): Yes, Sir. The business for the first week after the Adjournment will be as follows:
MONDAY 4 JUNE — Remaining stages of the Co-operative Development Agency and Industrial Development Bill.
TUESDAY 5 JUNE — Remaining stages of the Data Protection Bill [Lords] and of the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Bill [Lords].
WEDNESDAY 6 JUNE — Remaining stages of the Agricultural Holdings Bill [Lords].
Motion relating to the Control of Harbour Development (Revocation) Order.
THURSDAY 7 JUNE—Opposition Day (15th Allotted Day). There will be a debate on an Opposition motion on the mining dispute and the Government's failure to stand by the "Plan for Coal".
FRIDAY 8 JUNE—Remaining stages of the County Courts Bill [Lords]; Second Reading of the Mental Health (Scotland) Bill [Lords] and of the Food Bill [Lords]; Proceedings on the Public Health (Control of Disease) Bill [Lords], The Registered Homes Bill [Lords] and on the Dentists Bill [Lords], which are all consolidation measures.
Motion on European Community Documents 6386/83 and 11642/83 on combating air pollution from industrial plants.

[Debate on 8 June (Air Pollution)

Relevant documents

(a) 6386/83 —Draft Directives on air pollution
(b) 11642/83—from industrial plants.

Relevant reports of European Legislation Committee

(a) HC 78-viii (1983–84) paragraph 5
(b) HC 78 -xxvii (1983–84) paragraph 4.]

Mr. Kinnock: Because of the pressing business of the Bathgate debate, I shall ask only two questions.
I have twice asked the Government when time will be made available for a debate on the New Ireland Forum. Because of the doubts about the future of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, will the right hon. Gentleman redouble his efforts to provide time for a debate on the initiative, which will demonstrate the seriousness which I hope the Government attach to the forum?
I give an early warning that the Opposition will want a debate in Government time on the outcome of the economic summit in London. That debate should take place in the week beginning 11 June.

Mr. Biffen: The right hon. Gentleman wants a debate on the economic summit, and doubtless that topic can be pursued through the usual channels.
I noted his remarks about the New Ireland Forum. I do not think that there is anything further to add to what I said last week, although the House will no doubt wish to discuss the matter in due course. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is a great deal more durable than many other politicians.

Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop: Can my right hon. Friend tell us, with as much precision as possible,


when we can expect a Government statement on compensation for those who have suffered appalling damage from the imposition of milk quotas?

Mr. Biffen: I shall draw the attention of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to my hon. Friend's request for a statement. As I said last week, statutory instruments will have to be laid eventually under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, which will allow the topic to be further ventilated.

Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse: Does the Leader of the House feel that it is now time for a debate to ascertain whether the activities of the police in the miners' dispute are worthy of a public inquiry? Today six of my constituents set off for Mansfield because they were summoned to attend the Mansfield magistrates court to answer charges for alleged offences committed in April. On their way they were stopped on the motorway and turned back. The policeman refused to listen to their arguments and said, "The only way that you are going is back to where you have come from." My constituents could find themselves in contempt of court. Is it not time that this whole mess was cleared up by an inquiry?

Mr. Biffen: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I cannot comment on the matter to which he referred. There is a statutory procedure for investigating complaints against the police under the Police Acts of 1964 and 1976. However, I shall refer the hon. Gentleman's anxieties to my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary.

Mr. Toby Jessel: When will my right hon. Friend find time to debate early-day motion 769, signed by 38 right hon. and hon. Members?
[That this House calls on the Greater London Council to withdraw the experimental traffic scheme at the junction of North End Road and the Talgarth Road, which is causing extensive delays; notes that the scheme was implemented contrary to the advice of the Greater London Council's own officers and believes that this is evidence of the need to place the major trunk roads of London under the authority of the Department of Transport as envisaged by the legislation to abolish the Greater London Council which has clearly ceased to 'work for London'.]
The motion is concerned with the widespread disruption and delay caused every day to thousands upon thousands of people coming into west London because of the idiotic GLC experiment that has banned turns from the Cromwell road into the North End road. That decision was taken by GLC councillors in defiance of clear advice from the Metropolitan police and council officials.

Mr. Biffen: The most helpful thing that I can do is to draw the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Transport to the point made by my hon. Friend.

Mr. Leo Abse: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, despite representations four years ago, repeated during Prime Minister's questions and in an Adjournment debate, the committee dealing with in vitro pregnancies has been so delayed that it has been overtaken by events? What can the right hon. Gentleman do to encourage the publication of either an interim or a final report from the Warnock committee?
As there are a great many infertile people continually being brutally exploited commercially, is it not important

that we debate the matter before the summer so that the Government can prepare appropriate legislation for the next Session?

Mr. Biffen: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's deep and long-standing sense of commitment to this matter. I shall refer the points that he makes to the Secretary of State for Social Services.

Mr. Michael Latham: In view of its valuable and helpful contribution to the progress of Government business, will my right hon. Friend consider allocating some more late night debating time to the Liberal party?

Mr. Biffen: As their success was gained in the absence of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), that would have to be a condition of any such arrangement.

Mr. A. J. Beith: What is the rationale of having a debate on air pollution from industrial plants when a Select Committee of the House is in Sweden investigating that very problem?
On wider matters, may I ask the Leader of the House to share in the general appreciation that the reluctance of the Leader of the Opposition to have a debate on the coal dispute has at last been overcome? Will he provide more Supply days to other Opposition parties, as suggested by the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Mr. Latham), because if he had done so there would have been a debate on the coal dispute long ago?

Mr. Biffen: I am bound by Standing Order No. 6 on the allocation of Opposition days.
Considerable notice has been given of the timing of the debate planned for Friday 8 June. Hon. Members may wish to make their dispositions accordingly. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman agrees that it is an important Community document and that it is appropriate for it to be debated by the House.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: While appreciating my right hon. Friend's sympathy for the issue, will he treat the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) with rather more urgency, and ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to come to the House in the week immediately after the recess to make a statement on the scheme that he will introduce to alleviate hardship for smaller farmers as a result of the dairy package? Will he advise him that cessation payments, if that is the major part of the package, will not be acceptable to the dairy farming industry?

Mr. Biffen: My hon. Friend will at once acknowledge that I have been courteous and forthcoming to my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop). However, when I pass on the message I shall add to it the piquancy contained in the remarks of my hon. Friend.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn: When will time be made available for a debate on the Greater London Council (Money) (No. 2) Bill? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that any delay in passing that measure seriously endangers a large number of capital projects throughout London, including a number in my constituency? [Interruption.] I hear some Conservative Members shouting, "Good." One of those projects is the urgent repairing of a central heating and hot water scheme on an


estate that was left in a disgusting condition by shoddy builders some years ago, and the tenants have suffered great misery as a result of that. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the tenants living in the Andover estate are looking forward to the time when the House passes that Bill?

Mr. Biffen: The House will understand that, owing to Tuesday's extended sitting, it was not possible to debate that Bill. I have no doubt that the Chairman of Ways and Means will be looking for an early opportunity to find another occasion.

Mr. Nicholas Budgen: As the Commission of the EEC now anticipates that the budget will be overspent by £1·4 billion this year, will my right hon. Friend provide time for a debate about that so that we may know whether the proposal is for a loan, an advance or even perhaps a reduction in the expenditure of the EEC?

Mr. Biffen: I shall draw the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the most important point that my hon. Friend raises.

Mr. Jack Ashley: Further to the important point raised by the Leader of the Opposition at Prime Minister's Question Time, is the Leader of the House aware that it is clear, concerning the payment of benefit to striking miners' families, that either the rules have been changed or the interpretation of the rules has been changed? In consequence, these families are receiving reduced benefit, and that is an absolute scandal. May we have a statement or a debate on the subject because what is happening is the lowest of the low both in terms of social security and political activity?

Mr. Biffen: I cannot comment on the premise to the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. I thought that the Prime Minister had stated the position with admirable clarity. I shall refer the right hon. Gentleman's request to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services so that any ambiguity can be cleared up.

Mr. Peter Bottomley: May we have a debate on early-day motion 771, about the events of Tuesday's sitting when we lost a day and found a night?
[That this House notices the appearance of Liberal members after 10 pm on Tuesday 22 May but regrets the absence of the Liberal leader.]
Can we combine a debate on that motion with shorter speeches? Clearly the only person who knew the length of the Liberal speeches was the leader of the Liberal party, who was not here.

Mr. Biffen: A pause for reflection to put the dramas of the past couple of days a week or two behind us is necessary before we can make any sensible judgment about all that.

Mr. Donald Coleman: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, although the Government may have conveniently forgotten the uprating of the death grant, the National Association of Old Age Pensioners has not? Will the right hon. Gentleman arrange for a statement to be made by the Secretary of State on that matter when we return after the recess?

Mr. Biffen: I shall certainly convey that request.

Mr. Richard Tracey: In the light of comments about difficulties in ascertaining the views of the Leader of the Opposition, and in view of his absence during the past few days, will my right hon. Friend consider taking soundings as to whether that paid officer of the House should have a question time?

Mr. Biffen: I hear a good deal of the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. David Winnick: When we return, will we have a statement on the visit of the South African Prime Minister to this country and any kind of deal to sell planes that has been negotiated? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, bearing in mind the nature of that regime, which is almost based on the same racial views as Nazi Germany, many people view that visit as a great humiliation for this country. To invite the chief hangman of that regime is a disgrace?

Mr. Biffen: The hon. Gentleman and I had a mild disagreement about this matter during the debate on the recess Adjournment motion. I cannot add much to what was said then. I shall convey to my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary the hon. Gentleman's sense of distaste.

Mr. Richard Hickmet: Does my right hon. Friend accept that Conservative Members are delighted that the Leader of the Opposition has finally decided to debate the issue of the coal strike in some parts of the country, as it will give him an opportunity to answer some of the questions that have been put to him during the past two months which he has refused to answer and especially to make clear his position on the strike's effects on the 70,000 steelworkers?

Mr. Biffen: It sounds as though we shall have a very happy time during the first week back.

Mr. Guy Barnett: Is the Leader of the House aware of the increasing problem of international debt and the danger that this constitutes to the international banking system? Is he also aware of the devastating effects that it is having on the world's poor? Does not he believe that, after six months, we should have another debate on this topic, if possible before the summer recess?

Mr. Biffen: I have no plans for such a debate during the first week back after the recess, although, as the hon. Gentleman has said, that matter excites a number of people and will continue to be the subject of debate in the House.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the serious news today that another three Britons have been arrested in Libya without charge, making a total of five to date? May we have an urgent debate on the safety of all the remaining Britons still resident and working in Libya?

Mr. Biffen: I cannot hold out any hope for a debate on that topic. If any of those people are constituents of my hon. Friend, he may be lucky enough to discuss the matter in an Adjournment debate. I shall draw the attention of my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary to the point.

Teachers' Pay (Dispute)

Mr. Derek Fatchett: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 10, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
the teachers' pay dispute and the refusal of the Government to go to arbitration.
Earlier this week my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) drew attention to the effects of the teachers' pay dispute in Leeds. Those effects continue, and are being broadened to a national basis. At the moment, 240 schools are directly affected by the teachers' dispute, three quarters of which are closed. Forty-two local education authorities are similarly affected by the teachers' dispute.
This dispute can be solved by arbitration. The teachers' unions are prepared to go to arbitration and many of the Labour-controlled local authorities are similarly prepared to go to arbitration, but the Government refuse to accept that possibility. On this issue, as with the miners' dispute and other industrial disputes, the Government have taken a totally intransigent and inflexible position. Arbitration is a solution, but the Government are not prepared to consider it.
I submit that the damage caused by this dispute to our children's education, which is the direct result of the Government's refusal to go to arbitration, is a matter of such importance that it should be subject to immediate debate by the House. Parents throughout the country look to the House and the Government to give a lead. They will be disappointed if we are unable to debate this issue as early as possible.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely,
the teachers' pay dispute and the refusal of the Government to go to arbitration.
I listened with care to the hon. Member, but I regret that I do not consider the matter that he has raised is appropriate for discussion under Standing Order No. 10 and. therefore, I cannot submit his application to the House.

Royal Assent

Mr. Speaker: I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified Her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

1. Anatomy Act 1984.
2. Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984.
3. Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984.
4. Fosdyke Bridge Act 1984.
5. Tenants Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Amendment Act 1984.
6. Trade Marks (Amendment) Act 1984.
7. Agriculture (Amendment) Act 1984.
8. Derwent Valley Railway Act 1984.
9. British Railways Act 1984.
10. The Metals Society Act 1984.
11. Epsom and Walton Downs Regulation Act 1984.

Unparliamentary Expressions

Mr. Speaker: Last Tuesday, I undertook to look at the Hansard report of the exchanges concerning the British Leyland closures debate during which it was alleged that an unparliamentary expression had been used. At column 835 the hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson) is reported as having said that the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry was lying. I did not hear that word used. If I had heard it, I should have required its instant withdrawal. I have had an apology from the hon. Member for Tottenham. As I have said before on several occasions, I strongly deprecate any reflection in the Chamber on the honour of hon. Members.

Mr. Norman Atkinson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I have seen the words printed in the Hansard report of last Tuesday's exchanges, and I withdraw them unreservedly.

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Norman Tebbit): Further to the point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am grateful, as I am sure you are, Mr. Speaker, to the hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson). It is always to be regretted when hon. Members from the same part of London who are colleagues, because of their desire to serve their constituents, fall, as he and I occasionally do, into the trap of expressing ourselves too strongly. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what he has said.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. The Hansard report for the same day records the word "quisling" as having been used by the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson). Is that word unparliamentary?

Mr. Speaker: I repeat that any words that impute dishonour to any right hon. or hon. Member are unparliamentary and should never be used.

Mr. Andrew Faulds: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I understand that in this instance you referred to the recorded tape of the proceedings of the House. This is a fairly significant development, because I understand that previously that has not been held to be acceptable in relation to the proceedings of the House. If this new idea has been used — I am all for it, because occasionally the human beings who conduct the Official Report make lapses in their reporting of the House—I should point out that there is an omission from the exchanges during the afternoon to which reference has been made.
Some of my colleagues will remember that I made a comment quite clearly, and my voice is usually fairly audible, in which I put a rhetorical question. I shall have to check with the tape to see whether this is on it. I asked the Secretary of State which gutter the Prime Minister had picked him from. I regret to find that that is not in the record, and I shall have to see that it is put in.
I think that the time has come when the colleagues of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, both those on the Front Bench and those on the Back Benches, should consider whether they can stomach any further the style, tone and particularly the sound of the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Speaker: I do not wish to take time from the important debate that is to follow, but this gives me a further opportunity to tell the House and the hon.


Gentleman, who I hope will listen to me, that remarks made from a sedentary position which are not subsequently taken up in debate — the remark of the hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson) was—will not normally be recorded in Hansard as they do not form part of the proceedings of Parliament. The proceedings of Parliament are what is said by hon. Members when they are called to speak by the Chair or, occasionally, if a remark is subsequently taken up in the course of debate. I hope that the House will bear that firmly in mind, and I shall watch with great care to ensure that other sedentary remarks are not recorded, because they are not properly proceedings of the House.

Sir Kenneth Lewis: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I hope that the House will recognise that if we were to have a debate on extravagant language we would have another all-night sitting.

Mr. Speaker: I think that we had better move on.

BILL PRESENTED

PARLIAMENTARY PENSIONS ETC.

Mr. John Biffen, supported by Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mr. Secretary Brittan, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary Sir Keith Joseph, Mr. Secretary Walker, Mr. Secretary Heseltine and Mr. Barney Hayhoe, presented a Bill to make further provision with respect to the contributory pension schemes for Members of the House of Commons and for the holders of certain Ministerial and other offices; to increase the amount that may be appropriated under section 4(4) of the House of Commons Members' Fund Act 1948 for the alleviation of special hardship; and to provide for payments to be made, in certain circumstances, to persons who cease to hold Ministerial and other offices or to be Representatives to the Assembly of the European Communities: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 186.]

WELSH GRAND COMMITTEE

Ordered,
That the matter of Housing and urban development in Wales being a matter relating exclusively to Wales be referred to the Welsh Grand Committee for their consideration. — Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

British Leyland (Closures)

Mr. Peter Shore: I beg to move, That this House do now adjourn.

Leave having been given on Tuesday 22 May under Standing Order No. 10 to discuss:
The announcement by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry of the closures of Bathgate and C. H. Roe, Leeds.

Mr. Speaker: I remind the House that the debate will last for three hours only. There is an extremely long list of right hon. and hon. Members who wish to take part—17 in all—and I make a special appeal for very brief speeches so that the majority of those who wish to participate may be called.

Mr. Shore: We asked for this emergency debate on Tuesday after we heard the statement and the increasingly inadequate and irritable replies to questions put to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. I am sorry that he is not speaking today. He ought to be. He carries the principal responsibility for these closure decisions. Indeed, it is his unique personal mix of ignorance of economics and indifference to the human consequences of economic decisions that underlay his statement on Tuesday.
From the start the right hon. Gentleman has been a member of a Government whose policies have directly contributed to the deindustrialisation of Britain. The right hon. Gentleman is fast earning for himself in his present post the reputation of being the principal gravedigger of British industry. He acts the part, and there are many who think that he looks it.
I am sorry that this debate has been delayed for 24 hours because of the frivolous, irrelevant and time-consuming interventions of Members of the Liberal party throughout Tuesday night. However, the people for whom I am really sorry are those employees and others concerned with the future of Bathgate and the bus plant outside Leeds who came to London yesterday in the hope of hearing the debate. On behalf of the Labour Opposition I offer them an apology for what happened.
In the past 48 hours we have been able to reflect on what the Secretary of State said, and as we have been able to absorb the documents, including the corporate plan that was put in the Vote Office that afternoon, the more unacceptable and damaging his decisions to close Bathgate and Charles Roe, Leeds, appear to be.
I wish to stress three points. The first is the sheer scale and quality of the manufacturing resource available at Bathgate, which is now to be closed down. They have there the skilled management and men, the sophisticated machine tooling and large-scale and flexible plant investment capable of producing a great range of vehicles and engines, as well as many of the principal components. Of course new models are needed, and I shall say something further about that in a few minutes, but let no one doubt that in Bathgate there is a prime and prize facility from which the revival of British Leyland trucks could be launched.
That is not just my view. From studying the document, it is perfectly clear that it was also the view of British Leyland's management when it signed the co-operative production agreement with the American Cummins engine


firm in 1982. It was a view to which it certainly adhered as recently as August 1983, when it sanctioned the first £10 million of new investment.
Not only was Bathgate to be the major producing centre for a family of new diesel engines — the so-called Family One—but also the principal manufacturing and assembly point for the new seven to 11-ton vehicle, the model 211. But the Government and management got cold feet, and the whole Cummins-related investment was put on ice last December. Looking back, it is now clear that Tuesday's appalling decision to close Bathgate was the inevitable consequence of the failure and faltering of December last year.
The second point that needs emphasis, which shows that we are right to condemn this decision, is that it signals the abandonment, not only of vehicle manufacturing in Scotland, but of the effort to reinstate British Leyland's position as a major manufacturer of commercial vehicles.
When the Labour Government brought into public ownership and rescued the backrupt, private enterprise British Leyland in 1975, they did so because, apart from the hundreds of thousands of jobs that were at stake, they were convinced that a British-owned major vehicle producer of both passenger cars and commercial vehicles, including buses, was in the national interest. We intended to secure the revival of both.
Tuesday's decision signals the abandonment of any serious attempt for the future to restore British Leyland as a major supplier of commercial vehicles of all kinds. the deindustrialisation of Britain can be documented from a score of industries, but nowhere is the story more vivid than in the case of commercial vehicles and British Leyland.
From being the largest producer of commercial vehicles in the world in the 1960s, with an average annual production of 150,000 units a year, British Leyland's output declined steadily until last year, 1983, when production was down to a mere 11,000. It will take a major effort and a long haul to begin to reverse this position, and we know only too well of the difficulties that face exporters, particularly to the markets of the debt-burdened countries of the Third world, but the Government do not intend to make the effort, and that is our major complaint against them.
The third point that must be stressed is that these decisions do not make sense even judged against the financial criteria which the Secretary of State suggested. The savings that are supposed to accrue from the closure of Bathgate are put at only £10 million a year. This has to be seen against a deficit in Leyland Trucks of some £70 million and sales, of course, of well over £450 million per annum. The closure of Bathgate, with a job loss of 1,800 directly employed there and about another 500 whose jobs are linked to continued activity at Bathgate, will cost the Government in social security benefits and tax forgone £10 million to £13 million per annum. In addition, there will be redundancy and terminal payments of some £30 million.
Bathgate already has a male unemployment rate of 21 per cent. It will rise to at least 28 per cent. in the travel-to-work area and 30 to 40 per cent. in some of the smaller adjacent towns. There simply are not alternative jobs for those who will be made redundant at Bathgate.
Of course, there is the possibility that another foreign manufacturer, perhaps a commercial vehicle producer, will be tempted to buy the Bathgate facility. If that

happens, what a remarkable comment it will be upon the Government. It will demonstrate that the facility at Bathgate, contrary to what the Government are alleging, is capable of being viable. In demonstrating that viability, a foreign firm will be competing directly with British Leyland commercial vehicles and other British producers in the British home market.
The heart of the matter is the laissez-faire ideology, and the defeatism that flows from it, that influenced the Government's approach to this and many other industries. Let me illustrate. According to the Secretary of State on Tuesday:
Leyland Trucks … faces an exceptionally depressed market at home and particularly overseas, showing little sign of major improvement in the medium-term and severe over-capacity throughout Europe.
The same problem faces Charles H. Roe in Leeds. As the Secretary of State told us:
Leyland Bus too has suffered from a depressed market at home".
Having, as he thought, described the problem, the Secretary of State immediately moved to what is to him the only and obvious conclusion — the need to cut capacity and to close the plants. He managed to get in the statement:
The Government, like the company, greatly regret these measures".—[Official Report, 22 May 1984; Vol. 60, c. 830.]
The right hon. Gentleman's basic stance is that of a man shrugging his shoulders and saying, "What else can I do?"
All of this was echoed and stressed by Mr. Warton, the managing director of Bathgate, to his employees in a message copies of which have been made available to us. Mr. Warton told his work force that Leyland Trucks
continues to make heavy losses … this cannot go on.
He spoke of his review of Bathgate, which he claimed to have been a long and painful task. Then he delivered the resounding judgment that
there is no solution. Bathgate will have to close.
If the view of the Secretary of State and of Mr. Les Warton, the managing director of Bathgate, had prevailed in 1975, there would be no British Leyland in existence today. The crisis that faced a bankrupt private enterprise company at that time could be resolved only—I defy Ministers to disagree — by a Government who were determined to take a long-term, not a short-term, view and to back their judgment with the large financial resources that were necessary.
By investing in new models on the passenger car side, the Government, management and work force have produced a major turn round in the fortunes of British Leyland cars. I willingly pay tribute to all that has gone into producing the fine new range of Metros, Maestros, Montegos and Jaguars, but, given the neglect of the past, very large sums of money indeed have been needed to produce this change.
The truth is that since the public rescue operation began only a relatively small amount of the new investment that was necessary has gone into the trucks division, the commercial division of British Leyland, and only £25 million, as the Secretary of State told us, into Bathgate itself. A substantial new investment would be needed to turn it round.
There was published only this March an extremely interesting report on the future of the United Kingdom in the European motor industry, by Professor Bhaskar and the University of East Anglia motor industry research unit. His findings, which I shall put, are very pertinent:


Leyland's choice is between attempting to become a major manufacturer or giving up. But to establish itself as a major commercial vehicle producer, the group will require subsidies for another three or four years.
He went on to say:
No doubt with all European truck manufacturers in deep trouble"—
yes, that is true—
it may be tempting to close Leyland Trucks down. Cumulative losses between now and 1987 will be at least £100 to £150 million and the business will require around £100 to £200 million pumped into it if it is to survive as a non loss making competitive business by 1987. Just as BL cars has made a dramatic recovery on the back of market improvement it is probably worthwhile giving Leyland Trucks a breathing space until the UK and world market recover and to allow the company to prove whether it can survive.
I think that that is a fair summary of the situation. We know what the Government's choice has been. They are not prepared to find further resources to engage in the battle for viability for commercial vehicles. They have chosen to give up. Indeed, we know very well that they would never have embarked upon the rescue of British Leyland in the first place had the collapse occurred when they were in power.
What is totally unacceptable is that the Government are not even prepared to allow British Leyland the continued use of the financial resources that it at present has. The deficit of over £60 million a year on Leyland Vehicles, which the world recession and the internal British recession have combined to produce, has to be seen against the profit made by Jaguar last year of no less than £55 million. So long as British Leyland remains as a group, surpluses generated in one part of the business can be used to assist in financing the deficits in other parts, but it is the Government's intention, reaffirmed on Tuesday, while denying Bathgate and Leyland Trucks any additional resources, to sell off this year Jaguar, the jewel in the crown, the most profitable part of the whole enterprise, to private ownership. It is this decision that has inevitably posed a major crisis for British Leyland and decisively tipped the scales against any effort by the company, from its own resources, to continue with the Bathgate operation.
That is the direct responsibility of the Government and of the Secretary of State. No less important is their whole laid-back, laissez-faire approach to the problems that still face British Leyland. Has it not occurred even to the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues that, through their money supply and interest rate policies, they have had the most dramatic and adverse effect of all on the fortunes of the British passenger car and commercial vehicle industry? The only market in which we have clearly prospered abroad since 1979 has been the American market, where the pound has fallen massively against the dollar, thus giving us the sharp competitive edge which, combined with improved quality, has made the fortunes of Jaguar so remarkably strong. Against the European and other world currencies, the pound, compared with the 1979 base, has not been devalued, but revalued. We are still, in international competitive terms, some 16 per cent. more expensive in foreign markets than we were five years ago. Everyone in the motor car industry knows this to be true. It was referred to in this year's corporate plan and in last year's as well.
This basic lack of competitiveness, the over-valuation of the exchange rate, is the direct consequence of the

Government's tight money supply targets and high interest rates, which have pushed up and held up the value of the pound. There is, of course, a world recession in vehicles as in other industries. Has it not occurred to the Secretary of State that between 1979 and 1982 commercial vehicle production in France dropped by just over 5 per cent. and in Germany by 5 per cent., while in Italy production increased by nearly 4 per cent., yet in Britain it fell by no less than 34 per cent.?
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that between 1978 and 1983 the volume of commercial vehicle imports more than doubled and that there was an increase of more than 51,000? As our exports fell by some 50,000 during the same period, it is hardly surprising that we are in our present difficulties. Does the Secretary of State really believe that he can put the blame for all of this on the world recession and hope to get away with it? If that was the reason, why have not the Germans, the French and the Italians suffered a similar calamity? Is he really unaware, in regard to the decision to close the extremely efficient bus and coach works of C. H. Roe, that the collapse of the British domestic market has been the principal cause? Whereas domestic buying in the United Kingdom was some 18,000 vehicles a year between 1978 and 1980, domestic purchases in 1983 were down to just over half at 10,000.
Is it not plain that the over-capacity and lack of demand of which the Government complain, and on which the Secretary of State seeks to justify his closure decisions, are basically an excuse for inaction and an abdication of the proper functions and responsibilities of his Department and his colleagues?
I shall conclude by offering our proposals. First, there is still a little time. Assembly of commercial vehicles at Bathgate is due to cease in mid-1985, and engine production is due to cease in early 1986. That is time enough to obtain an independent reappraisal of the commercial vehicle market at home and abroad, not just for this dreadfully depressed year of 1984, but for the second half of the 1980s. We simply cannot get decisions right if we take short-term decisions only to find that we have missed out when the world economy revives and we have not the capacity to contribute to it.
Secondly, the Government must resolve to put Leyland Trucks back on the road, to increase its market share, to re-activate the model 211 Cummins engine project at Bathgate and to introduce its new models and engines which are just as important to the future of the commercial vehicle side of BL as have been the Metro, Maestro and Montego to its passenger car revival.
Thirdly, there is an obvious need to complete the model range of commercial vehicles. The main gap is in the replacement for a light van, the market for which is growing and in respect of which our imports are increasing and our exports falling. Can the Secretary of State confirm that General Motors in Portugal is assembling Itzu vans, badging them as Bedford and selling them to Bedford's traditional United Kingdom export market? I believe that to be so and it reinforces the case for a British-built new vehicle based on Bathgate in precisely this range of commercial vehicles.

Mr. Roger King: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Shore: No. I wish to be brief, as I know how many hon. Members have been frustrated by the length of time that it has taken to have this debate.
Fourthly, the Government should put the C.H. Roe decision on ice, reactivate the grant for new buses and encourage municipal transport authorities to purchase the vehicles which they certainly need.
Fifthly, the Government should at least postpone, if they will not abandon, the damaging and financially defeating proposal to privatise Jaguar this year. That would make the major contribution needed to finance the revival of the commercial vehicle division.
I commend those proposals to the Government and the House. If all that lies between their acceptance and rejection is the Secretary of State's loss of face, that is a sacrifice which the people of Scotland and the whole nation will be willing to bear.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. George Younger): As the House knows, British Leyland presented its corporate plan to the Government earlier this year. Thereafter, the Government had to decide whether to approve it. I assure the House that the most careful study of all possible options was made before we came to the conclusion that there are no sensible reasons to reject the company's plan.
We have agreed only, and with the greatest reluctance, to those aspects of the plan that affect BL's truck and bus operations. I welcome this opportunity to outline some of the facts and figures that led us to that conclusion. I should like also to make it clear that this is not a case of closure being due to failures by the work force. In the past few difficult years it has acted responsibly and with full regard to the need to improve productivity to the best of its ability.

Mr. Dennis Canavan: And the Minister is giving them the sack.

Mr. Younger: As this is a short debate, I shall concentrate most of my remarks on the effects on Scotland. If he catches your eye towards the end of the debate, Mr. Speaker, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry will cover more fully the non-Scottish aspects.
I should like first to remind the House of the main features of the plan. In 1983, BL achieved its objective of breaking even at the trading level for the first time for five years. Its quality and productivity have improved dramatically. The corporate plan sets out the basis on which long-term viability will be attained. It has also been the company's objective to return the business progressively to the private sector, and BL proposes to do just that with the highly successful Jaguar Cars as a first step.
There has been a dramatic turnround in all aspects of BL Cars. It has moved from a pre-interest trading loss of £78 million in 1982 to an operating profit of £73 million in 1983. The board of BL is to be warmly congratulated on that achievement. The bus and truck business of Leyland Vehicles, however, remains in deep trouble, and the board has been obliged to take a decision to close two important plants. As a result, 440 jobs will be lost at C. H. Roe, near Leeds, and there will be a phased loss of 1,800 jobs at Bathgate.
I am sure that the House will understand that, as Secretary of State for Scotland, I am particularly concerned about the closure of Bathgate—

Mr. Canavan: Do something about it then.

Mr. Younger: —but we must examine the board's decision on Bathgate in the context of the plan as a whole and in the light of the success of the board's policies for Austin Rover and Jaguar.
I should like to underline the fact that I do not accept the suggestion made by some hon. Members that the decision to close Bathgate demonstrates that the British Motor Corporation should never have come to Scotland, and that any attempt to establish a vehicle industry in Scotland was always doomed to failure. Anyone who has followed the fortunes of BL's operations in Scotland knows that the real story is much more complex and that the plant has experienced good times as well as bad. The circumstances that have led to the sad but, I believe, inevitable decision to close could not have been foreseen when the plant was established and the truck market was buoyant. The dismay with which the decision has been received demonstrates the value of the employment it has provided and the contribution it has made to the Scottish economy over the past 20 years.
The Government have, as my right hon. Friend underlined, given long and hard thought to BL's corporate plan before endorsing the decision to close Bathgate. It has been suggested that we held up the decision beyond BL's timetable, and I make no apology for that. We had a clear duty to examine all the available options, and we have done so, but the facts proved inescapable. What are they?
The facts are that the truck business across Europe has been severely depressed for several years, that most European manufacturers, including much bigger businesses than Leyland Vehicles, are losing large sums of money and that there is enormous excess capacity. The United Kingdom market has shrunk from 79,000 in 1979 to little over 50,000 in the current year. Leyland's sales fell from 14,000—

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Younger: I shall finish my sentence. I wish to put the facts before the House. Opposition Members will find it helpful to hear them, even if they do not agree with them.
Leyland's sales fell from 14,000 in 1979 to 8,000 last year. Abroad, the company's sales fell from 10,000 in 1979 to 2,700 last year. In Nigeria, an important market for the Bathgate plant, sales fell from 2,600 in 1981 to 318 last year.

Mr. Robin Cook: Will the Secretary of State acknowledge that if the Bathgate plant closes, Leyland Trucks will not have the capacity to produce its own engine? If he bases his defence of this deplorable decision on comparisons with other European truck producers, will he name one major European truck producer which intends to go into the remainder of this decade without the capacity to produce its own engine and to be entirely dependent on a foreign company providing it?

Mr. Younger: I shall come to the question of engines in a moment.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Younger: Mr. Speaker said that many hon. Members wish to speak, and if I give way I shall never reach the end of my speech.
I come to the point that worried the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook). Against those declining sales figures—the total for Leyland Vehicles was 11,000 last year—Leyland Trucks has capacity at its very modern plant to produce 24,000 vehicles and capacity at Bathgate, when in full production, to produce at least the same number. That is capacity to produce 48,000 trucks, against sales of 11,000 last year. To put it another way, even if sales recovered to their 1978 level of 24,000, the Leyland plant alone has the capacity to meet the demand.
Let us look more closely at Bathgate. In 1980 the plant produced about 13,500 trucks, in 1981 the figure was 9,000, in 1982, it was 8,200, and in 1983 it was 4,200. The Bathgate plant, as the hon. Gentleman said, also produces engines, and again there is a similar sad story. Capacity is around 700 engines a week; current production is around 200. Again, capacity vastly exceeds both present sales and any likely level of demand in the foreseeable future. Not surprisingly, with that enormous burden of unproductive overheads, Leyland Vehicles has been losing a great deal of money—over £60 million in both 1982 and 1983. No business of the size of Leyland Vehicles, with a £435 million turnover last year, can stand that level of loss for long.
I have been asked by the hon. Gentleman and others about the joint engine project with Cummins. There is no mystery about this. The project was conceived, and rightly so, when sales were much more buoyant than they have been in the past two years. With the lower sales volumes now forecast in every forecast made by the company, the BL board now believes it is cheaper to buy the engine from Cummins than to make it. Of course, the engine will still be made in the United Kingdom, although it is for Cummins to determine whether it is to be made at Shotts or Darlington.
It was evident from our examination of the company's plan that, unless something drastic was done, there was a real risk of losing the entire Leyland Trucks operation, including the 1,200 jobs at the Albion plant in Glasgow. There is some limited recovery in the home market for trucks, but there is no sign of recovery in the overseas markets, particularly in Africa, which Bathgate has traditionally supplied. No amount of new investment would have brought those markets back, and the gap between existing capacity and any foreseeable level of sales is immense. I do not believe that in these circumstances a responsible Government could have overturned the decision of the BL board.
The accusation has been made that the Government starved BL of investment, and that greater investment in the past would have avoided this closure. It is interesting to consider the facts. Since 1975, the Government have pumped £2,300 million into BL. The greater part has gone in since 1979. At Bathgate, £25 million has been spent over the past five years. It is natural, in the circumstances, that people should turn their attention now to supposed mistakes in the past, to new models which should have been introduced, and to facilities which might have been modernised. But the Government are in no doubt that at this juncture further large-scale investment at Bathgate in the face of the facts about the truck market, as has been suggested by the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) and others, would be the height of

folly. It would burden Leyland Vehicles — this is of interest for the future—with an added burden of debt which the company could not support, and there seems to be no prospect of it generating the level of extra sales needed to justify the plant's retention.

Mr. Geoffrey Robinson: Is the Secretary of State aware that those are precisely the same arguments as the Conservative Opposition advanced in 1975 against major investment in the motor car industry as a whole? Is he so lacking in confidence in the capacity and competence of British managers to invest again, perhaps not in the old markets but in new markets, as we did in Jaguar and Austin Rover? Why are the Government so afraid? We invested in those markets, so why is the right hon. Gentleman afraid that we cannot do so for the truck market?

Mr. Younger: I listened with special care to what the hon. Member for Coventry, North-West (Mr. Robinson) said, because he was involved in the industry and knows what he is talking about. He knows better than most hon. Members that he would never have applied the conclusions of the car market 10 years ago to a different market—the truck market—which has totally collapsed, during his commercial life. If he had, he would have been fired quickly. There may be consequences of that later for his own business.
The decision taken by BL, which the Government have considered carefully, was extremely unpalatable. Anyone who listens to and looks carefully at the facts that I adduce today will be in no doubt that the decision was made on the facts as they are. That is the responsibility of all hon. Members, whatever side of the argument they wish to take. It puts great responsibility on us to do all we can to help in what is undoubtedly an extremely difficult position.
We are now considering what realistic measures we can take to generate new employment in the area before the start of the phased redundancies at Bathgate. The Bathgate Area Support for Enterprise, sponsored by the Scottish Development Agency, Leyland Vehicles, Lothian regional council and West Lothian district council, has as its main objectives the regeneration of the local economy and the stimulation of enterprise. It will be possible to build on the existence of BASE, and the possibility of its playing a wider role is being examined. I was glad to note that Leyland is to extend its support for that scheme for two years beyond its initial three-year commitment. I am happy to say that, at my request, the Scottish Development Agency is to match that contribution. In addition, Leyland will appoint business consultants to identify and prepare an outline for business and other opportunities to utilise the engineering and other skills available. Again, I shall ensure that the SDA will be associated with the study and will have an early meeting with the consultants.
In addition, Locate in Scotland, through its overseas offices, will immediately seek to interest inward investors in the plant and in the area in general. The Manpower Services Commission will do all it can to meet local training and retraining needs, in line with its adult training strategy. By using the machinery we already have, rather than setting up an immediate task force or something like it, we are more likely to secure long-term success.
I should make it clear that it will be far from easy to find another use for the Bathgate plant, but, for those who


have doubts, I remind the House that last December no one believed that there was any chance of finding another use for the Scott Lithgow plant. Yet that was achieved, and the workers at Scott Lithgow were saved from threatened closure. Those who now say that we can do nothing to help Bathgate would do well to bear that in mind.
In the question after the statement by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry last week, several hon. Members drew parallels between the sad position at Bathgate and previous closures, such as those at Linwood, the pulp mill at Corpach, the smelter at Invergordon, and so on. They suggested that those closures were all that had happened in Scotland during the past five years of the Government's economic policy. Understandably, it was not even a complete list, because hon. Members forgot to add companies, such as Singer, Monsanto and Prestcold, which closed within a week or two of the advent of this Government in 1979 —[Interruption.] No one can think for one moment that that had anything to do with this Government's policies. If the closures were due to the policies of any Government, it was the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Milian), the Secretary of State for Scotland in the Labour Government, who was responsible for the decline in industry at that time.

Mr. Gavin Strang: rose—

Mr. Younger: Hon. Members must learn to listen to statements they do not like as well as to ones they like. They will learn in due course that I shall carry on until they do.
The Opposition's thesis does not bear examination, because that has not been the picture of Scotland during the past five years. Although many traditional industries have run into trouble and declined, as they have elsewhere in western Europe, in Scotland there has been a positive and increasing flow inwards of new industry. The list is so long that it would bore the House. Hon. Members mentioned Linwood, Corpach and Invergordon, but I do not have the time to list the alternatives. On the positive side. there have been big new developments—these are only the biggest—including companies such as Hewlett Packard, National Semiconductor, Motorola, Rodime, Fortronic, Future Technology Systems, Wang, NEC, IBM, Burr Brown, Mitsubishi, Shin-Etsu, Caledonian Airmotive, Ferranti, Jetstream and Prestwick Circuits. Most recently, Digital has just announced today—

Mr. George Foulkes: rose—

Mr. Younger: —that it is moving—

Mr. Foulkes: The Secretary of State must be corrected.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): Order. I remind the House that this is a short debate and that many right hon. and hon. Members have a great interest in making their contributions. Exchanges such as this delay the opportunity of calling them.

Mr. Younger: Today Digital, which is one such company, announced that it is moving from assembly to manufacturing and is embarking on a £15 million development, which will create 200 new jobs over three years.
In less than three years, Locate in Scotland has attracted inward fixed investments of more than £800 million,

producing 23,000 new and safeguarded jobs. Probably the most successful location of all is just down the road from Bathgate at Livingston. Since 1980, 16 inward investment projects have been attracted to Livingston. They promise a total investment of more than £170 million and about 4,000 new jobs. In the three years since Locate in Scotland was established, it has been actively involved in decisions to locate in the area by major international companies, such as Burr Brown, NEC, Mitsubishi and Shin-Etsu, in the electronics sector, and Gore Associates and Surgikos in the textile sector. Shin-Etsu is investing £38 million, with the prospect of 480 new jobs, and Integrated Power Semi-Conductors Ltd. is investing £15 million, which promises 500 new jobs. Locate in Scotland is currently engaged in discussions with several major multinational companies—

Mr. Bruce Milan: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Yesterday Mr. Speaker was specifically asked, given that this was a Standing Order No. 10 debate, whether it would be comparatively narrow, and he so ruled. This is an abuse of the House.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I find nothing out of order.

Mr. Younger: I understand that the right hon. Gentleman greatly dislikes anything that torpedoes the thesis that he wishes to introduce. He wishes to suggest that in Scotland many firms are closing. That is the reverse of the truth. The vast majority of them are coming in.
The Government greatly regret the closure of the Bathgate plant, but, having examined the facts, we must accept—as would anyone who considers the facts—that the British Leyland board had no other option. I understand that the work force at Bathgate voted this morning to continue the strike that began on Tuesday. I sympathise with the feelings of the workers and their local representatives, but I hope that they will accept that we shall now do all we can to find another business to use the facilities at Bathgate, and that they will not prejudice those efforts by their reaction to the announcement. It is essential that we bend all our efforts during the next two years to finding alternative uses for the plant and other employment in the area, and for that we need all the support that the House and the local community can give.
Last week the Opposition tried to suggest not only that this was a sad and regrettable decision—I agree with that—but that it was the only feature of life in Scotland. Clearly, they do not like new investment in Scotland, and would far rather paint a completely distorted picture of the country.
The right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney spelt out much of the background to the case, as he saw it, and at the end he proposed some solutions. I am glad that he made some effort to do so. He must have thought carefully about the matter. But what did those solutions amount to? They were that British Leyland, especially the trucks division, which is already in deep trouble and which has had years of sales so low as to cause huge losses—thus requiring Government help to keep it going in the hope against hope of an upturn in the market—should be saddled with further vast investment in new models in a depressed market that already has severe over-capacity. the solution, while no doubt well meant, is a recipe for disaster for all of British Leyland, and it will do no good to anyone at Bathgate or anywhere else

5 pm

Mr. David Steel: It is unfortunate that—

Mr. Merlyn Rees: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We are all interested in the terrible economic problems of Scotland, but—I asked Mr. Speaker about this yesterday—Leeds is also involved, The loss of jobs in Leeds may be small compared to the position in Scotland, in that only 400 are to go, but it is still important, and the Minister did not even mention Leeds. When are we to get an answer on Leeds? As we have not had one, we have not had a proper Government response to the subject being debated.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I realise how anxious and concerned all right hon. and hon. Members are, but this is a short debate, and the more we engage in such exchanges the fewer views we shall hear. Nothing that has been said has been out of order, and therefore the point raised by the right hon. Member is not a matter for me.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is not the constituency Member called first in such debates?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman knows, as he has been here a long time, that the choice of speakers is difficult. Constituency interests are always taken into consideration.

Mr. Harry Ewing: Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. When selecting speakers, should it not be taken into consideration that the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel) and his colleagues were responsible for us almost losing this debate?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I do not think—

Mr. Ian Wrigglesworth: Why is the hon. Gentleman now wasting time?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I assure the House that all relevant considerations have been taken into account very carefully.

Mr. Steel: It is unfortunate that what should have been the good tone of the debate has been spoilt because hon. Members are not prepared to accept that all parties have a right to put their point of view. I yield to no one in my admiration for the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) and his concern over the years—not just the months—for this plant. I do not intend to abuse the time Of the House by making a long speech. There is no point in wasting the time of the House in further arguments. We have time for a short debate and I suggest that we get on with it.
It is difficult to know what to say in response to the speech by the Secretary of State for Scotland. The kindest thing to say is that I feel sorry for him, because he has been made the fall guy in this story. There is no doubt that Bathgate is simply the latest victim of the Government's economic policy, and the people who should be at the Dispatch Box are the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
I happened to be in Edinburgh on Tuesday when the news about the closure of Bathgate came through. The House will understand the sense of shock that ran through the whole of Scotland when the announcement was made.

I remember in 1962, when I was a student living in West Lothian, the great excitement when that plant was started. There were even such minor things as the first length of dual carriageway laid between the two cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow to the planned site. It was a significant event in the economy of Scotland, and the closure is an even more significant event for Scotland.
The chief issue is whether the strategy that has been adopted for the cars division of British Leyland could have succeeded in the trucks division. I believe that it could. Four or five years ago there was a mood of apprehension in the House about the future of British Leyland. Few of us could have put our hands on our hearts and predicted the turnround that British Leyland cars division has achieved, with its new models capturing the market and doing precisely what an efficient automobile firm should do.
In the trucks division ther has been no such application of investment and no such introduction of new models, and we have watched the market being penetrated by imports in an unprecedented way. Leyland Trucks used to be the firm which, more than any other, had a worldwide reputation. However, Leyland's export market has been threatened by the artificially high exchange rates maintained by the Government's economic policies—that is one reason for the success of the export market.
As for the internal market, in the past couple of weeks we have all heard interviews on the radio with consumers of the vehicles complaining that they have had to buy foreign because those that they wanted from BL were not available. The message that has come from the successful cars division could and should have been applied to the truck division. There is no reason why there should not be a similar turnround in the production of trucks.
A few weeks ago I met a deputation of shop stewards from Bathgate. In the many years that I have been listening to such deputations I have rarely been so impressed as I was on this occasion by the careful documentation which they brought and the long story of false promises on investment and of investment unused—no doubt some of that mentioned by the Secretary of State. More important — here we can see the difference between Bathgate and Jaguar in Coventry—there has been a lack of long-term management throughout. There appeared to be no authority in Bathgate capable of dealing with the work force, answering its questions and making decisions. No authority is invested in Bathgate as it has been, for example, in the last few years at Jaguar in Coventry. There is a strong contrast in the way in which the two have been treated within the combine of British Leyland.

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Norman Tebbit): The right hon. Gentleman is missing out one other point of difference between the two cases. He knows as well as anyone that I was among those who backed the car business and the Jaguar business and I have done my best to back the truck business as well. However, the car market has been expanding, but the truck market has been diminishing. The loss of the Nigerian market has nothing to do with the level of sterling, and everything to do with the economic collapse in Nigeria.

Mr. Steel: The Secretary of State keeps mentioning the Nigerian market, as if the whole of Leyland Trucks depends on Nigeria. Clearly, it does not. No one denies that there has been some loss in the overall market and that


there has been more import penetration of trucks over the past five years. The Secretary of State should consider that, as the value of the pound has something to do with it.

Mr. Geoffrey Robinson: In 1975 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry voted against the rescue of Leyland, which was needed after a massive decrease in the car market. Despite that decrease there was massive investment, and the thing now is to do the same for the trucks division.

Mr. Steel: That is the point, and I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Linlithgow, with his detailed knowledge, will be able to give more information to the House, such as that which I was receiving a few weeks ago about the detailed failure of the internal management of Leyland Trucks to deal with the problems at Bathgate and to deal fairly with the work force. This is a story of almost criminal negligence in the treatment of these works.

Mr. Peter Shore: The right hon. Gentleman has made an important point, and it will be helpful if the point is driven even further home. Perhaps when the Minister winds up the debate an answer can be given on this issue. There is a big difference in timing between the big slump that hit the car industry and the later slump that hit the commercial vehicle division, not only in Britain, but in world markets. If people look at that dispassionately, they will find that what the right hon. Gentleman says is true. The truck industry collapse has come much later in the day. The present situation is indeed gloomy, but if we had accepted the situation in the car industry in 1975–76 with the same pessimism as now, it would never have revived.

Mr. Steel: I entirely accept that. If one believes Ministers about the upturn and the lead from the United States, far from being pessimistic, we should say that there is a chance for industry to invest in trucks. Ministers should match their optimistic words on the general economic front with some activity to restore BL's trucks division.
On 22 May the Secretary of State told the House:
Leyland Bus too has suffered from a depressed market at home".—[Official Report, 22 May 1984; Vol. 60, c. 830.]
He said that as though it were like the weather and just happened. In fact, we know perfectly well that the Government ended the system of bus grants and reduced investment in new buses throughout Britain. It did not just happen as a law of nature; it happened as a result of deliberate Government policy.

Mr. Michael Meadowcroft: I note what my right hon. Friend says about the reduction in the transport supplementary grant and the bus grant. Is he aware that the managing director of Leyland Bus put it even more starkly when he said:
Apart from the economic recession, the efforts which are being made to limit public expenditure have resulted in public sector operators drastically cutting back their requirement for new buses. The immediate prospects for the industry as a whole are not good and the position could deteriorate sharply if the"—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman should not make long quotations in an intervention. This is a short debate.

Mr. Steel: My hon. Friend is from Leeds and I have seen a copy of that letter. The point that the BL bus

division is making is that the deregulation of buses will reduce the orders which the public sector will achieve. Again, that is another act of policy.
The proposed sale of Jaguar will do nothing to boost the finances and continued international reputation of BL. It leaves the impression that in the Government's eyes the public sector is only for lame ducks — that anything successful is to be returned to the private sector. Given the statement of the national executive committee of the Labour party that anything privatised by the Government may be renationalised, with or without compensation, it is time that we called a halt to this irrelevant see-saw.
If the Government came forward with a scheme to distance Jaguar from the main board of BL, as has already happened in part, if they came forward with a scheme for BL to retain a 49 per cent. stake and let the other 51 per cent. go to the workers and customers of Jaguar, that might be different. Conventional privatisation with an employee's shareholding limited to what the investing protection committee will allow in its guidelines is not an answer to BL's problems.

Mr. Nicholas Fairbairn: Will the right hon. Gentleman remind the House who made the bus in which he went round during the election? Was it British Leyland?

Mr. Steel: As the hon. and learned Gentleman has raised that matter, I shall tell him exactly. I inquired whether a BL bus of the kind that I required was available and— [Interruption .] This is exactly the point of the story. This was a year ago. I was told that it would be available in October. Unfortunately, the election was in June. Therefore, I, like many others, had to take what was available. That is the whole point of my argument. The models were not available from BL's truck and bus division. I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for allowing me to make my point clear.
Various hon. Members have referred to the deindustrialisation of Britain, and Scotland in particular. That charge is true. If one looks at the trade figures published the other day by the Department of Trade and Industry for 1982–83, one finds an alarming trend. In 1982 the oil trade gave us a surplus of £4·5 billion, and non-oil trade a deficit of £2 billion. By 1983 the oil surplus was £7 billion and the deficit on non-oil trade had risen to £7·5 billion. That is a serious picture for Britain. The truth of the matter is that our oil trade and our sale of assets together provide the Government with an income greater than the whole of the public sector borrowing requirement.
What is lacking from the Government is a commitment to invest in Britain's industrial future. The Dutch are investing £32 million in DAF. Look how many DAF lorries we have on the road at the moment. The Spanish are investing £53 million in their motor vehicle industry. Yet the British Government are proposing to invest £12 million in lengthening the dole queues at Bathgate and Leeds. The Government say that they are bringing 450 Nissan jobs to the north-east, but they are losing three times as many as a result of their announcement this week. It is not just the number of jobs that is important, but the quality. Will the Government reduce us to a kit assembly economy, or will they agree to engage in public investment and let the people of Britain earn a living?

Mr.Younger: rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel) has finished his speech. I remind the Secretary of State that he spoke for 26 minutes

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton: As this is a short debate, I shall not follow all the comments of the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel).
I want to take up one point that was made by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) on 23 January. He and everybody who spoke in the debate confirmed that in no way could any fault at any time recently be charged against the work force at Bathgate. Everyone accepted that. Therefore, the statement made two days ago was extremely traumatic for the 1,750 men concerned.
Two questions remain. First, what went wrong and what lessons can be learnt? Secondly, what can now be done? Three factors relate to what went wrong. First, in the 1970s the 500 engine was not an unqualified success. Recently, Mr. Sam Newton, the newly elected chairman of the Leyland Truck Distributors Association said of the engine:
It was out of date when it was launched. It was designed when the average truck travelled 30,000 miles a year but was launched when 100,000 miles became the norm because the motorway system was opening up rapidly.
Apparently, there were problems with engine trouble. Not only had that, but the share of the domestic heavy truck market contracted from 30 per cent. in 1973 to 13·4 per cent. in 1982. That appears to have been an undeniable factor in making BL more vulnerable.
The second factor, which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State covered, is that the recession has led to a substantial reduction in sales of heavy trucks, which slumped from 80,000 to about 44,000, and last year it was only about 11,000.
The third factor was the collapse of the export market, not only in Nigeria but in Iran after the revolution. Last year, only 2,700 trucks were exported.
The lesson to be learnt from the 500 engine is that an engine that does not respond to future consumer demand can reduce the market potential, with eventual adverse consequences for employment.
At present, the company is losing about £70 million. Unfortunately, there was no evidence of a sufficient upturn in the market to keep two plants open. Even with the closure of one of the two plants, there will be substantial capacity at Leyland, which can double its output and still have further capacity over and above that. Bathgate was mainly in the export market, exporting 10,000 trucks in 1979, but in 1983 only about 2,700. Part of that collapse was obviously due to the loss of the Nigerian market.
That brings me to the question of what should and could be done. The decision to close Bathgate is phased over a two-year period, and half the work force will be employed into 1986. I ask my right hon. Friend to confirm the rate at which the slimming down of the work force will take place, that the redundancy terms will be generous, who will be offered more than £9,000 and who more than £7,000, and what the arrangements will be.
Leyland is to extend its support for the Bathgate Area Support for Enterprise scheme for an extra two years over and above its present three-year commitment. I think that BL is right to offer to appoint business consultants to develop alternative job prospects in the Bathgate area.
That leads me to my next point. I hope that full use will be made of that two-year phasing period to investigate employment uses for the Bathgate factory. In particular, I hope that the prospect of another operator or consortium will be examined closely. I suggest that my right hon. Friends should work closely with the Scottish Development Agency. Bearing in mind that Bathgate is a highly integrated factory with a skilled labour force, firms from abroad may well have an interest in taking advantage of this opportunity. If so, Leyland should not stand in the way of a potential competitor coming into the market place. No opportunity, possibility or option should be disregarded by my right hon. Friends.
My final point arises out of the statement made by the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) regarding the difficulty facing a person of 50 who is made redundant. I ask the Government to request the Manpower Services Commission to give priority to ensuring the provision of adequate retraining schemes directly related to the job opportunities of the future.
Contrary to what the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan) suggested, I think it is highly relevant that 4,000 jobs in the same travel-to-work area in Livingston have come in since 1980. Those jobs will grow, and more firms will come in. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the firms concerned—Shin-Etsu, Mitsubishi, Burroughs Machines Ltd., and Integrated Power Semi-Conductors Ltd. About 16 of them have become involved since 1980. These are the jobs of the future. That will, of course, be of considerable benefit to the service industries. Therefore, I hope that the Manpower Services Commission will give top priority to providing the retraining facilities necessary in this connection.
It is important to remember that the microelectronics industry in Scotland is now playing a leading role not only in Scotland, but throughout the world. Since this is the same travel-to-work area, I do not think that Opposition Members should scoff at it. They should not belittle the successes of their countrymen where they exist, but should build on those successes. What is more, those successes will grow.

Mr. William McKelvey: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there are now fewer jobs in Scotland in the electronics industry than there were five years ago? While we all applaud the new jobs that have come to Scotland, they are not, and never will be, the answer for the hundreds of thousands of unemployed.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton: I question the accuracy of the hon. Gentleman's figures. There are more than 40,000 jobs in Scotland in the electronics industry. In this particular area in Livingston, some 3,900 jobs are coming in. Those jobs, with the efforts of Locate in Scotland, will increase. I stress that this will have a substantial impact on the service industries. Success in the area has come from the natural evolution of the indigenous talents and industrial skills of those concerned. I hope that my right hon. Friend will take every possible advantage of the two-year phasing period. Two years is a long time not only in politics, but in industrial economics.
I believe that Bathgate, with its labour force, has a great deal to offer if Scotland is seen as a good place for firms to operate and where Government and labour can, and will, co-operate. I hope that every effort will be made to maximise the employment opportunities for the future.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: If, as the constituency Member of Parliament for Bathgate, I speak briefly, it is because British Leyland at Bathgate is not just a constituency problem for my hon. Friend the Member for Liverston (Mr. Cook) and myself, but an issue for central Scotland, for all Scotland, as was witnessed by the statement of the General Assembly of the Kirk and the moderator this very morning. Indeed, it is a national issue.
I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Eastham), who is the secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers group, that it is a national issue because his own trade union national committee has given definite instructions to the union's members affecting the whole of the United Kingdom on the Bathgate issue. This is an issue on which hon. Members from all parts of Britain, not least Scottish Conservatives, should have as much time as possible to speak during the three-hour debate.
On Saturday morning 26 May, at the offices of the West Lothian district council in Bathgate, there will be a series of crucial meetings, sponsored by the Scottish Trades Union Congress, of parliamentary colleagues, West Lothian district council, Livingston development corporation, Lothian regional council, shop stewards and others. It would be helpful, particularly in the wind-up speech, but certainly before Saturday, to have a Government response to the following questions, of which I gave notice to Ministers yesterday.
First, do present Ministers accept that they have any residual obligations for the actions of Harold Macmillan, Rab Butler and kin Macleod in bringing the motor industry to Bathgate by Cabinet diktat?
Do they recollect the motives of that Conservative Government which perceived the dangers of the division in our country between the employed home counties and the unemployed north in days when unemployment figures of 7 per cent. were thought to be alarming?
Should Governments really distance themselves from the actions of their predecessors since Ronald Hancock —and I pay a personal tribute to the hard work that that man has put into Bathgate over the years; I believe that he himself has behaved honourably in all the discussions at British Leyland — has made it clear that only the Government, not the company, can save jobs in Bathgate?
The unreality of the speech of the Secretary of State was symbolised possibly by the reference to BASE — the Bathgate Area Support for Enterprise—which was also mentioned by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Lord James Douglas-Hamilton). Do the Government realise that BASE is a small organisation of three people who work hard? The hon. Member for Eastwood (Mr. Stewart), the Under-Secretary of State, opened BASE, and some of us were present. The Minister must surely know, having read the brief, that it is just not realistic to think that BASE can deal with the problem when 1,800 people are to be without work, with knock-on effects throughout Scotland, and, indeed, throughout the United Kingdom. This is an example of cosmetic politics. The very idea that BASE can cope with this situation, worthwhile though it is, is unreal, on top of over 20 per cent. unemployed already.
When the Secretary of State talks about the turnround—the £73 million —and the £72 million—one might ask, "All right, but who carried Austin Morris and the rest of BMC in its uncomfortable and difficult days?" There are

people who work for Leyland Vehicles who say, "In their difficult times, we carried them. Can we not have some help now?" The Government's response is to sell off profitable Jaguar. That really is a scandal.
The Secretary of State talks about enormous excess capacity throughout Europe. I wonder whether the Japanese would accept the contraction syndrome, which leads me to the second question of which I have given notice to the Scottish Office.
What is the Government's attitude to the number of unemployed in the Bathgate travel-to-work area in 1986 if closure were to take place? On 5 April, the latest date for which information is available, there were 9,931 unemployed claimants in the Bathgate travel-to-work area. Ministers have had the corporate plan, not, as the Secretary of State said in his speech, since early this year, but, as I understand it, since December 1983. Surely they must at least have made some calculation of the number who are likely to be unemployed. Indeed, they have had 36 hours notice of that question, so I hope that I receive an answer to it at the end of the debate.
My hon. Friend the Member for Livingston and I are particularly concerned about men aged between 40 and 50, who have no prospect of obtaining work in our area, and whose redundancy terms are a good deal less generous than those in the coal and steel industries. What hope can the Government extend to them?
I must say to the hon. Member for Surrey, North-West (Mr. Grylls)—absent, alas—who seems, these days, to be Brian Redhead's pundit-in-residence, that I practically burst a blood vessel at 7.15 yesterday morning when he criticised those of us who had the day before yesterday raised the issue of the deindustrialisation of the north, and told us that we should be grateful for the electronics industry.
I cannot refrain from telling the hon. Gentleman, in his absence, and the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West in his presence, that for all the millions of pounds that Nippon Electric at Livingston has had from the Government, it takes on few miners, steelmen or motor vehicle engineers who are in their thirties, forties or fifties. Therefore, to say that the electronics industry has arrived is no answer to the problem that we face.
Thirdly, in cold financial terms, leaving aside the human misery and injury to self-respect, what is the estimated cost of the extra unemployment and related benefits that the Government would have to pay out in the Bathgate area if Leyland ceased production? Those who have had the corporate plan since December should at least have made that calculation.
Fourthly, in the concordat between the Government and Leyland, dating from the days of Sir Michael Edwardes, it was agreed that "political and social consequences" would be considered by the Government before putting a ministerial imprimatur on any major decision arising out of the BL corporate plan. Has that been done? If not, why not? If so, and it was indeed done, could the House be told what judgment Ministers arrived at? The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry is apparently asleep. However, during the course of the most insensitive statement to be made by a senior Minister in my 21 years as a Member of Parliament, he said to my hon. Friend the Member for Livingston, who had complained about wine lakes, that he wanted a lorry park. But, in reality, that is inaccurate and is not the full story.
Following the Secretary of State's intervention, I have a direct question for him. Are we to believe that oil-rich Nigeria will never recover during the next decade or so, so that it can buy such trucks? Is that the Government's assessment of Third-world prospects?

Mr. Tebbit: Not at all. Furthermore, under the plan, Leyland Vehicles will be well capable of meeting that market.

Mr. Dalyell: In that case, the long-term assessment should be spelt out. We are talking about the largest concentration of machine tools in Europe. The right hon. Gentleman says that that is not the Government's assessment. That highlights the point that in the coming months, we must talk much more about the future market possiblities for developing countries. Many developing and Third-world countries are crying out for good products, such as those made at Bathgate. Without transport, and that means trucks, they will not recover.
To put it at its lowest, the West of the present day has neglected its own self-interest towards the Third world. It may be that of 2,600 trucks, as I understand Ministers to say, only 300 now go to Nigeria, but, if things look up, the story will be quite different. Who then will have the capacity to supply Nigeria, the Cameroons and many other countries in Asia, Africa and South America? If, first by trade and, secondly, by aid we had done more to help developing countries, we would have been more easily able to use our unemployed skilled resources. Does the Government's acceptance of this corporate plan indicate that they see no upturn in this decade in the Third-world countries' ability to purchase? Are the Government resigned to that? Ministers have also had notice of that question.
I promised to be brief, but I should point out that when the Secretary of State prides himself on the fact that the Government have invested £25 million, that is the equivalent of what we spend in the south Atlantic in eight days. I shall not say any more than that. I say only—1,800 Falklanders, 1,800 Bathgate workers.

Mr. Nellist: rose—

Mr. Dalyell: I am sorry, but I shall not give way, as many other hon. Members wish to speak.
Reference has also been made to the sit-in. I have had the privilege to represent the Leyland workers at Bathgate for many years, and I know that they are not hotheads, but extremely serious, responsible people. Time and again there has been praise from unlikely people for Jim Swan's attitude and that of his colleagues. Their actions may now seem extreme, but they are prompted by what they see as the activity, or inactivity, of an unjust Government. Unemployment is not an act of God. As gently and as seriously as possible, I must tell Ministers that they are dealing with very serious and determined people, who are not taking action lightly or frivolously.
I have discussed Bathgate in various contexts and at various times with previous senior Conservative Members. Mr. Speaker, your predecessor but two, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, who was my first Chancellor of the Exechequer, Reggie Maudling and Iain Macleod all said that they favoured the vehicle industry having gone to Bathgate— in their opinion justly at the time—because of Harold

Macmillan's "Stockton experience". I remember them all using that phrase. Harold Macmillan's "Stockton experience" prompted the then Government to set up the motor industry in Scotland.
I conclude by asking Ministers and concerned Conservative Back Benchers, as unvituperatively and seriously as I can, whether they do not think that the time has come when the Government would be wise, in their own interest and that of the country, to show just a little more "Stockton experience".

Mr. Hal Miller: Anyone from the west midlands can well understand the sense of disappointment, shock, bitterness and perhaps even anger at the announced closure of a motor manufacturing facility, particularly that at Bathgate. Those emotions have been fully reflected by Opposition Members. Indeed, perhaps there has been rather too much emotion and rather too little thought about the problem.
The Secretary of State for Scotland was criticised for not doing anything, but when he announced the action being taken immediately following the closure announcement it was criticised as a political gimmick. Indeed, that emotion led Opposition Members to run down Scotland as a deindustrialised desert and wasteland. How will that attract new investment? Why will new firms want to move in, given the sort of climate that Opposition Members trumpet abroad? Surely Opposition Members should accent the positive.
We have had experience of this in the west midlands and I shall put the matter into context. The losses about which Opposition Members talk do not begin to measure up to what we have experienced in the west midlands. Scotland has the benefit of oil. New industries have been established backed by a grant regime which has not been available to us, and backed by Scottish Development Agency funding which is not available to us. Scotland has been backed by a political economy which ensures that carpet firms and foundries which might go under are rescued, whereas their counterparts in the west midlands which might have been successful in competing have not been rescued. Scottish industry has had a pretty good ride — [Interruption.] We are in one country and hon. Members will have to listen. The unemployment statistics reflect what is happening in the central belt of Scotland compared with the west midlands.
What depressed me, apart from the emotion generated, was the lead by the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) who accused Conservative Members of being ignoratnt of economics. He went through a litany of Socialist shibboleths. He started with the theory of production at any cost and the value of production, irrespective of the market. The right hon. Gentleman went on to Socialist egalitarianism and said that it was wrong to sell Jaguar. Indeed, the hon. Member for Coventry, North-West (Mr. Robinson) said on Tuesday it was wrong to take care of Jaguar, the transport of the toffs, while ignoring the buses, the transport of the working class. That was the sense of the hon. Gentleman's remarks and he nods in agreement. The hon. Gentleman totally ignored the fact that many of his constituents are proud to work at Jaguar and are the first to want its future secured. In their egalitarian way Opposition Members ignore the fact that successful firms can be strangled by having to give life support to unsuccessful activities.
The right hon. Gentleman made it plain that Jaguar should be kept inside so that its surplus can be used to fund the losses on commercial vehicles. He entirely ignored Jaguar's development needs and the new products that it needs to secure its market. He ignored the initiatives and decisions held up by the BL board because of the drain on the vehicle side which has shackled and threatened to hinder Jaguar's development to such an extent that in two or three years it also might not be viable. That way brings down the whole house of cards. That is why it is right that Jaguar should be released to the private sector.
The Liberal leader, the right hon. Member for Tweedale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel), made a transparent leap on to the bandwagon of the debate. His was a lightweight performance if ever there was one.
The right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney referred to the Ryder plan. He ignored the money that this Government put in because the Ryder plan was overextended, concentrated solely on production and ignored markets. The same old recipes have been trotted out—the same old policies that lost the Labour party the 1979 and 1983 elections and will lose them the next election.
We need to send a message of hope to the constituents of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). I urge them to reflect that our experience in the west midlands has shown that only by a concentration of the facilities of production can the burden of overheads be reduced to an acceptable level to enable the product to be internationally competitive. All the doom and gloom about BL does no good. The hon. Member for Linligthgow shakes his head, but he knows that the truck industry worldwide is in terrible trouble. Bedford, the United States and Japan have been mentioned. Truck industries throughout the world are in trouble. There is an endemic over-capacity in the world production of commercial vehicles. The major firms are suffering just as much as the others. The smaller firms have to seek tie-ups.
The Government should be asking the BL board what it is doing about co-operation in commercial vehicle production to which it has been driven on the car side. That is the only long-term way of survival. It is idle to suppose, with the volumes involved, that success can be achieved without a tie-up in marketing and technology.

Mr. Geoffrey Robinson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Miller: I shall not give way, although I am happy to debate the matter with the hon. Member for Coventry, North-West. I know his record with Jaguar and the paint plant.
It is important that the constituents of the hon. Member for Linlithgow should have some idea about the future and consider their position relative to others living in the same country. That is what I have tried to set out.

Mr. Bruce Milian: My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), in his excellent but in the circumstances remarkably restrained speech, said that we are not just debating another closure in the long list of closures with which we have become so depressingly familiar. The debate is about Bathgate, but I am sorry that no mention has been made of other closures. I hope that that will be remedied before the end of the debate.
We are talking about another psychological blow to Scotland's economy. Bathgate, with a number of other developments, including Linwood, was supposed to help in the industrial regeneration of Scotland. We are not simply losing 1,800 jobs, but seeing the end of another of the hopes for industrial recovery in Scotland.
The figure of 1,800 is misleading, because, as recently as 1978, Bathgate was employing 5,600 workers. Since then there has been a remorseless and steady rundown of capacity and work force. On every occasion on which a redundancy has been announced the workers have been assured, "This redundancy is necessary to give you an assured future." That is what they were told at the time of the reorganisation in November 1981 and at the time of the Cummins engine contract.
The workers have been given repeated assurances. That explains the deep sense of bitterness that they now feel. Their bitterness is felt throughout Scotland. The workers do not trust a management whose strategy for the tractor division has been so misguided and misconceived. They do not trust a management which in the past has given them so many assurances which have not been borne out.
This time we have a corporate plan, the copy of which issued to the Library does not even mention the closure of Bathgate, far from giving any explanation or argument for what is happening. The significant aspect of the corporate plan is that the first priority laid down for 1984 is privatisation. There is not a single line dealing with the merits of Bathgate and its closure.
We know that the truck industry worldwide has been going through an extremely difficult period. However, in the domestic market the figures have been picking up very well, although admittedly from a depressed base. A good deal of the improvement has, given the general state of British industry, inevitably come from imports rather than from British production.
As has already been said, it is foolish to be overoptimistic and plan only on the basis that the market will expand mechanically every year for ever and ever. But it is equally foolish to be so pessimistic that capacity is run down simply because the industry is going through a bad period. We should not assume that that bad period will continue for ever. Unfortunately, that is not only the basis on which this corporate plan has been prepared, but it has been the attitude of British Leyland management towards the trucks section during the past few years. Each time that BL has contracted, it has said that that will provide a springboard for expansion—but each case of contraction has led to another. We are concerned not only about: the closure of Bathgate but about the demise of the whole truck division.
An element of rationalisation is involved. Not all the work carried out at Bathgate will disappear; some will be transferred to other parts of the Leyland truck operation. I do not take a nationalist view of the matter. I am glad that the workers in Leyland Trucks have given their wholehearted support to the workers in Bathgate. In a period of recession and decline, there is a difference between spreading the burden and closing a major facility. If a major facility is closed, it will never be reopened. That is the tragedy of what is proposed at Bathgate—once it is closed, it will never be reopened. The Secretary of State has admitted that even the possibility of selling it to some Japanese car manufacturer is unlikely. If it had been saleable to the Japanese, it would have had to be maintained as part of Leyland Trucks.
The corporate plan has been in the hands of the Government for five or six months—

Mr. Roger King: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Brown) is reading a newspaper. Is that allowed?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman knows that he should not read a newspaper in the Chamber.

Mr. Millan: The Government have had the corporate plan for five or six months. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry said that the Government had considered all the options. Yet he did not say a word about the alternatives considered by the Government during the past five or six months. I hope that the Minister will say something about them when he replies.
The Government have dismissed out of hand the proposals put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore). Nothing has been disclosed—but we will ensure that it is disclosed sooner or later—about the alternatives considered by the Government. We want to know what the options are. The closure of Bathgate will produce a saving of only £10 million a year—less than the expense of unemployment benefit in the Bathgate area alone. Even from a strict financial and economic viewpoint, the closure is a scandal and a tragedy.
There is still time to consider alternative proposals, whether those put forward by my right hon. Friend or any others. If the management believes that it will have a comfortable, easy ride during the two-year rundown, it has completely misjudged the position. It has not helped to have the despicable blackmail in the closure announcement that if the workers do not co-operate in their own execution their redundancy payments will be reduced. The workers at Bathgate will not co-operate with the closure — why should they? Nor will the remainder of the workers in Leyland Trucks co-operate.
I hope that the alternatives will now be considered. The Opposition will do everything possible—the fight has only just begun—to ensure that Bathgate and C. H. Roe are kept open.

Mr. Gerald Malone: I have listened with great interest to what has been said in the debate. I was hoping that the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) would give us some sound economic reasons for keeping open Bathgate. Despite the shouting from the Opposition, Conservative Members are concerned that we have reached an impasse at Bathgate. It is a sad failure of what was once a proud prospect in Scotland. It is exceptionally regrettable.
Neither at the beginning of the debate nor since have we heard any valid reasons for any possible alternative. The right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney and other Opposition Members have stated the simple belief that a market may transpire in the future that can take the over-production from British Leyland—not only from its plant in Lancashire but from its plant at Bathgate.
The problem is that there is enormous over-productive capacity that cannot be ignored. We cannot simply say that things might turn out all right at the end of the day. It is worth considering the scale of the problem. The decline

in the overseas market has taken place since the 1960s. In 1962 we exported 60,000 vehicles per annum, but in 1983 the figure was only 2,700. There is an interesting comparison between British Leyland's share of the domestic market and that of other United Kingdom manufacturers—not only importers. Whereas BL's share of the market has dropped by 17 or 18 per cent., other United Kingdom manufacturers have lost only 2 per cent. of their share.
I make those points simply to show that it is difficult to envisage how the position will be reversed. The Opposition have given no reasons why it should be reversed, and I would be interested to hear their reasoning. It is an impossible mountain to climb. It is all very well to say that over-capacity can be tolerated in the short term, but where are the commitments from the Opposition about what they would do if they had to make the decision now being made by the Government? How long would they be prepared to tide over the industry? How can they seriously suggest that the world market will expand to the extent that it could ever hope to take up the production of British Leyland? We are not even talking about a rise in world demand taking up the production from Bathgate; we are talking about the capacity that will remain in BL, which manufactures two to two and a half times what can reasonably be expected to be the demand for trucks throughout the world.
We should look at other arguments for keeping Bathgate open. I look to two sources — the paper submitted by Lothian regional council, and the document submitted by the Scottish Trades Union Congress. The STUC simply suggests two reasons for keeping Bathgate open. One is that to close it would threaten Leyland Trucks' revival in the rest of the country, and the other is that it would kill our presence in export markets. It is clutching at straws to make such points, which illustrate that the priority to be reached in the decision that BL is now making is that truck-making facilities in the United Kingdom must be preserved in the most viable way possible.
It is regrettable that Bathgate no longer has a viable life, but there is nothing more realistic than facing facts.[Interruption.] When will Opposition Members learn that the piecemeal preservation of individual manufacturing units when their viability is no longer in prospect cannot contribute to the long-term benefit of the economy?
This is not a decision which BL or the Government have taken with joy or ease. It is regrettable for those who will be put out of work. However, it is inevitable, and unless Opposition Members can show that there will be a market for which BL in Bathgate could successfully produce they will not have made their case. BL's Bathgate workers are not well served by histrionics. If Opposition Members can adduce arguments of substance, very well. Histrionics provide nothing.

Mr. Derek Fatchett: This debate is about job losses in Scotland and west Yorkshire. Those losses represent human misery and personal devastation and are yet another chapter in the deindustrialisation of Britain. They are avoidable and they are a direct result of Government policy.
My constituents will be insulted by the remarks which the Secretary of State for Scotland made today. At no time did he refer to Leeds and the 440 people who will lose their


jobs. No Conservative Member who represents west Yorkshire is in the Chamber now. Why have not Conservative Members had the courage to face the arguments and support the Government's policies?
Some of us felt strongly yesterday about the tactics of the Liberals. They made sure that this debate did not take place when workers from Bathgate and Leeds were in London. I am appalled by the fact that the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. Meadowcroft) has not even deigned to be in the Chamber when perhaps issues relating to his constituents would be discussed. If he had more interest in the substance of politics and less in the game that the Liberals played on Tuesday night, he would have been present for this debate.
The closure of C. H. Roe is another example of the futile face of monetarism. In 1982, that firm increased its share of the market. That market though decreased as a direct result of Government policy, and C. H. Roe's production fell by 10 per cent. The overall production of buses fell alarmingly as a result of Government cuts in the capital available to county councils and passenger transport authorities. In 1979, 3,026 new buses were completed. By 1982 the figure had fallen to 1,944. I see the Secretary of State smiling. For my 440 constituents and those who work at C. H. Roe, those figures mean suffering, misery and no hope in the future. How disgraceful to see a Minister smiling at such misery. It is about time that Conservatives came into the real world and recognised what people are going through as a result of their policies.
On Tuesday, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry said that he regretted to announce the loss of 440 jobs. That loss will cost the Government in public spending more than £3 million in the first year, apart from the redundancy and severance payments that will be made to those workers. The madness of it is that we cut public spending to increase public spending. It is cut to stop productive and useful activity and is increased at the other end to ensure that we have the money to keep people idle as they suffer because of unemployment.
We now need from the Government a recognition of the futility of monetarism. They are using money deliberately to keep people idle. [Interruption.] I did not hear what he mumbled, but if the hon. Member for South Ribble (Mr. Atkins) wishes to intervene I will willingly give way to him, though I suspect that an intervention from him on his feet would be no better than his sedentary one.
Monetarism follows the path of waste, despair and pessimism. It is the policy of a Government who are prepared to keep people idle rather than give them an opportunity to contribute to society. The result is de-industrialisation and human suffering. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) said, we in Leeds, the people of Bathgate and the people of Britain generally who contribute to the wealth of the nation need from the Government action, imagination and a long-sighted view. My fear is that we shall not get it and that the Conservative policy of creating misery by deliberately keeping people idle will continue.
I hope that tonight we shall see at least some courage from Conservative Members who represent west Yorkshire and Scottish constituencies. They must tell the Government, "Stop this futility and stupidity, reverse the present policies and show some imagination."

Mr. Donald Stewart: The hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Miller), who is no longer in the Chamber, said that Scotland had the benefit of oil. That is exactly what we do not have. The Treasury has taken all its benefits. For Scotland, the home of oil in Britain, there is no benefit.
The hon. Gentleman went on to say that the Bathgate plant had not been feasible from the start. If, looking at the globe of the world, one examines the locations of the markets for those vehicles in the various countries and one notices what a pimple the British Isles represent on that globe, the idea that a plant can be viable in the midlands of England but unviable a little further north, across the border, is the most arrant rubbish, and it is regrettable that one needs to fall back on such a lame argument.

Mr. Ron Brown: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if the argument which the Government have advanced for closing Bathgate is true, it means that the Albion plant is not viable and that it will be the next to close?

Mr. Stewart: The hon. Gentleman is right. Indeed, I would regard it as the greatest danger signal of all if the Albion plant is receiving assurances about its future.
In an effort to retrieve something from this disaster, the Secretary of State gave a list of firms active in Scotland. I appreciate that he was pressed for time. I had intended to intervene to say that according to the only barometer by which people can measure a return to prosperity in Scotland—a drop in the unemployment figures—there is not the slightest sign of an improvement in the economy. If the firms to which he referred are operating in Scotland, they must be manned by robots because there has not been a drop of any significance in the unemployment figures.
Tuesday's deplorable statement came as a shock. The shock was not that it was made—because the intentions of British Leyland and the Government had been known for some time—but its timing. The work force and the shop stewards, at the plant had known of those intentions some time ago. There was a planned campaign of deception to fool the work force that the plant had a considerable life ahead of it. The Government attempted to allay the fears of the work force.
Following the 1981 BL corporate plan, the models manufactured at Bathgate for the home market were taken away and given to other plants in England. The right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan), a former Secretary of State for Scotland, said that he was not taking a nationalist line, but I am. It would have paid the Bathgate work force better if they had done so. There are 648 hon. Members who will fight the British corner, but I and my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) will fight the Scottish corner.
The manufacture of panel vans was transferred to Freight Rover Ltd. in Birmingham, and the Golden Harvester tractor was transferred to Track Marshall in Gainsborough. Production of the MT211 truck, developed at Bathgate, was given to Leyland in Lancashire. The work force was led to believe that, in return for the withdrawal of domestic market models from the production line at Bathgate, the new engine development with Cummins and the export truck lines would guarantee the future of jobs at the plant.
The promises given to the work force were cynically betrayed. The Scottish Office is leading the campaign in


the excuses for the collapse of the Bathgate factory with allegations about the non-profitability and non-feasibility of the export market. I emphasise in the strongest possible terms that the export market angle is simply a red herring — or, in the case of the Secretary of State, a blue herring. Bathgate has been systematically run down for many years and its lucrative home market production has been taken away. Bathgate was deliberately left with only the unprofitable export models. This calculated decision has given the Government and BL the convenient excuse they want to close the plant.
In February 1984 I warned of what has now come to pass. I stated that Bathgate must demand a share of home market production. I said that the MT211, which was taken from the Bathgate plant, should be returned. My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East and I have reiterated that call, and a motion to that effect stands on the Order Paper. There has been a deliberate and progressive rundown of the plant. It has been left holding the unprofitable baby of the export market which was once only a small part of the whole operation at Bathgate. The rundown has been engineered from the beginning. In many ways, we are seeing a complete reversal of the regional type of industrial policy in the 1960s which leaned towards the dispersal of jobs. The present trend is to concentrate jobs in certain parts of England.
This disgraceful affair has left us with and highlighted three Scottish tragedies. The first is the loss of jobs, and I shall not go into that matter because it has already been dealt with eloquently. The second tragedy is Scotland's reliance on the centralist policies of London government. Over the years forced closures have been experienced. They started in the 1960s, and have been compounded with the closures at Linwood, Corpach, Invergordon and so on. Bathgate is the latest in a long line of closures, and perhaps not the only one that we shall see, as the hon. Member for Leeds, Central (Mr. Fatchett) has said. Scotland, under Westminster control, is bound to continue to suffer, and we shall continue to drive that message home.
The third tragedy is the betrayal of Scots by the Labour party. At every election, Labour Members have given the same message, assuring the Scottish voters that Labour can protect the rights and interests of Scotland from the ravages of the Tory Government, which are real enough. We thought that the district election results would be a warning to the Government, but within a couple of weeks of those elections the Bathgate plant was closed.
It is plain that Labour in Scotland is powerless and unwilling to use the mandate that the Scots have given it. If the Scottish National party had won that mandate, Bathgate would not have been closed. If there were 41 SNP Members of Parliament, the position would have been different, and a Scottish Parliament would have been in existence.
There will be more Corpachs, Invergordons and Bathgates, except that Scotland is fast running out of them. While the country burns, the political Neros of the Labour party are fiddling away and the Government who have no mandate continue to destroy the industrial base of Scotland.

Several Hon.Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I remind the House that this is a short debate. The Front Bench speeches will begin at 7.10 pm. If right hon. and hon. Members speak for five minutes each, I shall be able to include in the debate most of those who wish to speak.

Mr. Roger King: The failure of Bathgate is one in a long line of retrenchments by the British motor industry. During the 1960s the aim was to expand at all costs and to develop the motor industry in areas which hitherto had not enjoyed the questionable advantage of having the industry in their locality.
Because of its location, Bathgate inherited a number of problems which were never resolved by the management. We had the white heat of technology and reorganisation of the British motor industry, because big was beautiful. We ended with Leyland, Scammell, AC, Guy, Austin and Morris commercial vehicles. For one reason or another, the management resolutely refused to rationalise correctly what it should have done. That did not happen in the old motor industry. Old names such as Wolseley, Riley and, latterly, Triumph, have almost disappeared from the books of motoring terminology, but commercial vehicles remain almost intact in the old way. That has resulted in a lack of investment in plants all over the country and the failure to grasp the nettle of overseas competition.
Some of the arguments of the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) cannot go unchallenged. He said that during the 1960s total commercial vehicle output by the British Motor Corporation was 135,000 units, but the figure was nothing like that in the heavy and medium-goods vehicle range. Under the old BMC setup, commercial vehicles included mini, Austin, J4 and J2 vans and formed the bulk of production. The equivalent figure of 12,000 units, which was also cited, more directly related to the medium and heavy goods vehicle range. The two items cannot be compared at the same time.
The right hon. Gentleman said that there was no new van for the BL group, but that statement can be open to challenge. The Sherpa van is made at Washwood Heath in Birmingham. Recently, the new wide-bodied Sherpa van has been introduced. It is enjoying a great deal of business, which has resulted in the plant taking on extra workers.
The organisation has not been negligent. It has invested. The new Leyland truck range—the T45 series — is proving popular. Although that truck does not necessarily have its own in-house engine like other competitors, that can be looked upon as an advantage, because it means that the prospective purchaser can build to his specification a bespoke truck using either a Rolls-Royce diesel engine, a Cummins diesel engine or some other manufacturer's engine. That is a distinct advantage for many hauliers.
The main problem is that people still fail to buy British. All too often local authorities plump for the alternative—overseas competition. Only a few months ago we had a visit from many disabled groups, who turned up in Mercedes and Renault vans. That was difficult to understand. Those groups were among the authorities under the control of the GLC. We must pursue the


objective of buying our products, even if they prove to be the second choice, or we shall find that we are not producing anything.
The other side of the debate is about the bus body factory of C. H. Roe. During the last 15 years there has been a massive change in the bus industry, with the switch from the conventional driver-conductor bus to one-man operation. That has resulted in authorities buying rear-engined front-entry buses for one-man operations. Manufacturers expanded to accommodate the demand from authorities for the changeover to this type of product.
Commensurate with that were better engine and gear box designs which resulted in the vehicles lasting longer. In addition, they are now being used to better advantage. Many authorites are now finding that their bus services, which once had between 800 and 900 units, can be operated efficiently with 600 units. Indeed, the Select Committee on Transport visited Newcastle last week and was told that that authority had managed to reduce its overall bus usage by about 200 vehicles. That authority had not wanted to buy any vehicles for the last two or three years, and it would probably be in that position for another two years.
The bus range has changed. The Leyland national bus built at Workington is an extremely strong vehicle, and some of the first that entered service 10 or 11 years ago are still as sound as they were on the day they were put into service. That is an integral type of bus, not the old coach-built type, which C. H. Roe and many other manufacturers continue to produce.
There is now a choice, a changeover in design and usage, greater use of vehicles and a reduced demand requirement. We must grasp the nettle and make sure that the products we produce are acceptable to the customer and built in the right quantity. As with the British Leyland motor car industry, we shall find that in the end jobs will then be created.

Mr. Robin Cook: I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible, but in my 10 years in this House I have never participated in a debate which has such profound and devastating consequences for the constituency that I represent, nor have I discussed an issue that has aroused so much bitterness among my constituents.
There is bitterness at the frustration of knowing that for six months the corporate plan rested with the Government without those most intimately affected by it knowing what was in it. That was a frustration aggravated by regular and contradictory rumours as to what the plan contained. It was a piece of refined cruelty for the BBC only last Friday to run a speculative story that the plant had been reprieved. The denial of that story caused unimaginable distress within my constituency.
There is something wrong with a system that keeps the work force in the dark and excluded from comment while a decision is taken over such a prolonged period. Indeed, every hon. Member knows in his heart that the chance of changing the decision and influencing the outcome of British Leyland's recommendation would have been immeasurably greater had we had this debate before the Government came to a final conclusion rather than only learning what was in the corporate plan after they had reached their decision on it.
There is also bitterness in my constituency at the suggestion that commercial pressure has forced this

closure. It was not commercial pressure that resulted in the loss of the work in the cab workshop at Bathgate, in the removal of domestic volume trucks from Bathgate or in the closure of the tractor line and its sale to a private sector firm. These decisions were not taken as a result of commercial pressure. They were quite deliberate managerial decisions.
Understandably, there is now a considered view in my constituency—I have great sympathy with the interpretation—that what we are witnessing is the final stage in a long pre-arranged, pre-designed plan to close the Bathgate plant.
In addition, the latest suggestion that we must close the engine line and wind down the export model line because of commercial pressure does not stand up to examination. The Secretary of State was perfectly correct to say that there is over-capacity in truck production throughout Europe. Every major truck producer has over-capacity. But the relevant point overlooked by the Secretary of State is that our situation is unique because only we are closing down our truck products engine line. Only we are attempting to be competitive in a highly competitive market without the capacity to produce our own engines for our own trucks.
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry agreed that the Nigerian economy would recover. I am glad that he did so, but when it does it will be no thanks to assistance or aid from the British Government. Even if Nigeria gets no aid, it will claw its way back to recovery and one day it will reopen its markets to the trucks that it needs for its development. I shall make a different prediction from the one made by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. When that happens, and trucks again run on the Nigerian roads, they will not be trucks from other areas of Leyland's truck division, because if we continue this industrial retreat they will be trucks from Sweden, Germany and Japan.
I wish briefly to reflect on the social environment of the community that is afflicted by this decision. I now see poverty at my surgeries of a kind that I have not seen in my 10 years as a Member of Parliament. In particular, I see the poverty of men struggling desperately to reconcile long-term unemployment with short-term benefit rates. The most harrowing cases that I see are those of men over 40 who are humiliated by constantly being told that they are too old to work and too old for the job for which they have applied. These men still have children at school. They still have 20 years of work left in them.
One of the tragedies of the proposed closure of Bathgate is that it has a mature work force—70 per cent. of the men there are over 40, and 37 per cent. are over 50. In all, 750 men are affected. The hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Lord James Douglas-Hamilton) talked about the electronics firms coming to Livingston. I appreciate the sincerity with which he made that observation. I know those firms well and welcome them. God knows, I am glad to have them in my area. But not one of the firms that the hon. Gentleman listed will touch one of the workers over 40 who are to be made redundant. They all want young, untrained labour which they can adapt — what the Japanese call "virgin labour". If this closure goes ahead, most of these men will never work again unless we can radically alter the labour market of west Lothian. That is the fate which awaits them.
The work force that is being exposed to this fate has, as all sides agree, been responsible and reliable. It has


accepted changes in working practices. It has tried hard—and it needed to do so—to make sense of the many different production directions imposed on it by the management at Bathgate. That work force has achieved further gains in productivity. Indeed, I have in my files a letter from the Secretary of State for Scotland praising the Bathgate work force for an improvement in productivity. It has done everything that the Government constantly ask of our industrial work force, yet as a result it is sacked to a man.
I shall vote against the Government tonight because the proposed closure at Bathgate is wrong. It is wrong for the British motor industry and for the social environment in my constituency as well as the community around it. I shall also vote with sorrow at what the decision, unless we can reverse it, will mean for my constituency. I shall vote with anger at a Cabinet which is so fixated with the financial flows involved in the decision that apparently it cannot comprehend the cost in human terms.

Mr. Edward Leigh: I wish to speak solely on a narrow constituency matter which I hope will not detain the House for long. A company in my constituency has been mentioned twice, and it is about that that I wish to speak. In doing so, I hope that I shall speak not just of recrimination in the past but of hope in the future.
In 1981, Track Marshal of Gainsborough learnt that the British Leyland tractor line at Bathgate was doomed. That line was acquired by Marshal of Gainsborough against stiff opposition from the local trade unions and the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). At the time wild accusations were thrown around about that acquisition. The hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) said that the acquisition was made not as a result of commercial pressures. It was Model development had been neglected on the tractor line and plant capacity was too large for the market, just as plant capacity is too large in the truck section. Productivity had been neglected and management was weak.

Mr. Dalyell: The hon. Gentleman is making wild allegations. I have in my hand the 20th report of the Committee of Public Accounts, the comments of the Department of Industry. The PAC, a senior Committee of the House, did not think that anything that I had said was a wild accusation. In the light of the PAC report, published by the Stationery Office, will the hon. Gentleman withdraw the wild accusations he has made? Will he also tell us how much Track Marshal paid for its part of the tractor line?

Mr. Leigh: I shall be happy to reply to the hon. Gentleman, because I, too, have read the 20th report of the PAC. I have in my hand Cmnd. 8759, the comments of the Treasury and the Department of Industry on that report, in which they say
that they are satisfied that the sale cannot be said to have been made at 'knock-down prices'; and note and share the Committee's concern that a number of unspecific allegations of impropriety were voiced for which no supporting evidence could be produced, either to BL or to the Committee.
I have talked to Track Marshal of Gainsborough, and a commercial price was paid. Not one penny of Government money was involved.

Mr. Dalyell: What was the price?

Mr. Leigh: I have not been told. Not one penny of Government money was involved. It was not sold at knockdown prices. On the contrary, the line was preserved.

Mr. Dalyell: It was bloody well stolen.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must not use words like that.

Mr. Dalyell: Is "stolen" an unparliamentary word?

Mr. Speaker: No, but "bloody" is.

Mr. Leigh: The line was preserved. My constituents are worried about the situation at Bathgate because the 98 series engines used in the tractors now being constructed at Gainsborough are made at Bathgate. Marshal of Gainsborough would like now to acquire that tractor line. I should like the Minister to comment on that possibility. I have been around the factory in my constituency. It is an example of tight management—

Mr. Nellist: Asset stripping.

Mr. Leigh: It is not asset stripping. It is providing jobs for my constituents. We have 18 per cent. unemployed in Gainsborough and my constituents have as much right to jobs as those of the hon. Gentleman.
Two models are planned for the future. The company cannot relax for a moment. It is working in tight commercial conditions, but it will survive because it is a free market company. There is life after death. Nothing can be saved by feeding a crippled giant. I hope that the Government and the Prime Minister will give a new lease of life to the company in my constituency.

Dame Judith Hart: A number of my constituents will lose their jobs at Bathgate, and others have already become redundant from it during the last few years.
I want to underline the general economic analysis made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) and other hon. Friends. I wish to direct attention to a constructive point. I am extremely sorry that the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry is not taking part in the debate. That is utterly incomprehensible and disgraceful. It is equally disgraceful that he cannot even spare the time to attend the whole of this short debate. That is an indication to Scotland of the concern of the Government. With all due respect to the Secretary of State for Scotland, he should have made sure that his colleague the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry sat through the debate.
When the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry made the announcement he talked about
over-producing trucks for which there is no market
and said:
The fact is that there are not sufficient customers coming forward to buy the trucks that are being produced."—[Official Report, 22 May 1984; Vol. 60, c. 833–34.]
The right hon. Gentleman was talking about the market economy. One understands that. I want to make my remarks within the Government's conceptual framework of the market economy. Of course I should prefer import controls and many other things, but they are likely to be unacceptable to the Government.
Taking the Government's conceptual framework of the free market economy, we know that the Nigerian market


has collapsed. We know also that only about 100 trucks went from Bathgate to West Africa last year. We also know, and I shall only skate over this, that there is a tremendous crisis in the Third world because of increased oil prices, diminished commodity prices, a world depression, shrinkage of aid, protectionism and the starvation of foreign exchange.
When there is talk of the market having collapsed and of trucks being produced for which there is no market, it has to be realised and understood that Africa is littered with vandalised trucks because the people cannot afford to buy the spare parts. There is a desperate market for trucks all over Africa—Nigeria is a special case, of course; everywhere in Africa, from Kenya to Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana, and the Gambia there is a market for trucks. Then there is Asia as well. It is nonsense to say there is not a market for trucks, but there is not the foreign exchange to pay for them.
It will be within the recollection of some hon. Members that during the term of the Labour Government, out of the aid programme, and totally in conformity with "More help for the Poorest", a White Paper which we produced during my term, there were activities which greatly assisted the shipyards on Tyneside and which kept Scott Lithgow going for six months. I remember a mining machinery order for India for Anderson Mayor and, although not through the aid programme, an order for trucks for Kenya which kept British Leyland going at a time when it was in difficulty.
In this case, very poor countries could be helped under the aid programme and this would be totally in accordance with its objectives, even under this Government. If one considers the loss of tax revenue and the amount to be spent on social security benefits, which may be £12 million to £15 million per year, one realises that that would buy about 1,200 trucks. We are at the beginning of the new financial year, when the aid programme has a good deal of uncommitted money. It is only much later in the year that the aid programme has committed itself and cannot find flexibility and room to manoeuvre. At this time the great need of many of the poorest countries is for what we call programme aid—that is, the financing of goods which they need.
My figures are very rough; I should like the Minister to check them and tell me if I am wrong. I estimate that at a cost from within the aid programme of some £18 million, added to the amount involved in tax and social security payments, an order could be given to keep British Leyland going at Bathgate. I shall pursue this. I shall not be content until I hear that the Government have considered this possibility and that there have been discussions between the relevant Departments.
If nobody else will do it, the Secretary of State for Scotland must contact the Foreign Secretary—I do not expect much of an initiative on this to come from the Foreign Secretary—and the Prime Minister, who, if she cares one atom about this, as I think she probably does, will convene one of her MISCs. It is possible to provide orders to keep British Leyland going until the Third world depression is over to such an extent that it can itself place orders.
I appeal to the Secretary of State for Scotland not to say that closure is inevitable, but to say, "Here is a stone that we have not yet looked under. Let us see what we can do in this direction."

Mr. Charles Wardle: You have instructed me to be as brief as possible, Mr. Speaker, but I should like to ask the right hon. Member for Clydesdale (Dame J. Hart) whether she is aware, from BL's corporate plan, that Leyland Trucks has sufficient capacity at Leyland to supply present demand in the United Kingdom market and an increase of more than 400 per cent. in its export sales. In view of that, what she said hardly provides an adequate argument for continuing with Bathgate.
I should like to declare a recent interest in the management of a company which for several years supplied small quantities of components to Bathgate from the midlands. Since coming to this place I have ceased to be involved in the management of that company and it has ceased to be a supplier to Bathgate. Based on that experience as a supplier, I believe that it would be folly to have a three-hour debate without examining the realities of the creation of Bathgate and some of the unhappy factors in its life which must be set aside if the rest of BL is to be the success that we know it can be.
As a supplier in the midlands, it was common knowledge that when the grandiose scheme in the name of regional assistance, which I believe was misguided, to open Bathgate was announced, the supply of components would immediately become uneconomic and therefore impractical.

Mr. David Lambie: The Japanese can send them 5,000 miles.

Mr. Wardle: That might be the case.

Mr. Lambie: It is the case.

Mr. Wardle: That might be the case, but it is not economic regularly to send small quantities of components 300 miles to Bathgate.

Mr. Ron Brown: If what the hon. Gentleman says is true and Bathgate is not viable, how can the Albion plant be viable? Is he saying that the Albion plant should be closed?

Mr. Wardle: I am not saying that for one minute. My point is that if existing demand for trucks is satisfied by Leyland in Lancashire and Bathgate, there is no doubt which of the two plants is more suitable for the sourcing of components. There were opportunities in Scotland for components in stampings, pressworks and fasteners to be provided locally, but they could not be provided in sufficient quantity, so the plant has always been on a shaky basis. For years, employees, management and everyone in the trade has predicted that Bathgate would run into difficulties. In view of the market development of the 1980s, the collapse in demand from Africa and Third world countries, the arrangement between Renault and Bedford and attacks on the market by the likes of Mercedes, it comes as no surprise that the sad news of Bathgate has had to be visited on the workers and management there.
I ask that one message be drawn from the experience of Bathgate. The midlands has already learnt the lesson. It has experienced far worse pain in the past two years in the motor industry and the component manufacturing industry. The message is that, in the face of the ravages of inflation during the 1970s, we must bear in mind that whatever plants we continue to run—whether BL or private industry—they must be run competitively. We


cannot carry excess capacity for ever and a day. Doing that debilitates the entire enterprise, and that could involve the rest of BL, in which many jobs are at stake and in which prosperity can be preserved.

Mr. George Park: As has been said, the depression hit the passenger car sector of British Leyland and the rest of that industry before hitting the commercial sector. The depressing thing is the Government's blinkered approach.
Tuesday's announcement is the latest attempt by Leyland Vehicles to deal with the recession in its market by slashing the labour force. That is a well-trodden path o in BL. The car division had to go through the same trauma, as the west midlands knows to its cost. Accepted wisdom in BL, which is aided and abetted by the Government, is that if products do not gain a sufficient share of the market, one declares that the company is overmanned. The axe then falls on the work force. Social implications are not taken into account. In the jargon, it is called matching resources to market realities.
The result of the policy that I have described is that design teams are scattered—never to be reassembled—help must be asked for from foreign companies, and our industry becomes ever more a screwdriver operation which, in turn, is replaced by robots, the human beings they replace being thrown on the scrap heap of unemployment as, for most of them, there is no alternative work. Driven by the Government's desire to privatise, Leyland Vehicles cannot wait for the process of improvement in the product to gain a larger share of the existing market. That would enable it to maintain its work force, or even to augment it. According to the corporate plan, that process
enabled Leyland Trucks to increase their market share to 15 per cent. from 13·4 per cent. which compared very favourably with its competitors".
That method would not be attractive to the profit takers who might be willing to get back into the companies that they left in chaos. The Government are prepared to add once again to their public sector borrowing requirement by adding to the dole queues.
The Chancellor does not help either as he keeps adding to the taxation charge. The corporate plan says that it has increased from £6·3 million in 1981 to £6·8 million in 1982 to £7·2 million in 1983. In that context, Jaguar Cars is now a much tastier morsel. I do not want to detract from the tremendous efforts that have brought the company back on course. The shop floor has shown that, given good parts, it can build good cars efficiently and cost effectively. The money this earned provides better facilities that contribute to that process. Better communications and job security encourage good industrial relations and the acceptance of modest wage increases. It cannot be denied, however, that a favourable exchange rate between the pound and the American dollar has also helped. It is not certain whether Jaguar Cars can continue to generate the resources that are necessary for continuous improvement of its products—the lifeblood of the motor industry — especially if exchange rates move adversely.
In their haste to privatise, the Government cannot wait. Nor will their backers, who are eager to get their hands on

the assets that have been created by public money. Since the Secretary of State's announcement on Tuesday, when I interrupted to make a point about the interdependence of BL companies, I have had the opportunity to question a member of the BL board. He agreed that there is considerable shared know-how on what is mutually beneficial in production, components, purchasing, banking and finance. On the latter point, the Minister will have noted that a highly paid executive has just been appointed by Jaguar to look after the City side of its affairs.
No one knows for certain what the effects of present and future announcements will be on BL as a corporate body. If there is mutual benefit as at present, taking it away by privatisation or by dismantling parts of that corporate body can only be to the detriment of that corporate body as now constituted.
If the Government achieve their aim and sell off the whole of BL and history repeats itself and the resultant private companies again get into difficulties because they take out more than they put in, we had better ensure that there is a Labour Government in power as the Tories will undoubtedly let them go to the wall. The effects of that would be even more disastrous than those which will be suffered at Bathgate and elsewhere because of this announcement.

Mr. Donald Dewar: The annnouncement about the corporate plan was bad news for many hon. Members, especially for those who represent Leeds and are interested in the future of C. H. Roe. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, Central (Mr. Fatchett) put its case effectively and strongly. I hope that he and his collegues will forgive me if I concentrate on Bathgate.
The final decision on Bathgate rested with the Government. It was their responsibility and, to be fair to them, they have not tried to escape it. They accept it. When my hon. Friends the Members for Livingston (Mr. Cook) and for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) and I met senior management there it became clear that if there is to be a recovery the Government must play a part in it. I make it unequivocally clear that the Opposition expect something to be done and believe that the plant should be saved. Despite recognising the difficulties in the market and those which face the company, the whole point of the concordat between British Leyland and the Government was that wider social implications should be taken into consideration. If ever there were a case for doing that, it is this one.
The House will agree that the Bathgate plant has been murdered by the recession. When the Government came to power in 1979 the domestic market for trucks was 80,000 a year, but by 1982 it had dropped to 45,000 a year. That catastrophic slump did not happen like a spell of bad weather, but had much to do with the Government's economic policies. The Government should not try to duck that responsibility.
The Minister may be glad to hear that there have been signs of economic recovery in the area. The market for 45,000 vehicles has increased to almost 50,000, and people in the industry talk of a requirement of 60,000 to 65,000 units in the domestic market. Ministers bolster that argument because they talk about stumbling on economic recovery round every corner and spying it out in every disaster. If they genuinely believe that a recovery is under way, the classic capitalist philosophy, which should


appeal to them, is to invest in the bottom of the trough as we begin to climb out of our recession, and to give Bathgate the chance to secure its own future and that of its work force.
The Bathgate case is not hopeless. It has not been an albatross round Leyland's neck for ever and ever. Until 1978 it made profits. In 1975 it had 26 per cent. of the domestic market, although now it has only 15 per cent. Even if we recognise the damage that has been done by import penetration, we can hope that, given a chance, it will repel the import invasion and get a bigger share of the market. If we accepted the sort of Conservative philosophy which we have heard today and had they been the masters in 1975, we could only assume, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) said—this point is of real importance—British Leyland would have gone to the wall and we would have been told there was no other option.
British Leyland should think long and hard before sourcing out its Family One engine and becoming the only major manufacturer in Europe which does not have its own, engine production facilities. There are opportunities—I cannot outline them all in a short speech—in the model range, especially to exploit the gap regarding medium-sized vans.
To leave aside my points about recovery and investment, and take the narrow accountancy view, Leyland Vehicles says that by closing Bathgate operating costs will decrease by more than £10 million. But as a result of the closure the Government will spend significantly more than £10 million if a reasonable multiplier for the costs of supplementary benefit and unemployment is taken. There will be a continuing drain on funds because of the age structure of the work force and the lack of employment prospects.
My hon. Friend and, I suspect, in their hearts, many Conservative Members will agree that this should never be regarded as a narrow accountancy exercise. It is not to be regarded as a neat financial calculation where one tots up the figures, balances the ledger and comes to uncomfortable conclusions. The Government cannot afford to scatter a skilled work force and allow the morale of an entire area in central Scotland to be sandbagged. They cannot allow a vast plant which once employed more than 6,500 men and which shelters 1,500 machine tools under its roof to become a vast echoing monument to failure.
I know, though not with the knowledge of the hon. Members who represent the area, what the impact will be on Bathgate, Armadale, Whitburn, Blackburn and even Livingston. They cannot provide alternatives. There is nothing academic or abstract about watching male unemployment rise inexorably from 21 per cent. to 40 per cent. That will happen over the next two years while this lingering closure is implemented, unless the Government prevent it. It is not just another closure, one of the many which we have seen in Scotland, but it is the last of a line. In 1979 before the Secretary of State took office we had Corpach, Invergordon and Linwood. They were a legacy from a Conservative Government, when the Conservative party was committed to the Scottish economy. Under the right hon. Gentleman every one of them has gone. It has been a shame and a shock for Scotland.
I found the way in which the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry buried Bathgate with a sneer offensive. Such callous indifference is the trademark of the man. I

wish that hon. Members had shown a little more compassion during this debate. The speeches of the hon. Members for Edinburgh, West (Lord James Douglas-Hamilton) and for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Malone) were all too typical of the performance of Conservative Members in the House. Tory Back Benchers are a lickspittle lot, fushionless, feckless and loyal to their Government to the point of folly. Their inadequacies and failure to speak cut about local democracy and unemployment were sadly recorded in an article in the Glasgow Herald on 11 May. The Tory convenor of the Lothian region, Councillor Brian Meek, who is probably the most prominent Conservative and local government councillor in Scotland, said of the Conservative MPs:
With few notable exceptions if you ordered them to jump in the river only a handful would pause to take off their trousers
Their performance during this debate fully justifies their Conservative colleague's judgment.
The Secretary of State's speech was a lamentable performance. At times it sounded like selected readings from Leyland Vehicles' press handouts and at other times like selected readings from Conservative Central Office press handouts. At no time did he face up to the realities of his action. He is totally inadequate for his task and his only other characteristic is that he is spiced with panic. I read carefully what the Secretary of State says. Two or three weeks ago he said to the faithful in Perth at the Scottish Conservative party conference:
The Scottish Office is now a positive force in United Kingdom Government in a way that it has not often been before".
Journalists told me that that earned him a standing ovation. Two weeks after that he kills Bathgate, which, had he won his battles in the Cabinet, he could have saved. If that is the right hon. Gentleman trying, all that I can say is that he should pray that he can stop trying, because matters could not be worse.
The Secretary of State said in a statement after the anouncement last week that he had enormous admiration for the work force at Bathgate. If he so admires them, he must recognise that his actions will leave a bitterness that eats into the soul of entire communities in that part of Scotland. Ministers may be well-intentioned, but they are ineffective, and they have been left lamenting on the sidelines while at the same time supporting policies that are the root cause of this disaster.
There is an alternative to closure, and there can be no alternative only if one accepts the ground rules of this Government and their limited vision. In the Glasgow Herald today I was accused by a Conservative candidate of being a doom and gloom merchant. What I find depressing is that the loyalty of Conservative Members to the mistakes of their Government means that they have become doom and gloom merchants in an effort to justify the damage that has been caused. I ask the Secretary of state to think again for the sake of those men and their families and the townships in west Lothian, much of whose future has been put in danger by this Government and by the cruel news that they announced this week.

7 pm

The Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry (Mr. Norman Lamont): The hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) put a series of questions to Ministers. I hope to cover some of them in my speech, although I did not receive a copy of them in advance, but,


if I do not manage to answer some, I shall, of course, write to the hon. Gentleman and give him as much information as I can.
I listened carefully to the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore)—

Mr. Dalyell: A list of questions was given to the Secretary of State for Scotland yesterday morning. Is this the degree of co-operation in the Government?

Mr. Lamont: I listened carefully to the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney, but I must say—I am sure that my hon. Friends agree—that it was difficult to believe that he believed the conclusions to which he came. If we had a Labour Government now, they, too, would be worried about the future of Leyland Vehicles, and they would have had to make hard decisions about Bathgate.
The first point that the right hon. Gentleman sought to dispute was that there was a problem of over-capacity in the truck industry other than in Britain. He tried to say that it was simply a United Kingdom problem, but the right hon. Gentleman must know that truck production in Europe—he gave some figures relating to commercial vehicles, including light commercial vehicles, although we are talking about trucks weighing more than 3·5 tonnes—has decreased by about 30 per cent. The right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel) mentioned what was happening in Spain with Enasa and what was happening to DAF trucks in Holland. Those companies are in precisely the same sort of difficulties as is Leyland Vehicles. It is not just a matter of a reduction in the domestic market, sharp though that has been; there has been a reduction in markets in Europe and in the Third world, to which Leyland Vehicles has sold much in the past. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Malone) said that in Europe lorries have been used much more productively and intensively for longer periods. It must be doubtful whether Europe will return to the level of commercial vehicle and truck sales that it enjoyed a few years ago.
The leader of the Liberal party berated my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) for quoting the figures for sales of Leyland Vehicles to Nigeria, and he said that there must have been many sales on other parts of the world. I should tell him that 40 per cent. of Leyland Vehicles' production used to be exported to Nigeria, other African countries and the middle east. I could give him a list of the Third-world countries where there has been a reduction in purchases similar to that in Nigeria, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland said. The only overseas market that has remained constant—the right hon. Gentleman will probably not welcome this —has been South Africa.
There is no doubt that our industry has considerable over-capacity. Leyland in Lancashire has the capacity to produce 24,000 vehicles, but last year it produced only 11,000. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Miller) said, British Leyland must take action to reduce its fixed costs. Unless it does so, there will be no hope of its becoming viable.
The right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney said that the closure of Bathgate would save only 10 per cent. of British Leyland's costs. That is an argument for deeper cutting and more retrenchment if the corporation

is to become viable. But that is not the direction in which the Government have gone. The Government decided to support the board's recommendation to continue with the production of trucks in Britain. Many of my hon. Friends, including my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South, might think it surprising that the Government hung on for so long after such losses. Last year Leyland Vehicles lost £70 million; the year before it lost £60 million; and the year before that it lost a similar sum. Those are the figures before interest.
However, the Government decided to back the recommendation of the board. I stress that it was its recommendation to close Bathgate but to continue lorry production at Leyland Vehicles. Unless we closed Bathgate, jobs and production elsewhere would have been endangered.

Mr. Shore: What information does the Minister have about the future of export or domestic markets that makes him confident that he can sustain losses of £60 million a year in the rest of the Leyland truck division, but also makes him confident that he is right to close the major facility at Bathgate, which would save only £10 million?

Mr. Lamont: We accepted the view of the board about the future truck demand in Britain and overseas. The board believes, based on the overseas and domestic markets and on other cost-cutting measures that it will take in its plants, that there is a prospect of viability for the industry in a few years' time.
Opposition Members have said that we should do the same for Leyland Vehicles as we did for British Leyland Cars—invest more and develop more models. But we have done precisely that. The leader of the Liberal party was way off the mark when he referred to the need for new models. Leyland Vehicles has developed new models at the heavier end of the market. The small MT211 truck will come on stream this year, and the Sherpa light van has already obtained more than 23·5 per cent. of the market. Leyland Vehicles has invested in new models and throughout this period has been supported with large sums of money by the Government. I wonder what a Labour Government would have done? Under the Labour Government nearly 30,000 jobs were lost in British Leyland, which is equivalent to the closure of Bathgate every four or five months. Opposition Members talk about import penetration. This year, for the first time for many years, Leyland Vehicles increased its share of the market. However, every single year that the Labour party was in office, British Leyland's share of the truck market declined.
Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen have said that they intend to fight this closure. I hope that they do not mean those words too literally and that they will not give encouragement to people who want to obstruct the continuity of production at Bathgate, which will go on for some time yet. If they insist on following that course, they will endanger jobs elsewhere in other parts of Leyland Vehicles. It is a serious matter if the engines cannot be got out of Bathgate for other parts of Leyland Vehicles. Therefore, I hope that Labour Members will use restraint and encourage the work force at Bathgate to behave responsibly.
It was interesting that, during the debate, whenever my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland talked about new jobs and new investment in Scotland, Labour


Members did not want to know. They could not take the words. Sometimes—perhaps I can say this as a Scot—I have the feeling that many Labour Members want Scotland to masquerade as an under-privileged and underdeveloped region. The truth is that unemployment in Scotland is lower than in many of the assisted areas in England, and lower than in the north-east and the north-west of England. It is also interesting that GDP per head in Scotland is higher than in any region of England, other than the south-east. Right hon. and hon. Members still insist on portraying the image of Scotland as a backward region, dependent on old, traditional industries. They do not want to know the good news and they do not want to know about the new investment.
The closure of Bathgate is regrettable, but I believe, on the basis of the facts that have been spelt out, that it is the only—

Mr. James Hamilton: rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.

Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.

Question put accordingly:—

The House divided: Ayes 177, Noes 281.

Division No. 336]
[7.11 pm


AYES


Abse, Leo
Douglas, Dick


Alton, David
Dubs, Alfred


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Eadie, Alex


Ashdown, Paddy
Eastham, Ken


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Edwards, Bob (W'h'mpt'n SE)


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Evans, John (St. Helens N)


Barnett, Guy
Ewing, Harry


Barron, Kevin
Fatchett, Derek


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Faulds, Andrew


Beith, A. J.
Fields, T. (L'pool Broad Gn)


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Fisher, Mark


Bermingham, Gerald
Foot, Rt Hon Michael


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Forrester, John


Boyes, Roland
Foster, Derek


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Foulkes, George


Brown, Gordon (D'f'mline E)
Fraser, J. (Norwood)


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald


Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)
Freud, Clement


Brown, Ron (E'burgh, Leith)
Garrett, W. E.


Caborn, Richard
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John


Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd &amp; M)
Godman, Dr Norman


Campbell, Ian
Golding, John


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)


Canavan, Dennis
Harman, Ms Harriet


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter


Clarke, Thomas
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith


Clay, Robert
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S.)
Haynes, Frank


Cohen, Harry
Healey, Rt Hon Denis


Coleman, Donald
Heffer, Eric S.


Conlan, Bernard
Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)


Cook, Frank (Stockton North)
Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)


Cook, Robin F. (Livingston)
Howell, Rt Hon D. (S'heath)


Corbett, Robin
Hoyle, Douglas


Corbyn, Jeremy
Hughes, Dr. Mark (Durham)


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)


Craigen, J. M.
Hughes, Roy (Newport East)


Crowther, Stan
Hughes, Simon (Southward)


Cunningham, Dr John
John, Brynmor


Dalyell, Tam
Kilroy-Silk, Robert


Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (L'lli)
Kinnock, Rt Hon Neil


Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)
Kirkwood, Archibald


Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)
Lambie, David


Deakins, Eric
Lamond, James


Dewar, Donald
Leighton, Ronald


Dixon, Donald
Lewis, Terence (Worsley)


Dobson, Frank
Litherland, Robert


Dormand, Jack
Lloyd, Tony (Stretford)





Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Rooker, J. W.


McCartney, Hugh
Ross, Ernest (Dundee W)


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


McGuire, Michael
Rowlands, Ted


McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Sedgemore, Brian


McKelvey, William
Sheerman, Barry


Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


Maclennan, Robert
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


McNamara, Kevin
Short, Mrs R.(W'hampt'n NE)


McTaggart, Robert
Silkin, Rt Hon J.


McWilliam, John
Skinner, Dennis


Madden, Max
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


Marek, Dr John
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'kl'ds E)


Marshall, David (Shettleston)
Soley, Clive


Martin, Michael
Spearing, Nigel


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Steel, Rt Hon David


Maxton, John
Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)


Meacher, Michael
Stott, Roger


Meadowcroft, Michael
Strang, Gavin


Mikardo, Ian
Straw, Jack


Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)
Thorne, Stan (Preston)


Nellist, David
Tinn, James


O'Brien, William
Torney, Tom


O'Neill, Martin
Wainwright, R.


Owen, Rt Hon Dr David
Warden, Gareth (Gower)


Park, George
Wareing, Robert


Parry, Robert
Weetch, Ken


Patchett, Terry
Welsh, Michael


Pendry, Tom
White, James


Pike, Peter
Wigley, Dafydd


Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)
Williams, Rt Hon A.


Radice, Giles
Winnick, David


Randall, Stuart
Woodall, Alec


Redmond, M.
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Rees, Rt Hon M. (Leeds S)
Young, David (Bolton SE)


Richardson, Ms Jo



Roberts, Allan (Bootle)
Tellers for the Ayes:


Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)
Mr. James Hamilton and


Robertson, George
Mr. Lawrence Cunliffe.


Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)





NOES


Adley, Robert
Buck, Sir Antony


Aitken, Jonathan
Budgen, Nick


Alexander, Richard
Burt, Alistair


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Butler, Hon Adam


Amess, David
Butterfill, John


Ancram, Michael
Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)


Arnold, Tom
Chalker, Mrs Lynda


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Chapman, Sydney


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Chope, Christopher


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Churchill, W. S.


Baker, Rt Hon K. (Mole Vall'y)
Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)


Baldry, Anthony
Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)


Batiste, Spencer
Cockeram, Eric


Bellingham, Henry
Colvin, Michael


Bendall, Vivian
Conway, Derek


Benyon, William
Coombs, Simon


Berry, Sir Anthony
Cope, John


Best, Keith
Cormack, Patrick


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Corrie, John


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Couchman, James


Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter
Cranborne, Viscount


Body, Richard
Crouch, David


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Currie, Mrs Edwina


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Dicks, Terry


Bottomley, Peter
Dorrell, Stephen


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.


Braine, Sir Bernard
Dover, Den


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
du Cann, Rt Hon Edward


Bright, Graham
Dunn, Robert


Brinton, Tim
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)


Brooke, Hon Peter
Eggar, Tim


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
Evennett, David


Bruinvels, Peter
Eyre, Sir Reginald


Bryan, Sir Paul
Fairbairn, Nicholas






Fallon, Michael
Lilley, Peter


Farr, John
Lloyd, Ian (Havant)


Favell, Anthony
Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)


Finsberg, Sir Geoffrey
Lord, Michael


Fookes, Miss Janet
Lyell, Nicholas


Forman, Nigel
McCurley, Mrs Anna


Fowler, Rt Hon Norman
Macfarlane, Neil


Franks, Cecil
Maclean, David John


Fraser, Peter (Angus East)
Madel, David


Gale, Roger
Malins, Humfrey


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Malone, Gerald


Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Maples, John


Glyn, Dr Alan
Marlow, Antony


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)


Goodlad, Alastair
Mather, Carol


Gow, Ian
Maude, Hon Francis


Greenway, Harry
Mawhinney, Dr Brian


Gregory, Conal
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Griffiths, E. (B'y St Edm'ds)
Mayhew, Sir Patrick


Grist, Ian
Mellor, David


Ground, Patrick
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Grylls, Michael
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Gummer, John Selwyn
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)
Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)


Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)
Miscampbell, Norman


Hampson, Dr Keith
Mitchell, David (NW Hants)


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Moate, Roger


Harvey, Robert
Monro, Sir Hector


Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Moore, John


Hayward, Robert
Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)


Heddle, John
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Murphy, Christopher


Hickmet, Richard
Neale, Gerrard


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Needham, Richard


Hind, Kenneth
Nelson, Anthony


Hirst, Michael
Neubert, Michael


Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Newton, Tony


Holt, Richard
Nicholls, Patrick


Hordern, Peter
Normanton, Tom


Howard, Michael
Norris, Steven


Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)
Oppenheim, Philip


Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Osborn, Sir John


Howell, Rt Hon D. (G'ldford)
Ottaway, Richard


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Page, John (Harrow W)


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Page, Richard (Herts SW)


Hunter, Andrew
Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Parris, Matthew


Irving, Charles
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Jackson, Robert
Patten, John (Oxford)


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Pawsey, James


Jessel, Toby
Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth


Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)
Percival, Rt Hon Sir Ian


Jones, Robert (W Herts)
Pollock, Alexander


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Porter, Barry


Kershaw, Sir Anthony
Powell, Rt Hon J. E. (S Down)


King, Roger (B'ham N'field)
Powell, William (Corby)


King, Rt Hon Tom
Powley, John


Knight, Gregory (Derby N)
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Knight, Mrs Jill (Edgbaston)
Price, Sir David


Knowles, Michael
Prior, Rt Hon James


Lamont, Norman
Proctor, K. Harvey


Lang, Ian
Pym, Rt Hon Francis


Lawrence, Ivan
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel
Rees, Rt Hon Peter (Dover)


Lee, John (Pendle)
Renton, Tim


Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)
Rhodes James, Robert


Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Lester, Jim
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)


Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Stamf'd)
Roe, Mrs Marion


Lightbown, David
Rossi, Sir Hugh





Rost, Peter
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Rowe, Andrew
Thompson, Donald (Calder V)


Ryder, Richard
Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)


Sackville, Hon Thomas
Thorne, Neil (Ilford S)


Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Thornton, Malcolm


Sayeed, Jonathan
Thurnham, Peter


Scott, Nicholas
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Tracey, Richard


Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')
Twinn, Dr Ian


Shelton, William (Streatham)
van Straubenzee, Sir W.


Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)
Viggers, Peter


Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge)
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Shersby, Michael
Waldegrave, Hon William


Silvester, Fred
Walden, George


Sims, Roger
Walker, Bill (T'side N)


Skeet, T. H. H.
Walker, Rt Hon P. (W'cester)


Smith, Sir Dudley (Warwick)
Waller, Gary


Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)
Wardle, C. (Bexhill)


Soames, Hon Nicholas
Warren, Kenneth


Speed, Keith
Watson, John


Speller, Tony
Watts, John


Spencer, Derek
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Squire, Robin
Wheeler, John


Stanbrook, Ivor
Whitfield, John


Steen, Anthony
Wiggin, Jerry


Stern, Michael
Winterton, Mrs Ann


Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)
Winterton, Nicholas


Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)
Wolfson, Mark


Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)
Wood, Timothy


Stewart, Ian (N Hertf'dshire)
Woodcock, Michael


Stokes, John
Yeo, Tim


Stradling Thomas, J.
Younger, Rt Hon George


Sumberg, David



Tapsell, Peter
Tellers for the Noes:


Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)
Mr. Douglas Hogg and


Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman
Mr. John Major.


Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.

Question accordingly negatived.

Mr. Nellist: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. We have just had an extremely important debate, during which the anger against the Government's announcement on 22 May of those hundreds of workers in Scotland who now occupy the Bathgate plant was reflected in speeches from the Labour Benches.
You will recall that that announcement was made as part of the statement of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on BL's corporate plan, which did not mention the closure of Bathgate or C. H. Roe and gave only three lines to the privatisation of Jaguar. It is my understanding that once a statement is made and questions asked on it, apart from your decision to accept the application under Standing Order No. 10 for the debate that we have just had, no further pressure can be brought to bear on the Government to answer questions on that statement. May I make it clear that the workers of Coventry, who support the opposition to the plan of those in Bathgate and Leeds, will also want the Government to answer questions on the privatisation of Jaguar?

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is making the speech that he might have made had he been called, he has made his point.

Cruise Missiles

OPPOSITION DAY

[14TH ALLOTTED DAY]—considered

Mr. Denzil Davies: I beg to move,
That this House condemns the government's decision to agree to the deployment of American cruise missiles in the United Kingdom; believes that these missiles are of no military value, that their deployment has directly contributed to the breakdown of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union for the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, has made the prospect of disarmament much more difficult and has weakened public support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and calls upon the Government to halt all further deployment and to remove all existing cruise missiles from the United Kingdom.

Mr. Speaker: I have selected the amendment in the name of the Prime Minister.
I appeal to right hon. and hon. Members for short speeches because I have a long list of 18 Members who wish to take part in the debate.

Mr. Davies: This is the first debate that we have had in the House since the Government's deployment of cruise missiles following upon the NATO decision in 1979. During the miserable escalation of nuclear weapons that we have seen over the past 35 years, there cannot have been a weapon of so little value and yet potentially so dangerous as the cruise missile. There cannot have been a Government decision so politically damaging as that to bring those missiles to Britain.
Since the December 1979 decision thousands of words, many of them long and most of them unconvincing, have been poured forth to try to find some justification for cruise. Indeed, if one reads the literature some of the attempts to justify cruise merely on grounds of military strategy have proved so convoluted that they make the dissertations of medieval philosophers sound as simple as an editorial in The Sun.
Vast negotiating and diplomatic claims—we see it in the Government's amendment — have been made for cruise. Apparently, cruise would drag the reluctant Russians kicking and screaming to the negotiating table. The shadow of cruise hovering over the congresses of Geneva would, like some technological Talleyrand, wring concessions out of the Russian bear. It has not happened. The reality has been completely different. Cruise came, and, as we know, the Russians went.
Even more remarkably, we were told that we had to have cruise because its presence in Britain and Europe would bind America firmly to the defence of Europe. A bridge of 550 cruise missiles was apparently to span the Atlantic and bind America to Europe. Again, the reality has been different. Cruise has destroyed more bridges than it ever built between Britain, Europe and the United States.
Most military experts will privately admit that cruise, especially when added to the West's vast nuclear arsenal, is of little military use. The House knows, and it has been said time and again, that both sides have enough nuclear weapons to blow up the world ten times over. The United States alone has 40,000 targets in its nuclear sights. No doubt the Soviet Union has likewise. Unfortunately, there is nothing that cruise can do which cannot be done already by the existing missile systems that we have in the West.
An American general is reported to have said—and he made the point bluntly, and with the elegance of language which comes naturally only to five-star generals—of cruise that all it would do was "to bounce the rubble." All that it would do was merely to add to the rubble that would be created by the existing deployment of nuclear missiles.
Mr. Robert McNamara, who knows a thing or two about this gruesome business, said in Newsweek magazine in December 1983:
There is no military requirement for NATO to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles to maintain a stable deterrent.
I should have thought that he would know and understand the problems involved in this matter. In that article, which I commend to the Secretary of State, he went on to argue that cruise and Pershing missiles should be unilaterally withdrawn from Europe by the Governments of Europe because of the political damage that they have already done within Europe and within the Alliance.
Not only is cruise of little military value but also, especially because the cruise that is being deployed in Britain is a land-based missile system, it exposes Britain to a much higher and greater risk of nuclear attack. With nuclear weapons becoming more lethal, more powerful and more accurate, it is criminally irresponsible of the Government to put nuclear missiles on land in a highly populated country like Britain, in a highly populated area of the country, where attempts to destroy those missiles would obliterate huge areas of southern England and kill thousands, if not millions, of people. That is the criminality of what the Government are doing in putting land-based missiles in a populous and highly populated country like Britain.
The House will recall the convoluted attempts of President Carter to base the land-based MX system in America. President Carter's advisers came up with the absurd, it seemed, notion of putting these missiles into perpetual motion. They were to be put on some kind of race track—a "Strangelovian" race track—that would run around the vastness and wastes of Utah and Nebraska. Everybody said that it was absurd. Within the logic of the game of land-based missiles, at least there was some bizarre logic about that decision. The A34 at Winchester, as I understand it, is not—or, at least, should not be—a race track. The wastes of Nebraska and Utah are not Hampshire and Berkshire.
The real point is that cruise is extremely vulnerable. It attracts an attack, especially as it is a land-based system in a highly populated area of Britain. The Government's attempts to minimise the vulnerability of cruise are ridiculous and irrelevant. These missiles are trundled out after midnight from Greenham common, taken a few miles down the A34, and then taken back before the sun rises. Apparently they have to be back in Greenham common before sunrise, like some kind of werewolves on wheels. That is the bizarre, ridiculous and irrelevant way in which the Government are trying to minimise the vulnerability of these missiles.

Mr. Roland Boyes: Does my right hon. Friend share my concern that not only are cruise missiles being brought out in the middle of the night and trundled round the countryside, when we cannot be sure whether they are armed or not, but, according to answers given to me by the Secretary of State for Defence, there are a number of half-crazed junkies running round


the Greenham common air base, and we cannot be sure whether some of the drivers of these trucks are not high on heroin or some other drugs?

Mr. Davies: Indeed. My hon. Friend's intervention bears out that, if the subject were not so serious, one could make a good Ealing studios Boulting Brothers comedy out of all this trundling of cruise missiles down the A34, and back before 6 o'clock in the morning.
The point about the vulnerability of cruise was put authoritatively by a gentleman named Mr. Richard Perle, who I believe is the United States Under-Secretary of Defence. The Secretary of State for Defence no doubt meets him from time to time. Mr. Perle is not a man, I believe, who is seen very often at peace camps. Mr. Perle is reported to have said — and I take it that he is authoritative on these matters—in the Boston Globe of 2 June 1983:
Cruise missiles never had much military utility because they are so vulnerable to attack.
Not only have the Government carried out a deployment that we believe is wrong, but they have deployed missiles on land in Britain that are vulnerable, because they cannot be manoeuvred out of any range of attack, which, as I have said, is criminally irresponsible.
The Secretary of State will no doubt curdle our blood with tales of the SS20, and will argue that cruise missiles were deployed in Britain because of, in retaliation for, the Russian deployment of the SS20 missile. We have heard this argument in the past, and no doubt we shall hear it again tonight. I do not suppose that we would get far if we argued that cruise missiles were in response to SS20s. However, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the deployment, manufacture, design and creation of cruise had very little, if anything—and probably nothing at all—to do with the SS20s. There is a considerable body of evidence that it would be counter-productive. There would be no point in going into it, because obviously the Secretary of State would not agree.
I will give one quotation to the House from General Bernard Rodgers, the supreme commander in Europe, who again, I should have thought, knows something about these matters. Addressing the Senate armed forces committee in the United States on 13 March 1983, he said:
Most people believe that it was because of the SS20s that we modernised.
I take it that "most people" includes the Secretary of State. He continued:
We would have modernised irrespective of the SS20s.
That is what the supreme commander says, so, whatever the Secretary of State says, the supreme commander at least does not agree with him. He says that the modernisation would have gone on irrespective of the SS20s.
With cruise, we have been trapped, as so often with these new weapons, into the technology. Once a weapon becomes a gleam in the eye of the technologist, once it gets on to the drawing board, once it is designed and production starts, the technology takes over, and the technology comes first. The bureaucrats, generals, experts and politicians then somehow or other have to find some reasonable justification for the new modern technological missile. That justification and that technology fashions

military strategy and political theory. That is the danger in which we are with cruise, and with other missiles when they are thought up, designed and produced.
If the Secretary of State argues, as I am sure that he will, that the SS20s brought, created or ensured that we had cruise, if the argument is that we had to have them in retaliation to the SS20s, I say this to him and to the Government. We reject the entire dangerous reasoning that lies behind that argument. The reasoning that we must have them because they have SS20s is based on the proposition that each side apparently must always match the other side's weapons—a bomb for a bomb, and a missile for a missile. That is the basis of the Government's case, if the Government argue that we must have them because they have them. It seems to us that therein lies the path to total nuclear disaster.
I quote next from Professor Michael Howard who is a respected academic and expert in this sphere. In The Times of November 1983, he said:
The SS20s remain a very small proportion of the enormous nuclear force that the Soviet Union is capable of launching against western Europe. The belief of some strategic analysts that the Russians can be deterred by the installation of precisely matching systems—ground-launched missiles must be matched with ground-launched missiles — is naive to the point of absurdity.
That is the other point that we make about cruise. Not only is it dangerous and vulnerable, because it is on land—indeed, we do not want it in any form—but the whole reasoning behind the Government's case, that somehow every weapon must be matched by another weapon system, is dangerous, and, indeed, as Professor Howard said, naive.
One claim that the Secretary of State will not be able to make, although I observe that there is some attempt to make it in the Government's amendment—is that cruise has brought the Russians to the negotiating table, and has forced concessions out of them. That was the claim. It was made by NATO and we have had it from Ministers, including the Secretary of State, in various articles which he has written. Apparently, the Russians would have to negotiate and come to an agreement if we deployed cruise missiles. It just did not work. NATO was wrong, the Government were wrong and the Secretary of State was wrong. The deployment of cruise destroyed the talks. We can say that it was unjustified of the Russians to walk out of the talks and that they are terrible people, but the fact remains that it was the deployment of cruise that destroyed the talks.
We are now in the alarming position of having no real talks between the Americans and the Russians on nuclear weapons, be they intermediate, theatre or strategic, and there is no prospect of such talks. There is an absence of talks because cruise missiles were deployed hastily by the Government and NATO in the middle of talks.

Mr. Peter Rost: If the cruise system is so vulnerable and so useless, can the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) explain why the Russians are making such a fuss about us deploying them?

Mr. Davies: That is part of the puerile game that is played between the two sides and an illustration of the great danger that we face when we start matching systems with systems. This is the real problem.

Mr. Rost: Answer the question.

Mr. Davies: The Government mention talks and there will have to be talks at some stage. The Russians will have to come back to the Americans and there will have to be some talks, and I hope that they take place fairly soon. Those talks will not be confined to cruise, Pershing and SS20s because the world will have moved on by the time that they take place. They will embrace more missiles, more missile systems and more deployments, including the missiles that the Russians are deploying in retaliation to cruise. The Secretary of State may tell us during the next two years that we need more missiles as a retaliation against the Russians retaliation. That will mean that we shall retaliate against the missiles that the Russians have used to retaliate against our cruise which, in effect, was a retaliation against their SS20s. The Opposition's case is that the miserable, puerile and deadly game goes on and on without a break.

Mr. Kenneth Hind: Would I be right in concluding from the right hon. Gentleman's comments that the Opposition would rather not join the puerile game at all and would rather have no nuclear weapons, including cruise?

Mr. Davies: It is not really a matter of joining the game. We are in the game and we want to try to stop it. We want to do something positive instead of playing it all the time without any hope of bringing it to an end.
I think that most people would agree that cruise is not much use militarily and that diplomatically it has not created the concessions for which we hoped. In fact, it has created retaliation by the Russians which may lead to retaliation on our side.
Finally, it is argued that we must have cruise missiles because, in the jargon of the trade — there is a considerable amount of it—they will couple Europe to America. Apparently these missiles will overturn the configuration of geography and ensure that an American president will risk the nuclear destruction of New York and Chicago in the defence of Frankfurt and London. That is the essence of the jargon of coupling the United States to Europe.
That justification has failed also. If an American president were faced with that awesome decision, he would act, quite rightly, on the basis of America's national interest and that of the people who elected him. The presence of 500 cruise missiles in Europe would make no difference to that decision. The idea that we can overturn national interest, geography and history by having these wretched missiles in Europe is a misunderstanding of the realities of states, presidents, prime ministers and decision making.

Mr. Edward Leigh: Am I to take it that the right hon. Gentleman accepts that America is not installing cruise missiles in Britain to wage a limited war in Europe? That allegation has been made by CND on several occasions and it cannot be true.

Mr. Davies: Cruise missiles are in Britain as part of a NATO strategy, unfortunately, which envisages a limited nuclear war. Cruise is the third part of the escalation. It is ridiculous. We have battlefield nuclear weapons, theatre nuclear weapons and the third round of the escalation is the cruise missile. Cruise is with us to fight what is ridiculously called a limited nuclear war in Europe.
The justification has failed — that was bound to happen — because the deployment of missiles cannot

change the very nature of America and its relationships with western Europe. Far from bringing America and Europe closer, its deployment has harmed relations between the two. The deployment of cruise and Pershing has undermined much public support for NATO, especially among younger people on the continent of Europe. One example is the attitude of the younger people in Germany, who are especially concerned about the deployment of Pershing. The deployment of these missiles has brought to the surface latent anti-Americanism, which exists in every country in Europe. The case for cruise has been destroyed, even on the ground of coupling. There is no case on military grounds, no case on diplomatic grounds and no case on the bridge-building ground between Europe and America. Most of those who know about these matters tell me that NATO is facing the worst crisis that has arisen since its inception.
The Government should now admit—I think that this would probably be admitted by the Secretary of State in private—that the 1979 decision was wrong, hasty and damaging. The Secretary of State should now stop berating, before he goes off to Stormont or wherever—

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Not him.

Mr. Davies: I apologise to the Secretary of State, for I did not want to spoil his day. I withdraw my remark about Stormont. The right hon. Gentleman should stop berating constantly the peace movement and its continual and rightful opposition to cruise missiles in Britain. When he goes to NATO he should stop bullying the Dutch, who do not want cruise missiles in Holland any more than we want them in Britain. The Government should start by sending the cruise missiles that are here back to where they came from. They should stop deploying any more and start taking some positive steps to halt the slide to nuclear catastrophe.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Michael Heseltine): I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
welcomes the determination of Her Majesty's Government to implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's twin-track decision of December 1979 on intermediate range nuclear forces; deplores the unjustified Soviet departure from the Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva; and reaffirms that adherence to the agreed deployment programme offers the firmest foundation both for the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Alliance and for the resumption of arms control negotiations.
There are many right hon. and hon. Members who wish to contribute to the debate, and I shall not detain the House long. Many of the arguments have been rehearsed before and tonight we have not heard any that are new.
The speech of the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) was disappointing in a significant way, because he approached the issue as though the previous Labour Government and their policies had never existed and never came about. When the Conservative Government came to power, inevitably we had to reach a number of judgments in the light of current events and the unfolding momentum of current policies. That is inevitable for any newly elected Government. I was not at the forefront of the decision-making process because I had responsibilities in a domestic Department. However, those of my colleagues who had to reach judgments on these critical and immensely significant issues found that the Soviets were in the process of deploying SS20s on a significant scale.
First, the SS20s were facing western Europe and the east. That was an extremely unpalatable and unattractive escalation in the defence situation. I use the word "escalation" just as the right hon. Member for Llanelli did. That was a fact. It was not something that one could ignore. No one in government could ignore that. It proceeded persistently throughout the mid-1970s, despite all the western countries' adverse comments.
The second fact that the Labour Government of the day and the NATO Alliance had to recognise was that the intermediate range of weapon systems available to the NATO Alliance was aging. When looking into the 1980s and 1990s, no one could question that the V-bomber force, for example, which was Britain's contribution, would not remain credible, and that the F111 would become increasingly less credible as Soviet technology advanced. Therefore, there was a need to ask whether we should modernise that intermediate range of nuclear weapon systems. That was an inevitable question for any Government at the time who held a responsible position of power.
The third fact to be taken into account was the fear of the Social Democrats, who were then in power in the Federal Republic of Germany—led by Helmut Schmidt —that, if some of those systems were not replaced by a land system in Europe, there would be a de-coupling process that would separate the Americans from the nuclear umbrella that protected Europe.

Mr. Denzil Davies: The right hon. Gentleman should not slide over the point about the previous Labour Government and its relationship with NATO. There was a decision to modernise theatre nuclear weapons, but it was a decision to modernise the F111s. The decision whether to go totally against all that had happened in the past and to have cruise missiles was totally separate from that decision. There were two different types of modernisation.

Mr. Heseltine: That innovation in the debate will be widely noted with a certain scepticism. It might help if the right hon. Gentleman could say how the F111s are being modernised. We might then be able to judge the validity of his observation. I notice the silence that greets that.
That is not what the discussions were all about, but I shall come to that shortly. I shall have to remind the House of some of the quotations that Opposition students of such matters can find in Hansard. Those quotations will, I think, establish beyond peradventure whether the dialogue in NATO was about the modernisation of F111s or the introduction of a counter to the SS20s.
My point is that there is a factual background to the decisions that this Government had to take. The third factor was the Germans' growing anxiety about the need to ensure a continuing American commitment to the defence of NATO. Those three factors were among the essential ingredients that led to the formulation of the policies of the previous Labour Government. That was the background to be found on the desks of my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, and, of course, on that of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, when she and my colleagues had to grapple with the question of where to go next. There was not much time to seek to change the momentum of events, even if we had wanted to do so. A matter of days before

the 1979 general election, a decision was taken when Lord Mulley—then Fred Mulley—was present at the NATO meeting that discussed these matters. I have the communiqué of the NATO conference, with which the House will be familiar. Indeed, I shall quote from it. It was decided that it would be necessary
to maintain and modernise theatre nuclear forces.
That decision was taken on 25 April 1979.
The right hon. Member for Llanelli tried to say that that had nothing to do with cruise. I accept that the communiqué did not refer to the cruise missile system. The right hon. Gentleman wants the House to believe that it was a decision about the modernisation of the F111s. However, shortly afterwards, it was announced that we were going to proceed with modernisation, involving the cruise weapon system — [Interruption.] That was in December, by which time we were in office. But the suggestion that the option was F111s has to be seen in the context not of what the right hon. Gentleman had to say, but of what the Labour party spokesmen had to say when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made his announcement, and a debate was held on the NATO decisions.
I shall quote Bill Rodgers—[Interruption.] I hope that Opposition Members will remember that he was then the Labour party spokesman on defence and that he spoke from the Opposition Front Bench. It may well be that he found the policies that we are now listening to so intolerably suffocating that he got out, but that does not mean that they were not the Labour party's policies at that time.
I remind the House of what the official spokesman for the Labour party said in the Chamber when the House debated the issue of cruise missile system modernisation. He said:
As the House knows, when the right hon. Gentleman made his statement on 13 December, we accepted the need to move ahead on the proposed timetable. It was the view of the previous Government that theatre nuclear modernisation was essential, and that is our view today.
Bill Rodgers was referring to the statement made about the modernisation of the cruise missile system.
A little later in the same volume of Hansard one can find the speech made by Mr. Mulley:
The key argument in all this … was not whether we should modernise but whether we should modernise before seeking a possibility of arms control agreement with the Soviet Union in this area or whether we should first take the decision and then seek negotiation … I therefore accepted that the NATO decision could not be further delayed."—[Official Report, 24 January 1980; Vol 977, c. 691–99.]
I hope that the House will accept that without any shadow of doubt the previous Labour Government were totally and deeply involved in the process leading to the cruise decision, and that the Labour party spokesmen confirmed, after the decision was announced, that they believed that the previous Labour Government would have taken precisely the same decision as this Government took. Given the arguments that the right hon. Member for Llanelli and his colleagues now deploy, that leaves them open to the almost unanswerable charge of hypocrisy.
Tonight, the right hon. Gentleman has argued that the whole concept of deterrence is to be questioned, and that it is not necessary for the NATO Alliance to have a range of nuclear weapons that is broadly equivalent to those deployed by the Soviet Union. The right hon. Gentleman says that he does not believe that it was necessary to


modernise the INF weapon systems. I assume that that is what he is now saying. He is saying that it was not necessary—

Mr. Boyes: The Secretary of State thinks that he is in the Oxford Union, but he is in Parliament.

Mr. Heseltine: But the Labour spokesman at the time confirmed that modernisation was necessary. It is not the need or the threat that has changed, but the policies of the Labour party. The right hon. Gentleman has confirmed his view that the weapons system has no military use, but that was not the view that his colleagues held at the time the decision was taken when speaking from the same Front Bench as the right hon. Gentleman. They believe that it was a relevant and right decision. Therefore, without the slightest shadow of doubt, the Labour party has changed its position, despite the fact that, in the view of the Government and the NATO Alliance, there is not a shred of evidence to justify such a major reversal of defence policy in the NATO Alliance.
The next suggestion is that the arguments have become of such current concern in the NATO Alliance that they have harmed the relationship of NATO with its European allies. The interesting thing about that is that, whilst that is often asserted by those who represent the one-sided nuclear disarmament lobbies in Britain, when the people of this country or of the NATO Alliance have an opportunity to voice their expressions of certainty in a democratic process — in the Federal Republic of Germany and in this country, for instance—significant enhanced majorities are achieved by the Governments who want to proceed with the decision that the House is now considering
Effectively, the right hon. Member for Llanelli is saying that, although the democratic process has created larger majorities for the policies that the Government are advocating, simply because people are prepared to take to the streets, the democratic impact of the ballot box should be overturned. We wholly reject such an interpretation of the democratic process.
The need for defence and flexible response has been rehearsed not just in the last few years, but over decades. That strand in the debate—that if one made a one-sided and ultimately neutralist approach to defence, somehow one would remain secure—has always existed. There is no historical evidence to support that assertion.
The only time in recent history that Britain made such a gesture, it made no impact upon Soviet defence polices. I refer to the one-sided decision that we took to abandon a chemical capability. The only consequence was that the Soviet Union continued to build up its chemical capability. It remains today a significant threat to the Western Alliance. Everyone who has studied the issue is aware of that.
There is no argument for abandoning our policy of deterrence. Deterrence cannot be maintained unless we are, from time to time, prepared to modernise the systems which make up that deterrence. Of course, every time that that is done, difficult dilemmas, which massively concern public opinion, are created. Everyone knows that weapons systems have a horrendous capability. Everybody knows that it would be better if we could secure agreements with the Soviets to reduce numbers.
There is no evidence that we shall achieve agreement with the Soviet Union if we destabilise the position by

unilaterally reducing our own capabilities. We would rather pursue the arms negotiations route. The second track of the twin-track decision is as important to us as the modernisation of the weapons system itself. Nobody can doubt that we tried at Geneva to persuade the Soviet Union to reduce its SS20 deployment before we took the initial decision to deploy cruise missiles in NATO countries.
We now say what we have said consistently. If the Soviets will come back to the negotiating table, with every good will we shall try to secure a limitation, or preferably an elimination, of weapons systems in Europe. That is what we want in the NATO Alliance. The Soviet Union is carrying out a major deployment of a new weapons system — the SS20s — in advance of equivalent deployment in the West. When we try to negotiate with them, they refuse; and the moment that we begin the deployment by way of deterrence they walk out of the negotiating conference on their own. It cannot be said that after that we should give up our right to the deterrence that we believe is necessary for our protection. That is not a defensive strategy, but an abdication of the sovereign rights of the Western world and a major destabilising contribution to the peace of our society.

Mr. Kevin Barron: Does the Secretary of State agree that the majority of people believe that the deterrence factor of nuclear weapons is that they will not be used? I have a Ministry of Defence document about cruise missiles, which was handed out at Greenham common. On the question of nuclear war, it states that the aim of using cruise missiles would be
to persuade the Russian leadership, even at the 11th hour, to draw back.
That does not seem to me to involve a question of deterrence in terms of, "They will not bomb us because we will bomb them." The document discusses the question of not having an all-out nuclear war. The pamphlet is specific, and says that cruise missiles would be used to avoid all-out nuclear war. How does the Secretary of State expect the people to accept these awful missiles in relation to the protection of this country?

Mr. Heseltine: The hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) grossly misrepresents any document that he has from the Ministry of Defence. Everyone knows that the purpose of the deployment of cruise and all other weapons systems available to the NATO Alliance is to create a deterrence and to ensure that the Soviets do not attack the NATO Alliance. Everyone knows that it came about to stop the westward advance of the Soviet Union at the end of the second world war.

Mr. Barron: Here, read the document.

Mr. Heseltine: The hon. Gentleman will not persuade the British people to allow him to re-write history in such a naive and irresponsible way.
Our position remains clear. We shall do all within our capability to persuade the Soviet Union—

Mr. Bob Clay: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I believe that the Secretary of State has implied that a document from which a quotation has been taken is bogus.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Clay) appears not to be making a point of order; but if he has a point of order in this short debate, will he make it quickly?

Mr. Clay: Is it in order for the Secretary of State to imply that a document produced in the House is bogus?

Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.

Mr. Heseltine: There is nothing bogus about what I was saying. I was referring to a bogus interpretation of the document.
Our position remains as it always has been. We want above all else to secure a negotiated arms reduction with the Soviet Union. That offer is on the table and remains there. Any disruption in the process is because the Soviet Union walked out. We remain willing to talk.
In the meantime, we shall continue, in the range of arms procurement, to have a dialogue with the Soviet Union when it will talk to us. A range of alternatives is being progressed by the West.
Within the deployed systems of nuclear weapons at our disposal we are as concerned as anyone in the House could expect or require of us to ensure that we do not deploy, or allow to be deployed, more weapons systems than are essential for the task that we undertake.
In the dialogue about whether we have too many short-range or battlefield nuclear weapons, the Government have demonstrated their concern in the most visible and tangible way. During the 1960s, about 7,000 battlefield nuclear weapons were available to NATO. That remained the position right through the period of the last Labour Government. As many battlefield nuclear weapons were deployed at the end of the Labour Government's time in office as at the beginning.
Within a short time of this Government coming to office and taking their part in the NATO Alliance, we announced a reduction of 1,000 weapons. Subsequently the Government have added to that a further reduction of 2,000. That means that when the exercise is completed we shall have secured the lowest deployment of such weapons for 20 years. The Government have helped to carry through that process, in sharp contrast to the words now being used by Opposition Members who, when in office, did nothing tangible to secure such objectives. By all means, we shall negotiate. We want arms control and reduction. However, in the process we will not reduce the essential deterrence upon which we believe the peace of the Western world depends, and has depended with success for 35 years.

Dr. David Owen: The House is debating a Labour party motion that is straight unilateralism. The Secretary of State is not entitled to quarrel about the justification for the motion. It contains the view of the Labour party at the last election. All Labour Members sitting in the House supported a unilateralist manifesto. Therefore, we should expect such a motion to be tabled.
I do not think that a great deal is achieved by discussing what happened prior to 1979. It was not, of course, the interpretation put upon it by the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies). The theatre modernisation was mainly connected with the need to do something quickly about Pershing I. The whole question of theatre modernisation relates to the Federal Republic of Germany and its politics. As it has forsworn nuclear weapons, it is anxious about the validity of the United States nuclear guarantee. That is the core of the issue.
The only logical reason for cruise missiles being deployed in Italy and Britain is that the Federal Republic of Germany felt that it was wrong to expect it to modernise Pershing I on its own. It wanted other members of NATO to share part of the political burden. An alliance is not simply military sharing; it is a sharing of political burdens. That was the real case for a spread of deployment.
The Secretary of State cannot have it both ways. He said that the Labour Government had prepared the possibility of theatre nuclear modernisation during the painful negotations within NATO that lasted for two years, and he was right. But the Labour Government also paved the way for the reduction of 1,000 battlefield nuclear weapons, to which the right hon. Gentleman laid claim. I spent many hours arguing that the fundamental issue was to remove the battlefield nuclear weapons which are easily the most dangerous nuclear weapons that exist.
Nothing causes me more despair than reading the Foreign Secretary's party political press release at the beginning of the European campaign. He said:
The barriers which divide East from West cannot be dismantled by gimmicks …the SDP-Liberal 'Battlefield Nuclear Weapon Free Zone' 
does not have any practical significance. It is
designed to camouflage internal policy conflicts.
The number of people and Governments who now believe that we should move towards a battlefield nuclear-free zone is growing every day.
Frank Cooper, the most distinguished permanent undersecretary who ever served in the Ministry of Defence, during a speech at St. James's Church, Piccadilly—as reported in The Guardian—made it absolutely clear that he would like to see both sides rid of all battlefield nuclear weapons
by which I mean weapons of short range (say up to 100 km.)
It is ridiculous to call that a gimmick. I wish that the Foreign Secretary was here to justify his ludicrous statement. If that is the view that the Foreign Secretary takes into the arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, there is no chance of achieving progress.
The Labour party's motion must be opposed lock, stock and barrel. It is straight unilateralism. If there was any doubt about what the Labour party thought during the last election, that has been completely eradicated by what the new leader of the party has said. The right hon. Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock) made it clear to United States Senators and Congressmen that there were no circumstances in which, if ever given the opportunity, he would authorise nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no point in any future Labour Government—which I do not think will ever come about—ever having nuclear weapons. I do not mean only cruise missiles, but Polaris, Trident or any nuclear device, such as LANCE or others. That is the Opposition's policy. It is misguided and wrong. It is inconsistent with the view of any previous Labour Government, but they are entitled to it. We should not worry too much about that.
The real question is what the Government are saying. Their amendment asks us to endorse the twin-track decision of December 1979 on intermediate range nuclear forces. As the Secretary of State knows, I think that he was given no other option in the light of the circumstances of November and December last year. He could only continue with the deployment decision. I welcome the decision of the Italians and the Federal Republic of Germany to follow suit.
The right hon. Gentleman cannot, however, continue to invoke the December 1979 decision as if nothing has happened. That decision made specific reference to SALT II. At that time, it was hoped that SALT II would be ratified and carried out. The commitment to INF negotiations was seen in the context of a successful SALT II, with the possible moving on to SALT III. The right hon. Gentleman knows that that was the background to the decision. That has now changed, because SALT II has not been ratified. However, it is important to remember that, so far, all its major provisions have been maintained. Neither President Reagan nor President Chernenko has, as yet, made any formal breach in the limitations agreed in the treaty. That is one glimmering light of progress in a rather dismal arms control scene.
Should the 1979 decision be held to in all circumstances? It is the utmost folly for NATO countries to insist that countries such as Holland should split apart on the issue and carry out deployment exactly and within all the parameters of the basis of the 1979 decision. Holland has a coalition Government tackling some very difficult economic problems. They are solid for NATO and have not become unilateralists. To drive them into a decision that may well risk the cohesion of that Government is foolhardy. And for what? It is simply to keep to the letter of the 1979 decision when the basic decision and the basic question—

Mr. Leigh: What about the Belgians?

Dr. Owen: Much the same applies to the Belgians. The burden of responsibility for deployment should be taken by the three key countries which have the political stability and no history of neutralism — Italy, Britain and Germany. If Holland could begin the preparation of the airfields that would be helpful, but it does not serve the integrity and cohesion of NATO to put such pressure on the Dutch Government.
There is another reason why we should not continue with deployment, and that is spelt out in our amendment. We genuinely believe that there will not be any possibility of reopening the INF negotiations until after the US presidential election. It is clear that the Soviet Union has made a decision not to make any progress in arms control, despite the great many discussions and back-channel negotiations prior to the elections. That means that there will be no serious negotiations this side of the early months of 1985. It would be foolish for NATO to add to the existing levels of deployment during that time.
We have made it clear that we will not accept a Soviet veto on deployment. That was a political decision which we had to face down. We had to keep NATO's integrity intact. There is no military purpose in further deployment; there is only a political purpose. That political purpose will be damaging inside NATO and will make it that much harder to get the Soviets around the table.
The initial deployment of 16 missiles in Britain and 16 in Italy, together with 18 Pershings, is sufficient at the moment. If, in 1985, there are still no negotiations and the Soviet Union is still holding to the position that it will not discuss anything while we have the missiles, we will be into a different ball game. The Secretary of State's speech shows that he understands the problems. I urge him not to provoke, at this stage, a bad decision and make the Soviet Union turn away wholly from any form of arms control negotiation.
The virility of NATO has been demonstrated. Now is the time to ease back and concentrate on the fundamental question, which the right hon. Gentleman and most of his senior Ministry advisers know is how to improve the conventional defence of the NATO countries so that we can not only take out the further 2,000 battlefield weapons —most of which are out of date and would have to be taken out anyway—but all of them from an area around the frontiers, while beginning to ensure that we have a conventional capacity to hold a potential Soviet attack. We should not have to use nuclear weapons to overcome a major conventional attack.
There are ways other than nuclear weapons to prevent the concentration and massing of Soviet forces, which has been the only tactical and strategic justification for holding battlefield nuclear weapons — that one would thereby dissuade the Russians from so concentrating all their forces that they would push through on a very narrow front. It can be done with the new munitions—the new type of conventional armament — using non-nuclear devices. We should be developing that strategy.
The Government should stick with the present position on cruise, suspend further deployment, hope that in early 1985 we can get back to a dialogue with the Soviet Union and recognise that no serious talks will take place until the new US President is established in the White House, which means past the inauguration in January.
I hope, therefore, that the Secretary of State will use his influence in NATO to prevent those other countries which have a long record of having great difficulty with this issue from being forced to take such a decision. Italy has been able to manage the decision without causing the political strains which some people thought might occur. The Secretary of State should encourage the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to take a more enlightened view on this issue.

Mr. David Alton: My right hon. Friend will be aware that many people in Britain are deeply concerned about the failure to introduce a double safety catch system after the deployment of cruise.

Dr. Owen: I agree with my hon. Friend. He speaks for 90 per cent. of the population, who feel that if cruise missiles are to be deployed here, there should be a dual key, which means that the British Prime Minister would authorise British service men to release the safety catch. It is a physical control which goes beyond the political control. The present arrangements are political, not physical; they form a political agreement.
With the Thor missile there was a physical control. The argument is used that we purchased the Thor missiles. If the only way to get physical as well as political control is to purchase these cruise missiles, let us purchase them. There would then be much more support for the current deployment than there is in Britain, and anything to get a greater degree of consensus is worth achieving. The cost would not be anywhere near what the Secretary of State has implied. The United States Defence Secretary would willingly make an accomodation over cost. In any event, there would be ways of arranging that, as the right hon. Gentleman is aware.
Faced with the present situation and the inability—this is not a criticism—to move our amendment to the Labour motion, we shall vote against both that motion and the Government amendment to it. Both are bogus and bad.

Mr. Francis Pym: I hope that the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) will forgive me if, because of the shortness of the debate, I do not comment on the interesting points that he made. I shall address myself to the Opposition motion, and it is hard to find words to condemn it strongly enough. It is negative, pusillanimous, futile and a cause for celebration in the Kremlin.
The Opposition motion begins by condemning the Government for the decision to deploy cruise missiles. That was a unanimous decision by NATO. As the Secretary of State pointed out, the Opposition did not oppose that when we announced it. On the contrary, they accepted it. Indeed, they had themselves been a party to the NATO discussions which led to that very decision.
What is more, in the nuclear debate which took place the following month—which the Government initiated and which I opened—the Opposition gave us support. Since then, Opposition Members have changed their minds. They are entitled to do that, but they have changed them to a unilateralist position and have taken an attitude towards NATO that is completely incomprehensible and, therefore, absurd.
The Opposition motion says, secondly,
that these missiles are of no military value".
It is arguable whether any nuclear missile has any military value. It is not arguable, however, that they have a crucial deterrent value. The peace has been kept and, whether or not we like it, the value of these weapons lies in their deterrent capability.
It is not the kind of deterrence that any of us would choose. That is obvious. But one cannot just wish away these horrendous weapons and pretend that they do not exist. They cannot be disinvented. We must face the real world. It is right to use them to deter, and that is the entire concept of the West's strategy—defensive only, based on deterrence—and that applies a fortiori to nuclear weapons.
The third point in the Opposition motion is that
their deployment has directly contributed to the breakdown of negotiations".
That was the Soviet Union's excuse for walking out, which Opposition Members swallowed hook, line and sinker. How naive can they be? The Soviet build-up of SS20s, which is their modernised INF, had already reached 600 warheads at the time of the dual track decision in 1979, and in the succeeding four years, before NATO had deployed one Pershing II or cruise, the Soviet Union went on deploying more and more SS20s ruthlessly and remorselessly. There are now well over 1,000 warheads deployed in this category, compared with the 30 or so in NATO.
Labour Members appear to want to take no notice of that. They want to turn a blind eye to it and leave Britain and the West with an incomplete deterrent, exposing us to all the risks that that implies. I was shocked not to hear a word of criticism from the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) of the Soviet Union and what its military build-up is doing, the destabilisation and so on.
The Opposition motion goes on to say, fourthly, that
the prospect of disarmament … is now … much more difficult".
That is rubbish. The Soviet Union responds not to gestures but to facts. Why does anyone suppose that the Russians took so much trouble to try to frighten the Alliance away

from deployment? Why did they go to such lengths to try to upset the West and dissuade us from taking that step? Their propaganda machine has been at full stretch to try to prevent deployment because they would like NATO to have a hole in its deterrent and for our shield to be incomplete. Of course they would, but we are not all suckers. NATO remained firm and resolute in its decision: if there was progress in arms control — and we made enormous efforts to try to get it—there would be no deployment, but if there was no progress there would be deployment.

Mr. Boyes: rose—

Mr. Pym: In the interests of time, I will not give way.
If arms control negotiation is achieved at any time in the future, that decision can be reversed. I go so far as to say that, unless NATO's deterrent is complete and adequate, there can be no arms control negotiations because there would be nothing to negotiate about.

Mr. Boyes: rose—

Mr. Pym: I will not give way.
The Russians would have achieved the very advantage for which they have always worked. In the Alliance, contrary to what the right hon. Member for Llanelli said, we are not competing with the arms build-up of the Soviet Union. We are maintaining our defences in the minimum state adequate to deter the potential threat and to preserve the peace. That is our purpose. We are not competing with them weapon for weapon or anything like that.
Fifthly, the motion states that the deployment
has weakened public support for the North Atlantic Treaty organisation".
I do not accept that. The British people are solidly behind NATO. The vast majority of the people of Europe are behind NATO. [HON. MEMBERS: "That is not true."] What is true—and what is understandable and right—is that there is increasing anxiety about nuclear weapons. Who is not anxious about nuclear weapons? Those of us who have held or now hold positions of high responsibility in this connection have thought about those weapons perhaps more than anyone else. It is the irresponsibility of the Labour party that has caused doubt and apprehension in the minds of some of the public.
The Labour party is using its position as a great political party to weaken people's resolve. Labour Members do not have a defence or security policy. Some Labour Members support the policy followed by their party when they were last in office, and honourably so, but the Labour party, especially the Front Bench, is all over the place on defence. Labour Members criticise everything the Government do because they have no alternative of their own. They have no plan to fulfil their first responsibility, if they were to become a Government, which I do not believe they will—to defend the realm. Their position is as dishonest as it is disgraceful. A responsible Opposition —indeed, the old Labour party—would have supported the Government's amendment. In their hearts the Opposition know that the amendment is right and in the national interest. I fully endorse the Government amendment.
In a short debate there is no time to analyse the East-West balance or to describe the background to Western strategy and the rationale of our nuclear policy, but I shall state what I have always believed to be the three essentials for preserving our security and peace. The first is adequate


defences. I emphasise the word "adequate" because we do not want any more weapons than are necessary to fulfil the functions of deterring and defending. With that adequate defence must go a deterrent capability that is credible and effective, and that must include nuclear weapons.
The second essential is to conduct a dialogue with the Soviet Union, to increase mutual understanding, to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings and to build a more confident relationship. It is a slow process. It relates not only to arms control talks but to the whole spectrum of international politics. We must persevere with that process. The keynote is patience and persistence. We know the Soviet Union's reluctance to negotiate at the moment. Opposition Members too easily forget that point, but we must not be put off by that. We must persevere. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the Government now believe, as I do, that this dialogue is extremely important.
The third essential is co-operation among our allies and partners. "Consultation" and "co-ordination" are the key words. They are more difficult to achieve in practice than they sound, but co-operation is crucially important and one of the highest priorities for heads of Government.
Those three essentials are foundation stones upon which we can build a safer world and, however gradually it may occur in practice, ease the present tension. There is no hope on the basis of the Opposition's motion, and I have no doubt that the House will throw out their motion with the largest majority it can muster.

Mr. Michael Foot: I suppose that I should first sympathise with and congratulate the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) on having discovered a subject on which he can support the Government. He has done so with considerable grace. We would much prefer to see him back on the Front Bench, because then the job could be done much better. I shall refer later to his recipe for success. Obviously, the most important part of the debate is how we are to proceed.
The Secretary of State was incautious enough to say at the beginning of his remarks that he had heard on a number of occasions the arguments presented by my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies). He was familiar with all of them. In that case, it is strange that the right hon. Gentleman did not reply to them. Why did he not reply, especially to the most formidable parts of my right hon. Friend's speech about the Russian response to deployment? My right hon. Friend argued, as many people have argued before, that if deployment went ahead arms control would be very difficult for a considerable period. The Government, President Reagan and Conservative spokesmen, took a different view. Apparently, the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East took a different view also. All of them held the view that if they went ahead with deployment, it was likely to make arms control more feasible and likely and more frequently on the agenda. The correct argument on that subject is made by the Labour party. So far, there is not a scrap of evidence to support what the Secretary of State said but plentiful evidence to support what my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli said.
Weeks, months and even years before the deployment, the Russians said — this may have been sinister or Machiavellian — "If deployment goes ahead we shall clear out of the arms control discussion." That is what

some of us argued a long time before the latest deployment. We said, "Let us have proper discussions with the Russians then." Even before 1979 we were saying, "Let us get down to the negotiations as soon as possible. Let us not wait." We did not agree with the propositions on which President Reagan fought his election—to scrap all arms control and to close the gap, as was said, that had developed because of the nuclear superiority of the Russians. We did not agree with those propositions because we did not believe that there was any such thing as nuclear superiority on the side of the Russians vis-a-vis the Americans. The Government have shown that they believe that, because they have said so to President Reagan on many occasions. From 1979 we have argued for early discussions on arms control. We were in favour of those talks long before the Russians had built up their forces.
I agree that the Russians have stationed SS20s, but that does not alter the fact that there are now more SS20s. If there had been arms control discussions in the circumstances for which we argued, there would have been a better prospect of success. That point refers especially to what the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East said about the 1979 discussions. It is no use his going back over the argument about what the last Government agreed and disagreed. I know that there were many discussions and arguments about that in the House and elsewhere. As the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) has confirmed on a number of occasions—he looked at the minutes on the subject—there was no decision to go ahead with cruise.
Mr. Bill Rodgers, speaking for the Labour Oppostion, made some remarks on that matter. One of the first things I did when I was elected leader of the Labour party was to invite Mr. Bill Rodgers to relinquish his post. On the day of judgment, that is one of the things that I can present as one of my credentials. It was right to remove him. He did not express our whole view on the matter.

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Foot: I shall not give way.
The right hon. Member for Devonport has strongly underlined that point, but it is never underlined by the Secretary of State who should know something about these matters. The 1979 dual-track decision was taken in the light of agreements of the SALT II treaty. When that treaty was embarked upon there was an understanding that it would be sustained. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli is correct in saying that the superpowers have sustained the observance of that treaty even though they have abandoned their commitment. The Americans, not the Russians, walked away from the SALT II agreement. The United States chief negotiator, Paul Warnke, said that the American Government walked away from the SALT II agreement. That agreement was never ratified by the United States Government. It was an arms control agreement of major significance. It is no good the Secretary of State or anyone else saying that all the breaches of arms control agreements come from one side. We are not defenders of the Russian view or, indeed, of the American view. We think that both super-powers are guilty of grave offences against the rest of humanity.

Mr. Heseltine: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would not want to leave a false impression. The American Government have stuck to the figures in the SALT II agreement. Congress would not ratify it because the Soviets had marshals in Afghanistan.

Mr. Foot: I understand that, but the Labour party believes that that was no reason for the western countries, which had committed themselves to the arms control agreement, to abandon it.
Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that, because of the invasion of Afghanistan, he is not prepared to agree to any arms control with the Russians? If so, that makes nonsense of all the speeches he has delivered, although I appreciate that that is not a great feat.

Mr. Heseltine: The right hon. Gentleman will realise that the Americans have not abandoned the SALT II treaty limits. That is the critical point. They have stuck to them.

Mr. Foot: I understand that argument, but they abandoned a commitment to SALT II. Therefore, at any time they could breach that provision without being charged with having broken the agreement. The United States, supported by — I am ashamed to say it—this country, accepted the abandonment of the commitment to SALT II when the Russians retained a commitment to it. That also helped to govern the dual-track decision.
There have been great developments since that date. No one would dispute that. There have been many developments on the flexible response. Some of us thought that the whole idea of so-called flexible response was an insanity from the beginning. Many others took some time to come to that view. Field Marshal Carver— [HON. MEMBERS: "Ah."] I do not know why he should be jeered. He is one of the most distinguished soldiers that this country has known. I doubt whether the Secretary of State would jeer at him, and I am sure that the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), a former Foreign Secretary, would not jeer at him. Field Marshal Carver has always argued against the flexible response, and more and more people, including Mr. McNamara in the United States, are coming round to that view.
They are doing so for good, commonsense reasons. I was horrified when the other day the Secretary of State reiterated his allegiance to the flexible response in such unqualified terms, because that is the idea that we in the West would be responsible for using nuclear weapons first. It means that in certain circumstances, because of the estimated conventional strength of the Soviet Union, we must be committed to using nuclear weapons first. Some of us have always believed that to be an insanity. Some experts have now come round to that view. More and more people are coming to that view. If the view of General Rogers could be properly taken, I dare say that he would come round to that view.
The Government are among the few experts—if one can call them that—who still owe their allegiance to the theory that we must sustain flexible response. That policy must be changed for a variety of reasons, although I shall not go into the details now as this is a short debate. The Government must think again, not only on the theory of the deterrent but on the theories within the deterrent. The right hon. Gentleman advanced the extraordinary theory that cruise and Pershing were essential to maintain the deterrent of the West. That is an absurdity. That view was never held before 1979. The idea that there are not enough

weapons in the West to sustain the so-called deterrent without cruise or Pershing is an absurdity. There are plenty of experts here and in the United States who can knock down anyone who tries to advance that proposition, because it is opposed to common sense.
If, as many American experts have said, a larger quantity of nuclear warheads is assembled on the American side than on the Russian side, it is nonsense to say that we must have cruise and Pershing to maintain the deterrent.

Mr. John Lee: rose—

Mr. Foot: The main point that I wish to press is directly apposite to the amendment and is the most urgent of all. What will be done to stop the nuclear arms race? What will be done to prevent making the pace of the race hotter month by month and year by year? The Government advance no proposals to this end, nor do either of the super-powers. In that respect I brand the Russians as much as the Americans.
One of the troubles is that when the super-powers discuss disarmament, they always say in the same breath, "But before we come to disarmament we must have a new scale of rearmament." That is exactly what President Reagan proposed after his election in 1980, and it is exactly what he is proposing now. That is exactly what the Russians proposed when they left the disarmament discussions. They said, "Before we have control we must have a few more nuclear weapons piled up."
The logic of that is as mortal to mankind from the mouth of a Russian general as it is from the mouth of an American general. It is even worse when it is mimicked in this House by the so-called Secretary of State for Defence

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend: rose—

Mr. Foot: The Secretary of State ought to have told us what the Government would do to get disarmament talks properly moving in the right direction, but he has said nothing.
Since the motion was tabled, there have been further fresh proposals on how we might start to stop the nuclear arms race by getting back to the negotiating table. Those proposals are contained in the so-called four continent initiative. The Prime Ministers of India, Sweden, Mexico and Greece and the six-power nations have made those positive proposals. It is tragic that before anyone has had time to examine them they should have been turned down by some junior spokesman from the United States. I dare say that they will be turned down by some junior spokesman in this country, if we can find one junior enough to do it. It might even be the right hon. Gentleman. I plead with him and the Government not to follow the example of President Reagan, particularly in an election year.
We know that President Reagan's devotion to disarmament is not to be trusted at any time, least of all at election time. Some of us can remember the basis on which he won the election four years ago. I ask the Government carefully to consider these latest proposals which emerged from leading neutral powers. They go much further than the ones put forward at the United Nations and include verification and all the other demands that it is right to have in such proposals. The Government must recognise that neutral countries which have no


nuclear weapons have as much right to speak on these matters as those countries which have them. In some respects they may be saner than the countries with nuclear weapons, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli so brilliantly illustrated.

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend: rose—

Mr. Foot: Sometimes the nuclear madness becomes such an obsession with the scientists, the generals and others that they cannot think about it. Sometimes it infects Ministers of Defence. When the Secretary of State for Defence spoke on the subject I could not help feeling that he too was infected. What is needed is a new kind of initiative. If they listen to what is said by the right hon. Gentleman or even by the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East, the former Foreign Secretary, there is not a neutral country in the world that could not say that it needs the deterrent as much as anyone else

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend: rose—

Mr. Foot: The world is at one of the most critical moments in the whole history of arms control debates, more dangerous than at any time in the last 20 years. I plead with the Government to abandon all the rigmaroles they have been presenting to us on this subject over recent years and to support a real disarmament plan which is available to the world.

Mr. Nicholas Soames: I regret that I have to follow the right hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot), for whom I have a good deal of respect. However, I find all these arguments very confusing when I recall the record of the Labour Government and their undoubted intentions.
The argument about cruise missiles and their deployment was convincingly defeated at the general election. Certainly we should stick to deployment. The unilateralist motion that has been put down by the Opposition merely confirms me in my belief in the apostolic succession, there being no other convincing way of accounting for the direct descent of the Labour party from Judas Iscariot.
What conclusions could we possibly seek to draw from the fact that deployment has successfully taken place? First, we were undoubtedly right to deploy, for the very reason that it is folly to expect the Russians to restrain themselves from exploiting circumstances which they see and perceive to be favourable to them. To do so is in every respect to misread history and the whole message of Russia. The essence of the West's task is to foreclose where we can every available Soviet opportunity. It is up to us to define the limits of Soviet ends. This is an attainable objective. By allowing the deployment of cruise missiles to go ahead in western Europe we have already achieved that in one sphere.
Secondly, we must seek to create and maintain a practical dialogue with the Soviet Union. We can afford to acknowledge that the interests of Communism and capitalism are irreconcilable. Nevertheless, we have to live in the same world. The secret in all these talks is to guard against excesses of conciliation on the one hand and of truculence on the other.
We have now come to a point where we must consider carefully our next move. What some Opposition Members

have said is true; weaponry will continue to be developed simply because scientific and technical progress has always, sadly, taken precedence over political ideas. It is this particular form of intellectual rot in terms of arms control that we should set about seeking to stop.
The policies of all Governments since the war have been based on preventing potential aggression before it starts. At the same time, we have always claimed that we seek to reach agreements through diplomatic negotiations to limit and reduce the high level of armaments on both sides.
Unilateral disarmament by Britain and its allies is clearly not a safe or sensible alternative. Pressure for unilateral moves, as we have seen in our abandonment of chemical weapons, will clearly encourage the Russians to block any negotiations, in the belief that if they wait long enough the West will disarm on its own without seeking or asking for any Soviet reduction. We have arrived at a militarily adequate position. We must now play a far greater role in the formulation of the policies, ideas and discussions that go on to prepare the ground for the disarmament negotiations.
Generally speaking, relations with Russia are bad. I have recently been to Moscow. Perhaps the most striking impression that I came away with was the grotesque misconceptions that seem to exist on both sides. For example, they genuinely regard NATO as an offensive force. This is inconceivable. They seem to have a deep-rooted sense of insecurity, with a massive inferiority complex. Driving in from the airport I was interested to notice at the side of the road two enormous tank traps which mark the spot 13 miles from the front door of the Kremlin where the Red Army turned the Germans. This must bear very heavily on Russian thinking. In this country we must attempt to consider more the Russian point of view, because we cannot expect them to come up with any realistic ideas of their own. We should have confidence in ourselves when it comes to these matters. There is no reason for us not to play such a role. There should be no excuses about our shrinking resources and our limited influence. In truth it is a problem that since the war there has always been a question in foreign affairs of shrinking horizons.
We must acknowledge that the Russians are incapable of coming up with any realistic ideas of their own. I believe them to be paranoid, frightened and deeply distrustful. They are morally and intellectually bankrupt as a people and their system is entirely and definitively reactive.
We must try to persuade the American Administration to desist from the kind of verbal rhetoric which is so damaging. There is no harm in trading the conventional insults; when they are dished out, we have broad shoulders which can take them. When the Americans seek to question the very legitimacy of the right of the Soviet Union to exist, they are doing grave damage not only to their interests but to ours. We should lay out a long-term plan on which we should seek to get agreement, which I know is difficult, from all our allies on a step-by-step march to real progress.
The most important and likely place to achieve progress is, funnily enough, in confidence-building measures. I believe that the Stockholm talks resumed today. I know that they are considered small beer in the great realms of disarmament negotiations, but unless we start somewhere and go for an agreement—have the will to try to get an


agreement and then reach an agreement—there will not be the necessary momentum to achieve agreement in bigger and more important spheres. That is a tiresome and, as my right hon. Friend said, difficult long-term process, but it is one in which we must be consistent.
I do not like to say this, and I do not doubt that it will be held up to great ridicule by Opposition Members, but I believe that America, through a variety of circumstances, which we all know, is as much a prisoner of its own ideology as is Russia. Europeans generally are greatly worried and, I believe, looking for someone to try to take an initiative to find a way through. I am talking not about bridge building or any naive nonsense, but of people coming up with genuine and realistic ideas which have merit and can be used as a platform for discussion by the super-powers. The Government should take the initiative. I believe that they could take up the challenge.
As to Soviet interests, I am inclined to think that the fundamental Soviet interest, embracing the past, the present and the future, is nothing less than total military invulnerability, the achievement of which would encompass offensive and defensive designs. That is at once an expression of great power and of a great and possibly growing sense of insecurity — a syndrome which shows no sign of dissipating. Military impregnability is the one continuing theme of Russian history, whatever the decade. For that very reason I ask the Goverment to rise to the level of events.
We should be bold and put up some new ideas. Let us break new ground and get on with steady, sensible but above all active diplomacy. There is no short cut. It is a long, unglamourous and disagreeable business. It carries attendant domestic political risks and requires an enormous effort of political will. This is no longer a military problem. It is for politicians to kill the presence of distrust, antagonism and suspicion.

9 pm

Mr. Stan Thorne: It is clear that political, military, commercial, bureucratic and technological factors have influenced the making and deployment of cruise missiles. I shall not go into any of those factors in depth because I am sure that my comrades are anxious for an opportunity to speak.
President Carter and the breakdown over SALT II have been mentioned. We should remember that it was the Americans who failed to ratify SALT II. Since Reagan has come to power, there has been continuous American opposition to agreement about nuclear weapons. It is almost as if an anti-Soviet campaign or crusade is being pursued by American leaders. I recall not entirely dissimilar circumstances prior to the second world war which helped contribute to that war.
The United States is obviously intent on giving Europe some form of nuclear guarantee. Cruise represents that guarantee. I do not believe, as has been argued, that cruise is a response to SS20s. I believe that the United States needed new weapons and wished to use Europe, in the event of a conventional war, as a base for the launch of cruise missiles.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Thorne: No. I shall try to be brief and do not intend to give way.
Cruise missiles are an effective nuclear weapon. They could be used as part of a mass attack to destroy Soviet missiles that have not been launched. The main use for cruise, however, is fighting a limited nuclear war —limited, that is, geographically to Europe. That is the greatest threat to the British people.
Ground-launched cruise missiles in Britain can be fired at important military targets deep inside eastern Europe. Many people in the United States Administration appear to believe that fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe would not result in worldwide devastation. It is the theory of a first strike to avoid nuclear war — a quite unacceptable paradox. Cruise missiles make nuclear war in Europe more likely, not less likely. They make larger areas of the United Kingdom, which is our main concern, into high priority nuclear targets. The arrival of cruise missiles makes arms control almost impossible and the nuclear arms race irreversible.
Recently I attended a Western European Union meeting in Paris. The hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) tabled a motion about the militarisation of space—a Star Wars presentation. He assured me that it was the Government's policy in co-operation with Europe to take the arms race to space. The only way to prevent that and to ensure that there is no nuclear war is by negotiation. The road to peace is through genuine negotiation. Britain is not the junior partner of the United States and must not carry out its behest in various parts of the world. The Government should cease to act as if that were the case. They should take real initiatives towards peace by accepting the Opposition motion.

Mr. Richard Shepherd: The House is divided, as is often the case, by the perception of other people's intents. I listened with great eagerness and interest to my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Mr. Soames), who made an exceptionally distinguished contribution. It echoed many of my anxieties. My experience of life has left me with a deep suspicion of the intentions of the Soviet Union. It is necessary only to characterise the last two decades with one or two events to remember the fearsome and awful objectives of Soviet public policy.
As recently as last year, a deeply defensive, suspicious and aggressive Soviet Union shot down a civil airliner. I am not sure whether any other great country would preempt in such a way a rational discussion about the intent of an aircraft flying over its own air space.
I do not intend to perceive the debate in those terms, but to consider the nature of the Alliance and our response to it. We are a stronger and more forceful Alliance for being seen to be one in which each member decides and co-operates on matters of mutual interest. All too often the public perceive the initiative for its decisions as coming from the United States. That may be so because it is the most significant contributor to our own defence strategy.
I turn to the observations of the leader of the Social Democratic party. I accept that there will probably be no reasonable, rational movement towards negotiations this side of the United States presidential elections and possibly for even longer. We have difficulty in analysing
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the political power structure of the Soviet Union, especially during what seems to be a long transitional phase.
It does not serve our interests as a free, independent nation not to have absolute and unquestioned control over which weapons are fired from our soil. There is no doubt that, if we do not possess the ultimate ability to determine whether we go to war, we are not a free, independent sovereign nation. One can dress that up as one wishes, but that remains the central truth.
I am worried that another nation, albeit with which we have had the greatest alliance and one with which we have lived in friendship for many years, and which I count most highly, may hold the final decision as to whether this country goes to war.
That is not because we have doubts. I note that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has satisfied himself that there is no question of an American weapon being deployed from the United Kingdom without the final sanction of a British Prime Minister. I understand the reasons for his view, as far as it goes, but who does not accept that interpretation? Unfortunately, many important Americans do not accept it. They include Robert McNamara, who was Secretary of Defence in the United States through some of the most turbulent periods of the 1960s. Many Americans will attest that, notwithstanding our friendship and alliance, or their understanding of the problems facing their allies, they would hold it incumbent upon the President of the United States to exercise such a final judgement. After all, he is not responsible to the electorate of Aldridge-Brownhills or to that of the rest of Britain; he is ultimately responsible to the American people. What he perceives to be in the interests of their defence is what will decide him about any action that must be taken.
That is a constitutional argument advanced by many senior Americans from all walks of life. Let me put it another way. Could you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, conceive of an American Government accepting a British RAF plane carrying nuclear weapons over which they did not have the ultimate sanction? I could not stand up as a representative of an American congressional district and advance that proposition without being lynched as someone who wished to undermine the sovereignty of the United States.
There is an unequalness in the Alliance that calls into question in the minds of many Britons the validity of such decisions. If my constituents and other British people feel that doubt, it is incumbent on a British Government to eliminate it from the discussion. I know full well that, if there were absolute certainty that we would ultimately make the decision, so that our people could accept the contention that there is a common, united European and United States approach on which individual sovereign nations have a veto, this debate would move to the next and more important stage of asking how we can negotiate with the Soviet Union to find the way towards a peaceful world.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: So those of us who, for the past 18 months or more, have wanted a debate in the House on the nuclear deterrent have, by the skin of our teeth, got it—for two and a half hours. This must be the most momentous subject that can be considered by the House or by the public. How necessary such a debate

is—it must be continued both inside and outside the House — was made clear by the chilling and candid illustration by the Secretary of State for Defence of what he called the momentum by which each successive Government were caught up when they entered office—how they entered into an inheritance of commitments, assumptions and philosophies from which at that moment they were unable to break free. Only debates such as this — debates to which contributions such as that of the hon. Member for Crawley (Mr. Soames) can be made—can enable us over the years to take a new, and perhaps more rational, view of policies to which we have been committed.
We are assured that the underlying purpose of our nuclear armaments is deterrence—to deter the Soviet Union from making war against NATO. That proposition cannot rationally be made good, because I do not believe that there can rationally be shown to be circumstances likely to arise in such a conflict in which it would be in the interests and to the advantage of Britain to resort to using a nuclear weapon. That can be decided only by hypothesis. The hypothesis must be a deliberate assault upon western Europe by the Soviet Union, with the presumed intention of conquering and occupying it.
That is the hypothesis which one must adopt for testing the notion of deterrence, although I find it a hypothesis beyond my powers of imagination. That a nation so intensely jealous and fearful of the outside world, so anxious about its own structure and the great populations which it is itself controlling with difficulty, should want to annex 80 million Germans, 50 million Frenchmen and 55 million Englishmen—people of the most intractable sorts of the human species—passes my capabilities of imagination.
Nevertheless, that is the assumption that we have to make, to test the proposition that the nuclear weapon is needed for the purposes of deterrence. I proceed to do that as briefly as I can. I hope the House will realise that in doing so, and in doing so against time, there are many intermediate situations which it is necessary to ignore.
I take the case of an actual assault on the front line of western Europe. The answer to this in the good old days of the trip wire, the secure days of the early 1950s, used to be simple enough. The first Russian soldier to go over that line would result in the United States launching nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. It was under the shadow of those wings—those absurd, grotesque wings —that for so many years the defence establishments of the European countries lived.
Then doubts arose. Somebody said, "Is it really possible to imagine that just because there has been an indentation in the eastern front line of NATO, therefore the United States will engage — now that the Soviet Union has made progress in nuclear technology— in a suicidal duel with the other major nuclear power?" The European nations began to say that they could not believe that. They could hardly believe that in much more desperate circumstances that would be the choice of any American Government or people; but that they would do it because of a minimal penetration into western Europe was incredible. With that the credibility of the NATO strategy and the notion of the deterrent began to dissolve.
So brains were put to work, and they discovered the principle of coupling. They discovered a form of nuclear weapon which it was assumed would involve American participation but would not invoke, at any rate at the first


stage, the fatal nuclear duel between the major powers. This is how we come to be debating cruise. Cruise is the non-strategic strategic nuclear weapon. It is the nuclear weapon that will do the deterrent job for us without any of the inconveniences to which the notion of a nuclear deterrent was open.
So I proceed to apply the case of cruise to my incredible Russian invasion of western Europe. Let us assume that the Russians have made progress. After all, they are bound to make progress against the ludicrous strategy of "forward defence and flexible response", because that is what it means. So let us say that they make progress up to 100 miles, here and there, with their forces.
Now, the Secretary of State told the House the other day:
The Government have made it absolutely clear that they will not use any weapons first.
In the context, that meant nuclear weapons—

Mr. Heseltine: No.

Mr. Powell: I am reading from Hansard, and I shall
repeat what the Secretary of State said:
The Government have made it absolutely clear that they will not use any weapons first.
That means that they will not use nuclear weapons first.

Mr. Heseltine: No.

Mr. Powell: It says that
they will not use any weapons first." — [Official Report, 22 May 1982; Vol. 60, c. 820.]
They will not? [HON. MEMBERS: "Any."] I see. They will use nuclear weapons, but not other weapons. I am amazed.
I had thought that the context clearly was that of nuclear weapons. Now we are back to the point made by the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) that if these weapons are in Europe and in the European countries, for the purposes of deterrence, even if we ourselves do not think that deterrence requires the first use of those weapons, those who are the masters of those weapons are likely to find themselves led to that conclusion.
So, neglecting the self-denying ordinance, which apparently the Government and the Secretary of State have imposed upon themselves, I propose the question: after the 100-mile penetration, is that the moment when we shall resort to the use of cruise in order to halt the Soviet advance?
It seems to me that the answer to that is no. The battle has not been joined. The forces in Europe have not made the test of strength. Redeployment is taking place and the decisive battle is still to come. Why at that stage, when all is still to be fought for, all still to be lost or won, deliberately incur the nuclear exchange which is implied by our balance with the SS20s of the Soviet Union?
So we proceed with the campaign. I advance rapidly to the decisive land battle. I will assume that the decisive battle is lost by NATO, that the Americans and other forces, so far as they can be extricated, fall back and their bases are withdrawn into the fixed aircraft carrier—the British Isles. The question now arises whether, in those circumstances, NATO, or what is left of NATO, or this country and the United States, will choose at that point to invoke a nuclear duel in European terms or whether we should say that we still have the opportunity of successful resistance of a reversal of progress of events, and must

seek to bring that about by the rational means which are still at our disposal with the immense strength of the United States, with the Atlantic open behind us, with our forces still largely intact and with the bases in these islands.
So I advance to the last condition. It is the special case which I put to the Prime Minister during the general election when she had stated that the nuclear weapon was our weapon of last resort. It is the case in which we found ourselves in 1940. Let us suppose that our enemy at that time had been in full possession of the present nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union and we ourselves had, let us say, cruise. I asked the Prime Minister whether, on a dark night in August 1940, when the news came in that the barges were on the move from the Channel ports, we should have decreed for this country the certainty of widespread annihilation by resorting to the nuclear discharge against a nuclear power occupying the continent of Europe.
It might be—I hope that it would not be but it might be—that the United States would say, "Yes, we will incinerate the last Englishman," that the United States would say, "Yes, this is the time when we convert this struggle into a nuclear one." What I cannot believe is that any British Government would make that choice on behalf of the British people.
Therefore, I conclude on an assessment of each stage of a developing struggle with the Soviet Union that there is no point at which conversion of the struggle from non-nuclear into nuclear would be rational for us. — [Interruption.] It is to reason that we must appeal. It is no use resorting to the hypothesis of an insane opponent. Of course one cannot deter a madman. It is no use piling up armaments and expectations of unhappy consequences in order to deter a madman. Deterrence works only in a rational environment, and is intended to deal with a rational potenial opponent.

Mr. Matthew Parris: If the Germans had asked themselves the same question, would they have invaded?

Mr. Powell: They would have invaded if they had given what I argue is the only rational answer to which a British Government could have come. Remember, when one pleads deterrence, that one matches reason with reason, one matches probability with probability, one matches the situation of a nuclear Europe with the British Isles.
Certain gestures of the hon. Gentlemen opposite lead me to conclude that I am desired to reverse the argument and to pose the question: would not an aggressor in those circumstances seek to shorten the conflict, seek to make sure of his victory, by resorting to the use of a nuclear weapon, so that we use the term deterrence to mean deterrence of the use of a nuclear weapon by a superior and victorious enemy? My answer is again that rationally the purposes of a victor in those circumstances— a victor who supposes that what he has won or can win by force of arms is within his grasp—forbid him to convert that struggle into a nuclear struggle which would threaten to deprive him of the fruits of his victory.
Thus, whether one looks at it positively or negatively — deterrence of a Russian conventional attack, or deterrence of an aggressor using nuclear blackmail—I find no rational means by which to construct a situation in


which, with any credibility or probability, the nuclear weapon—call it cruise—would be used by the United Kingdom. My conclusion is that this is not a weapon which it is the interest or need of this country to possess, or to allow to be stationed or operated upon its soil; and in that sense I give my voice.

Mr. Phillip Oppenheim: It is necessary perhaps to remind Opposition Members of the real reasons why the Alliance took the decision to deploy cruise missiles.
It was in the mid- 1970s and late 1970s that the Soviet Union decided to deploy no fewer than 350 SS20 intermediate weapons. Each of those missiles, mention of which has been strangely absent from the lips of Opposition Members, has three warheads. Each of those three warheads has the power to destroy Hiroshima many times over. Each one of those warheads is many times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. That is why in 1979 the Alliance decided to deploy Pershing II cruise missiles. It decided to do it to modernise our obsolescent intermediate weaponry. Not to have done so would have been to be guilty of letting our weapons, particularly the F111, slowly sink into oblivion, obsolescence and ineffectiveness.
But the Alliance was not so foolhardy or irresponsible as to deploy, or threaten to deploy, cruise without offering the USSR the option of negotiated reductions. Firstly we offered an option which no true disarmer could criticise, the so-called zero option. This offered an end to the cruise programme, if only the Russians would dismantle their SS20s. I challenge any disarmer to say that that was a wrong offer, or that the Russians were right to reject it. Our offer was turned down flat by the Russians.
Instead, the Russians offered us a freeze whereby they would keep all their SS20s and we would not be able to deploy any cruise missiles. This shabby offer was quite properly rejected. Then the Soviets came back and offered to reduce their SS20s to the level of the Anglo-French independent strategic deterrent. Such a solution may appeal to the swollen ranks of the uninformed CND, but as the Anglo-French independent weapons are strategic they are not comparable to the intermediate cruise or SS20 weapons, which come under other reduction negotiations.
The Russians, as if acknowledging the bankruptcy of their negotiating position, left the Geneva talks. At every stage the Alliance offered the Russians realistic and fair options. First, it offered them the option of getting rid of intermediate weapons. Secondly, it offered them the option of reducing weapons to an equal but lower number on both sides. Both those reasonable offers, which should have been supported by all nuclear disarmers, were rejected by the Soviets.
What have been the attitudes and arguments of the opponents of cruise missiles? One of their main arguments is that cruise missiles will make Europe into a battlefield of the evil super- powers. What utter nonsense! As cruise missiles can reach the Soviet Union from Europe, the United States would inevitably be involved should such a terrible event take place. Secondly, the opponents of cruise missiles fail to notice that the United States has no fewer than 300,000 troops in Europe. Those troops would inevitably be involved in any nuclear war involving intermediate nuclear weapons and hence the United States would be fully involved.
The opponents of cruise missiles object frequently that the missiles would be operated by the Americans. Surely that is no different from the situation in the 1960s and 1970s when the Americans had control of the Poseidon submarines and F111 nuclear bombers that were based in Britain. Then as now, the ultimate sanction was held by the Prime Minister.
This brings us back to the position of the Labour party and the Labour Governments who were in power during the 1960s and 1970s. They accepted American control over nuclear weapons based in the United Kingdom. However, the Labour party—a different Labour party, admittedly, from that of today—accepted the need for nuclear weapons. There is strong evidence that it accepted the need for cruise missiles in early 1979. Did not Bill Rodgers say in 1980, when he was still a Labour Member, that when the Labour Government were in power in the mid- 1970s it was decided that theatre nuclear weapon modernisation was essential? That statement was not denied at the time by the right hon. Members for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot) and for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan). How strange. Mr. Mulley, as he then was, attended a NATO conference in April 1979 and he was party to a statement to the effect that NATO could not rely on conventional forces alone. Mr. Mulley said:
It is necessary to modernise theatre nuclear forces.
That was Labour's position then and there was hardly a squeak of protest from Labour Members and Ministers. What is theatre nuclear modernisation if it is not Pershing II and cruise?
Labour sought potential political advantage in 1981 and 1982 and it came out against cruise missiles and all nuclear weapons. Individuals who had never stood out against nuclear weapons in the Labour party before 1979 suddenly found a new article of faith. If those people were antinuclear before 1979, and if it is such a fundamental issue, why did they remain in the Labour party in the mid- 1970s when a Labour Government fully supported our nuclear policy and multilateral disarmament? There is, indeed, an arrogance among unilateral disarmers. They appear to think that only they know the true path to peace. I do not want us to spend billions of pounds on nuclear weapons any more than they do—I have many far better ways of spending the billions of pounds that we spend on nuclear weapons—but I see nuclear deterrence as an unfortunate necessity, and the only guarantor of the peace.
The best argument that I have ever heard for that policy of deterrence has not come from a politician or a general. It was put to me by an old man whom I met in a miners' welfare club in my constituency during the last election. He had fought in both the first and second world wars. He told me that in the first world war the Germans had gas but we did not. Our troops, of course, suffered terribly from gas attacks during that war. In the second world war we as well as the Germans had gas, and no gas was used against our troops.
That gentleman had not voted anything but Labour all his life, but in 1983 he changed his vote, along with thousands of others. Judging by the absence of many Labour Members who were part of the Labour Governments of the 1960s and 1970s, and who accepted the need for an effective operational nuclear deterrent, it is the Labour party that has changed and not the old gentleman in the miners' welfare club.

Mr. Gavin Strang: When opening the debate, my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) reminded us of the debates that took place during the INF talks which ended last December. He reminded us of the statements made by the Prime Minister and others, that if only NATO pressed ahead with the intention—if not the fact—of deployment, the Soviet Union would back down and we would obtain an agreement. That strategy has failed. I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House recognise that something has gone wrong.
In the few moments left to me, I should point out that the overwhelming responsibility for those talks breaking down lies with the NATO leadership. It is simply not true that cruise and Pershing II missiles are being deployed in response to the Soviet SS20s. That point has been made repeatedly, and, indeed, I was glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli made it earlier. In the course of the arguments about cruise missiles, statements were made by President Reagan and others to the effect that the Soviet Union had a monopoly of land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles. That is a very careful use of words. The word "missiles" excludes, of course, the American F111 bombers. The words "intermediate range" are used to exclude all the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in central Europe by the West. Most crucially, the phrase "land-based" is used precisely because we have deployed our weapons at sea and, above all, because the American Poseidon missiles are deployed in British waters.
The background to the negotiations is that there was broad parity between the Soviet and US arsenals. That is acknowledged by spokesmen in the United States and by any arms control experts who care to discuss the matter. Against that background of parity, the West sought to negotiate an agreement —the so-called zero option—whereby the Soviet Union would reduce its missiles and cut down its missile deployment and, in return, we would agree not to deploy additional missiles. In the final intermediate offer by the West, we offered to deploy only some of the additional new generation of missiles, provided that the Soviet Union made reductions in the deployment of its existing missiles. Thus, the prime responsibility must lie at the West's door.
I am opposed to the deployment of SS20s and, of course, to the Soviet Union's counter -measure to the deployment of cruise and Pershing. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot) pointed out, the Soviet Union is doing exactly what it said it would do throughout the talks. We must look at the importance of that failure. I hope that it is common ground that that failure is important. It was very refreshing to hear the speeches of the hon. Members for Crawley (Mr. Soames) and for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd), because speeches by Conservative Members in previous defence debates virtually echoed the statements made by the American Administration.
East-West relations are worse than they have been for many years. Certainly they are worse than at any time since I came to the House 14 years ago. Europe is now the focus for the most dangerous escalation yet of the nuclear arms race. The nuclear weapons are deep strike weapons and they are part of the policy of flexible response. The nuclear weapons cannot be verified by conventional

satellite procedures partly because they are small and mobile and no one can tell whether nuclear or conventional warheads are being carried.
We want all cruise and Pershing missiles to be removed from western Europe. I was interested in the remarks of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen). Even he said that surely the NATO alliance would not pressurise the Dutch Government into deploying cruise missiles. If the Liberals do not support the official Opposition, they will make a mockery of what they said during the general election campaign. The motion is not unilateralist; it is confined to cruise missiles.
If the Government will not agree to the removal of cruise missiles, surely it is not too much to ask that they advocate a freeze on all existing deployment of cruise and Pershing and a Soviet freeze on deployment. Then we could try to get the talks going again. Surely that is not too much to ask, even of this Government.

Mr. Kevin McNamara: This has been one of the most sober debates that we have had on this subject for a long time. Perhaps that is because this Parliament has a fair time to go and people have time to think of the many issues involved.
For the first time from the Government side we have heard some refreshing speeches which show that some hon. Members are looking carefully at the problems. The hon. Members for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) and for Crawley (Mr. Soames) accepted the Government's possession of the weapons, but they have examined closely the Government's motivation and called upon them to examine the motivation of our alleged opponents to see whether our possession of the weapons has not aggravated or worsened the position. They questioned whether NATO should be thinking of some other gesture to convince the people of the East that we do not have hostile intentions. That is an important development, which we should welcome.
One feature that has been absent from the debate is the claim by the Prime Minister that she has a virtual veto over the use of cruise if it is to be deployed in the United Kingdom and perhaps set off. The Prime Minister has never been prepared to say what a "virtual veto" is. It is either a veto or it is not a veto. If it is a veto, is it absolute? Can we prevent United States forces in Britain from using the weapons if the President of the United States directs that they should be used and we disagree? The Secretary of State must answer. Can we prevent their use and if so, how and why? The right hon. Gentleman has failed to answer that in the past.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) dealt with the real reason for cruise being deployed here. He questioned the theory that it is as a result of the American agonising decision to respond to a West German request for tangible proof that the Americans would stay in Europe. My right hon. Friend quoted General Rogers' statement in March last year before the Senate armed services committee when he said:
Most people believe it was because of the SS20 that we modernized. We would have modernized irrespective of the SS20 because we had this gap in our spectrum of defense developing and we needed to close that gap.
That contained nothing about coupling, an agreement with western Europe or about a need to show American determination to remain in Europe. Was it not simply that


the West Germans needed a gesture of support, and the Americans merely gave them what they had already had in the past?
The Government's amendment is complacent about the issues we are discussing. It shows a Maginot line mentality in its attitude towards the declared policy of NATO and an inability to move from it. There is a belief that it is so safe and secure that it is bound to succeed. It is almost, if I may misquote Descartes, "I wish, therefore it is. "
The motion raises two major points about the twin-track decision. It suggests that it offers the firmest foundation both to the security of the NATO Alliance and to the resumption of arms control negotiations. Let us consider the Alliance, its cohesion and security and its ability to face the decision on cruise deployment.
Cruise has created more dissension, more disunity and more unhappiness in the Alliance than anything at any time since its inception. We know that the Danes have refused to pay their part of the cost of the installation of nuclear weapons. But, more importantly, the Secretary of State has made public statements and has bullied the Dutch — some of the most loyal and active members of NATO, who have contributed their part—to force them to take weapons that the Dutch people do not want, that part of the Dutch coalition does not want, and that the Dutch Defence Minister does not want. It is ludicrous that a Foreign Minister wants it, just as our former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) wanted it, but the Dutch Defence Minister does not want it.
The effect of the Dutch problem has whittled into Belgium, which is also anxiously trying to decide its policy. But it is to the Germans, more than anyone, that the cruise decision will cause problems—even if we accept that Helmut Schmidt originally wanted it. The consensus of defence policy in Germany is shattered beyond recognition. At its last conference, the SDP moved into a position similar to that of the British Labour party. It was especially concerned about the apparent divergence between traditional NATO doctrine and what is in the American field manuals—the idea of the air-land battle, of the integrated, conventional, nuclear, chemical warfare method that was urged and advocated by the Americans.
The pressure in the Alliance is reflected in the attitude of the populations throughout Alliance countries. It is all very well for the Secretary of State to say that we have had the general election and this was the result. The problem exists and will not go away. It will not go away in Germany or Holland and it will not go away even if we get rid of all the women outside Greenham common. The people do not believe the Government—they believe it is an escalation in the arms race. They believe that the Government have thrown away a real opportunity to begin the movement towards peace and security.
The Secretary of State said that he believed in negotiated arms reductions. Yet the Prime Minister has thrown away the offer of the four continental non-nuclear power leaders to try to do something about that. On Tuesday she brushed it aside and said that she believed only in what NATO was doing and thinking. She uttered not a word of praise or encouragement, not even a suggestion that she would look at the matter; just a brushing away of it, sitting in her little bunker or dugout with no real thinking of what can be done.
The Secretary of State says, "We are prepared to negotiate with the Russians at any time." If so, he must

say whether he is prepared to put Polaris on the table in the negotiations for INF. Is the right hon. Gentleman willing to say, "We are willing to negotiate away Polaris if that will achieve the reductions that the world wants"? Or is Polaris the Government's weapon of last resort, and therefore they are not prepared to put it on the table?
Because they are not prepared to do that, and because the Russians are not bothered whether they get blown up by cruise or Polaris—they just do not want to he blown up—we get nowhere. The Russians are determined that, whatever happens, they will not have it. Because of the lack of faith that people in Britain have in the Government's attitude to the negotiations, they are forced to say, "We do not want cruise."
The policy of the Labour party on this issue is clear and straightforward. [Interruption.] It is perfectly clear. Et is all very well for Conservative Members to complain at that and for people to ask what Bill Rodgers and others said. Bill Rodgers is not here now. When he was here I disagreed with him, as did the Labour party. Our policy is against the cruise and Trident system. We say, "Take it away because it serves no useful purpose whatever in the defence of our country. Its presence increases war." That is why we shall press our motion to a Division.

Mr. Heseltine: With the leave of the House, I shall respond to the debate.
Everyone who has listened to the debate —and a significant number of hon. Members have stayed right through it—appreciates that it has been treated with the seriousness which the question undoubtedly deserves, and I shall respond to some of the important points which have been made.
The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) suggested that there would now be value in freezing the limited deployment that has taken place of the cruise and Pershing II systems because the Soviets. having walked out, must be encouraged to return. I take a different view, and I know that the NATO Alliance would support the view that if one were to do that the Soviets would believe that they had secured a major objective of their foreign policy, which is to achieve a substantial imbalance in the deployment of this class of weapons system in the European area. One would, if one accepted the right hon. Gentleman's advice, be awarding a sort of prize to the Soviet Union for walking out of the peace discussion processes, and that would be unwise.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion that the urgent need is to develop the conventional capability, particularly to attack the choke points of the Soviet Union if it were ever to mobilise. That is precisely why the Government have increased defence expenditure by about £3·6 billion a year, the vast majority of which is spent on conventional defence. That is in stark contrast to the policies of the Opposition, who not only want a non-nuclear policy, but have committed themselves to a substantial reduction in overall defence expenditure, including conventional expenditure.
The right hon. Member for Devonport and my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) spoke of the dual key. There is, of course, anxiety about this matter and it would be irresponsible not to recognise that. If the right hon. Member for Devonport


was still arguing for the same sort of policies in opposition that he supported in government, a great deal of public unease would not have arisen in the first place.
There is a responsibility on politicians who were content, as members of the last Labour Government, to remain with the letter of assurance that we have from American Presidents—which satisfied them in respect of the F111s and Poseidon submarines—not, the moment they are in opposition, to suggest that that letter is not sufficiently guaranteeable for the cruise and Pershing missile systems.

Dr. Owen: The right hon. Gentleman keeps making that allegation. The only land-based nuclear missiles that were held during that period of Government were Lance, and they were under a dual key mechanism. The right hon. Gentleman should withdraw the allegation. The only other precedent was Thor, which was under a dual key mechanism.

Mr. Heseltine: The right hon. Gentleman is aware that the issue is not where the weapons are based, but whether they are under the control of the American or British people. The control which the right hon. Gentleman, then Foreign Secretary, was prepared to accept in respect of the F111s and Poseidons was the letter of assurance on which we now rest for cruise missile deployments, and nothing has changed in that circumstance.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym), in an especially impressive speech, outlined precisely the policies that are central to the defence interests of this country—we should believe in a policy of defence, but should pursue the opportunities for dialogue wherever they can be found.
My hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Mr. Soames) made sensible and constructive suggestions on how to work up many of the approaches from a relatively low and unambitious starting point. We must seriously consider that option. My hon. Friend will be as aware as everyone else of the difficulty. When we thought that we had reached a point of dialogue with the Soviet Union—exactly as we were discussing matters in the context of SALT I leading to SALT II—the Western Alliance was faced with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and we could not seriously be expected to ignore the implications of that act of aggression for our attitude towards a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union. That action brought a reaction within America which prevented the ratification of SALT II. It is important to note, as a sign of how much American Governments have consistently cared about this issue, that they have stood within the limits of SALT II, despite the fact that it has never been ratified.
The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) was perhaps not at his very best in understanding the concepts of the NATO Alliance. We have made it clear that this is a defensive alliance. We will use no weapons first, precisely because we will attack no one. That is the ultimate guarantee which Governments have been perfectly prepared to articulate, and is the one thing that should be of concern to those who might fear the NATO Alliance. There is nothing to fear, because we will not attack. That is the essence of what we are saying.

Mr. Foot: rose—

Mr. Heseltine: Forgive me, there is not time to give way. I am just coming to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. Perhaps the most interesting observation in that speech was in one of its jokes rather than its content. The right hon. Gentleman referred to his first decision to get rid of Bill Rodgers as defence spokesman for the Labour party. That reveals the real change that occurred in the composition of Labour's defence policies. The right hon. Gentleman, for as long as I can remember, has consistently believed in a policy of one-sided nuclear disarmament, so, of course, the first thing that he did upon becoming leader of the Labour party was to get rid of the Front Bench spokesman who believed in the policies which all Labour Governments since the war had pursued.
It was not a matter of reappraising the threat from the Soviet Union, pursuing a new policy of dialogue with the Soviet Union, or talking about a more effective deterrent. All his political life the right hon. Gentleman has sought to be in a position of power when unilateral disarmament was a possibility for his party. That is what he sought to achieve and what he has actually achieved for the Labour party.

Mr. Foot: Will the right hon. Gentleman now answer the main question that I put to him: what is the Government's response to the new initiative that has come from the Prime Minister of India and others to stop the nuclear arms race?

Mr. Heseltine: I am more impressed with the Foreign Secretary from the Federal Republic of Germany, who has just returned from Moscow and given his views of the attitude of the Russians to continuing dialogue. I believe that he is in a better position to judge the likelihood of what appears to be attractive on the surface as a gesture, but which, in terms of hard diplomacy, does not seem to have a prospect of success.
In reaching a decision on this matter the House must remember that, although we all share a passionate concern for dialogue, arms control and peace, the fact is that Labour Governments, one after the other, have had to face precisely the same difficult decisions as this Government face. Labour Governments have maintained Britain's independent nuclear deterrents. They carried through the modernisation of Polaris with the Chevaline process. They were deeply involved in the decisions that were to lead to the cruise modernisation programme. That is the reality of what Governments of the Western world have had to face when dealing with the Soviet Union.
It is recklessly and naively irresponsible, the moment they leave office, for Labour Members somehow to sweep aside the experience of those years in government and pretend that they will do things differently if ever they come to government again. I do not believe that they will return to government, because people realise that only a policy of deterrence and dialogue is credible, and only this Government offer it to the nation.

Question put, That the original words stand part of the Question: —

The House divided: Ayes 162, Noes 269.

Division No. 338]
[10.12 pm


AYES


Adley, Robert
Batiste, Spencer


Aitken, Jonathan
Bellingham, Henry


Alexander, Richard
Benyon, William


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Berry, Sir Anthony


Amess, David
Best, Keith


Ancram, Michael
Biffen, Rt Hon John


Arnold, Tom
Biggs-Davison, Sir John


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Body, Richard


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Bonsor, Sir Nicholas


Baker, Rt Hon K. (Mole Vall'y)
Boscawen, Hon Robert


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Bottomley, Peter


Baldry, Anthony
Bottomley, Mrs Virginia





Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas


Braine, Sir Bernard
Irving, Charles


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Jackson, Robert


Bright, Graham
Jones, Robert (W Herts)


Brinton, Tim
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael


Brooke, Hon Peter
King, Roger (B'ham N'field)


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
King, Rt Hon Tom


Browne, John
Lamont, Norman


Bruinvels, Peter
Lang, Ian


Buck, Sir Antony
Lawrence, Ivan


Budgen, Nick
Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel


Burt, Alistair
Lee, John (Pendle)


Butler, Hon Adam
Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark


Butterfill, John
Lester, Jim


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Stamf'd)


Cash, William
Lightbown, David


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Lilley, Peter


Chapman, Sydney
Lloyd, Ian (Havant)


Chope, Christopher
Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)


Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)
Lord, Michael


Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)
Lyell, Nicholas


Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)
McCrea, Rev William


Colvin, Michael
McCurley, Mrs Anna


Conway, Derek
Macfarlane, Neil


Coombs, Simon
Maclean, David John


Cope, John
Major, John


Cormack, Patrick
Malins, Humfrey


Corrie, John
Malone, Gerald


Couchman, James
Maples, John


Cranborne, Viscount
Marlow, Antony


Crouch, David
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)


Currie, Mrs Edwina
Maude, Hon Francis


Dorrell, Stephen
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Mayhew, Sir Patrick


Dover, Den
Mellor, David


du Cann, Rt Hon Edward
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Dunn, Robert
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)


Eggar, Tim
Miscampbell, Norman


Evennett, David
Mitchell, David (NW Hants)


Eyre, Sir Reginald
Moate, Roger


Fairbairn, Nicholas
Monro, Sir Hector


Fallon, Michael
Moore, John


Farr, John
Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)


Favell, Anthony
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Fletcher, Alexander
Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)


Fookes, Miss Janet
Moynihan, Hon C.


Forman, Nigel
Murphy, Christopher


Fowler, Rt Hon Norman
Neale, Gerrard


Franks, Cecil
Needham, Richard


Gale, Roger
Nelson, Anthony


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Newton, Tony


Glyn, Dr Alan
Nicholls, Patrick


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Normanton, Tom


Goodlad, Alastair
Norris, Steven


Gorst, John
Onslow, Cranley


Greenway, Harry
Oppenheim, Philip


Gregory, Conal
Osborn, Sir John


Grist, Ian
Page, John (Harrow W)


Ground, Patrick
Page, Richard (Herts SW)


Grylls, Michael
Parris, Matthew


Gummer, John Selwyn
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)
Patten, John (Oxford)


Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)
Pawsey, James


Hampson, Dr Keith
Percival, Rt Hon Sir Ian


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Pollock, Alexander


Harvey, Robert
Porter, Barry


Hayward, Robert
Powell, William (Corby)


Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Powley, John


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Hind, Kenneth
Price, Sir David


Hirst, Michael
Prior, Rt Hon James


Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Proctor, K. Harvey


Holt, Richard
Pym, Rt Hon Francis


Hordern, Peter
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)
Rees, Rt. Hon Peter (Dover)


Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Renton, Tim


Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Rhodes James, Robert


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Hunter, Andrew
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)






Roe, Mrs Marion
Thompson, Donald (Calder v)


Rossi, Sir Hugh
Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)


Rost, Peter
Thorne, Neil (Ilford S)


Rowe, Andrew
Thurnham, Peter


Ryder, Richard
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Sackville, Hon Thomas
Tracey, Richard


Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Twinn, Dr Ian


Scott, Nicholas
van Straubenzee, Sir W.


Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Vaughan, Sir Gerard


Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')
Viggers, Peter


Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Shersby, Michael
Waldegrave, Hon William


Sims, Roger
Walden, George


Smith, Sir Dudley (Warwick)
Walker, Bill (T'Side N)


Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)
Walker Rt Hon P. (W'cester)


Soames, Hon Nicholas
Waller, Gary


Speed, Keith
Wardle, C. (Bexhill)


Speller, Tony
Watson, John


Spencer, Derek
Watts, John


Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Squire, Robin
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Stanbrook, Ivor
Wheeler, John


Steen, Anthony
Whitfield, John


Stern, Michael
Whitney, Raymond


Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)
Wiggin, Jerry


Stevens, Martin (Fulham)
Winterton, Mrs Ann


Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)
Winterton, Nicholas


Stewart, Ian (N Hertf'dshire)
Wood, Timothy


Stokes, John
Woodcock, Michael


Stradling Thomas, J.
Yeo, Tim


Sumberg, David
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Tapsell, Peter
Younger, Rt Hon George


Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)



Temple-Morris, Peter
Tellers for the Ayes:


Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.
Mr. Douglas Hogg and


Thomas, Rt Hon Peter
Mr. Michael Neubert.


NOES


Alton, David
Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)


Anderson, Donald
Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Deakins, Eric


Ashdown, Paddy
Dewar, Donald


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Dobson, Frank


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Dormand, Jack


Banks, Tony (Newham NW)
Douglas, Dick


Barnett, Guy
Dubs, Alfred


Barron, Kevin
Eadie, Alex


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Eastham, Ken


Beith, A. J.
Evans, John (St. Helens N)


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Ewing, Harry


Bermingham, Gerald
Fatchett, Derek


Boyes, Roland
Faulds, Andrew


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Fields, T. (L'pool Broad Gn)


Brown, Gordon (D'f'mline E)
Fisher, Mark


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Flannery, Martin


Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)
Foot, Rt Hon Michael


Brown, Ron (E'burgh, Leith)
Foster, Derek


Caborn, Richard
Foulkes, George


Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd &amp; M)
Fraser, J. (Norwood)


Campbell, Ian
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Freud, Clement


Canavan, Dennis
Garrett, W. E.


Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)
Godman, Dr Norman


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Golding, John


Clarke, Thomas
Hamilton, James (M'well N)


Clay, Robert
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S.)
Hardy, Peter


Cohen, Harry
Harman, Ms Harriet


Coleman, Donald
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter


Conlan, Bernard
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith


Cook, Frank (Stockton North)
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy


Cook, Robin F. (Livingston)
Healey, Rt Hon Denis


Corbett, Robin
Heffer, Eric S.


Corbyn, Jeremy
Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)


Craigen, J. M.
Howell, Rt Hon D. (S'heath)


Crowther, Stan
Hoyle, Douglas


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Hughes, Dr. Mark (Durham)


Dalyell, Tam
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)


Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (L'lli)
Hughes, Roy (Newport East)





Hughes, Simon (Southwark)
Rees, Rt Hon M. (Leeds S)


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Richardson, Ms Jo


Kinnock, Rt Hon Neil
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Lambie, David
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)


Lamond, James
Robertson, George


Leighton, Ronald
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Lewis, Terence (Worsley)
Rooker, J. W.


Litherland, Robert
Ross, Ernest (Dundee W)


Lloyd, Tony (Stratford)
Rowlands, Ted


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Sedgemore, Brian


McCartney, Hugh
Sheerman, Barry


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


McKelvey, William
Short, Mrs R.(W'hampt'n NE)


Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Silkin, Rt Hon J.


Maclennan, Robert
Skinner, Dennis


McNamara, Kevin
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


McTaggart, Robert
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'kl'ds E)


McWilliam, John
Soley, Clive


Madden, Max
Spearing, Nigel


Marek, Dr John
Steel, Rt Hon David


Marshall, David (Shettleston)
Stott, Roger


Martin, Michael
Strang, Gavin


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Straw, Jack


Maxton, John
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Meacher, Michael
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Meadowcroft, Michael
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Mikardo, Ian
Thorne, Stan (Preston)


Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Tinn, James


Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)
Tomey, Tom


Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)
Wardell, Gareth (Gower)


Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)
Wareing, Robert


Nellist, David
Weetch, Ken


O'Brien, William
Welsh, Michael


O'Neill, Martin
White, James


Owen, Rt Hon Dr David
Wigley, Dafydd


Park, George
Williams, Rt Hon A.


Parry, Robert
Winnick, David


Patchett, Terry
Woodall, Alec


Pendry, Tom
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Pike, Peter
Young, David (Bolton SE)


Powell, Rt Hon J. E. (S Down)



Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)
Tellers for the Noes:


Radice, Giles
Mr. Don Dixon and


Randall, Stuart
Mr. Frank Haynes.


Redmond, M.

Question, That the proposed words be there added, put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No.33(Questions on amendments):—

The House divided: Ayes 254, Noes171.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Mr. Speaker: forthwith declared the main Question, as amended, to be agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House welcomes the determination of Her Majesty's Government to implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's twin-track decision of December 1979 on intermediate range nuclear forces; deplores the unjustified Soviet departure from the Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva; and reaffirms that adherence to the agreed deployment programme offers the firmest foundation both for the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Alliance and for the resumption of arms control negotiations.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 79(5) (Standing Committees on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.)

AGRICULTURE

That the Agriculture and Horticulture Grant (Variation) Scheme 1984 (S.I., 1984, No. 619), a copy of which was laid before this House on 1st May, be approved.—[Mr. Lang.]

Question agreed to.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

That the draft Employment Subsidies Act 1978 (Renewal) (Great Britain) Order 1984, which was laid before this House on 8th May, be approved.—[Mr. Lang.]

Question agreed to.

WELSH GRAND COMMITTEE

Ordered,
That during the proceedings on the matter of Housing and urban development in Wales, the Welsh Grand Committee have leave to sit twice on the first day on which they shall meet; and that, notwithstanding the provisions of Standing Order No. 67 (Meetings of standing committees), the second such sitting shall not commence before Four o'clock nor continue after the Commitee has considered the matter for two hours at that sitting. —[Mr. Lang.]

PETITION

Greater London Council Elections

Mr. Frank Dobson: with your permission, Mr. Speaker, I beg leave to present the following petition:
To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled.
The humble petition of the people of London and elsewhere sheweth:
That we wish to register strong protest at the Government's proposal to cancel the 1985 GLC elections in London and thereby remove from Londoners direct representation in the running of he GLC and ILEA.
That the Government's proposal would reduce democratic control over London's public services.
That the abolition of the GLC would mean that London would be without a directly elected city wide authority.
Wherefore your petitioners pray that your honourable House do not proceed with this undemocratic proposal.
And your petitioners, as in duty bound will ever pray.
I present the petition on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends representing London constituencies. They are the hon. Members for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson), for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks), for Greenwich (Mr. Barnett), for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Bidwell), for Leyton (Mr. Cohen), for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn), for Tooting (Mr. Cox), for Walthamstow (Mr. Deakins), for Battersea (Mr. Dubs), for Norwood (Mr. Fraser), my right hon. Friend the Member for Brent, East (Mr. Freeson), my hon. Friends the Members for Dagenham (Mr. Gould), for Peckham (Ms. Harman), for Vauxhall (Mr. Holland), for Newham, North-East (Mr. Leighton), for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo), for Brent, South (Mr. Pavitt), for Barking (Ms. Richardson), for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington, (Mr. Roberts), for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Sedgemore), my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Mr. Silkin), for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith), for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley), for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore).
The signatories of the petition number more than 1,066,000. The number of boxes that were delivered to the House exceeded the resources of the Serjeant at Arms and so we have only 10 boxes in front of us, each representing more than 100,000 signatories. I have great pleasure in presenting the petition, which duly presents the views of the people of Greater London.

To lie upon the Table.

Oil and Gas Reserves (Environmental Protection)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn—[Mr. Lang.]

Mr. John Browne: I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for selecting my subject for debate this evening. I thank, too, my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for attending the debate. I shall complete my speech as quickly as possible, to enable him to reply fully.
Despite the early wells that were drilled in Hampshire in the early 1930s, large-scale onshore, as opposed to offshore, exploitation of oil and gas reserves is a new phenomenon in Great Britain, with major implications.
I shall start by stating my position, because this is a complex argument. I am not against any of the oil companies. In fact, I have oil companies as clients of my own company. I am not intending to criticise in any way local government planners or local councillors in actions that have been taken or are taking today. Planning of offshore oil and gas exploitation is a complex business. It is a difficult challenge that they face.
I am entirely pro, not only exploration, but exploitation, but I want wells that end well. By that I mean exploitation that results in the maximum profit both to the company and to the Inland Revenue, with the minimum of environmental and psychological damage.
As I said, onshore oil and gas exploitation is a new phenomenon, but increasingly profitable. Let me point to just some examples of the profits and potential of this onshore exploitation.
The area known as the "Golden Belt", which is a Jurassic limestone rock line stretching from the English Channel through Dorset, Hampshire, Surrey, Sussex, into the Weald of Kent and up through Norfolk to the Wash, is probably one of the largest potential upstream developments in the world since the North sea. Like that of the North sea, the oil is of a high quality, but unlike North sea oil it is much cheaper to locate and easier to exploit.
Onshore exploration drills in the south east of England have had a striking rate of eight out of 10, whereas in the United States the average is a mere two out of 10. So it is a very attractive area. To drill one hole of about 5,000 ft costs approximately £500,000. In the North sea it would cost tens of millions of pounds to drill a similar hole.
To date, onshore oil flows do not suffer petroleum revenue tax. That is correct. The Government must encourage exploration, but it means that good profits can be made. Take, for example, Humbly Grove, which has an estimated full production of some 4,000 barrels a day at $20 a barrel at today's prices. Over 25 years the gross revenue for that well would be about $730 million—or about three quarters of a billion dollars—against costs of approximately $25 million spread over 25 years. Therefore, a share of the profits which rightly accrue to the companies which explore and exploit can and should be spent on enhanced environmental protection.
Onshore oil and gas is a great asset. It is more profitable than the North sea and it is much more secure, both against weather and potential aggressors, so we must exploit it. That implies planning permission and threats to our

environment. Furthermore, exploitation and environmental protection imply a conflict between the Department of the Environment and the. Department of Energy. To date, the Government's view has been to leave planning to local decisions makers. That has some merit, but it also has important risks.
First, most oil companies are bigger and possess more land, through their leases, than most county councils. Is there not a need for a regional planning process rather than a county planning process? Secondly, the oil business is extremely complex and my experience as a banker, both in New York and in London, has taught me how easy it is for an oil company to massage figures and, if it wished, to pull the wool over the eyes of people without expertise in the business. They are faced with a mass of detail and no ability or training to verify the oil companies' figures. Such training and expertise are not in the normal line of training and expertise of even the best of county planners such as we have in Hampshire. So there is an inherent need for county planners to buy in outside expert advice, and in that the Government have a duty not to desipate but to help and advise in suggesting suitable consultants. As local authority planners work on the oil applications they will gain valuable experience.
In Hampshire, as I said, the first well was drilled in 1930. Again, the Government have an obligation to start to encourage local planners to pool the experience as it is gained. What happened in Hampshire yesterday is happening in Surrey today and may happen in Norfolk tomorrow. To date, I know of no effective mechanism for pooling this experience on a regional basis.
In the United Kingdom, the basic planning process is by nature gradualist. I believe that this is correct when related to our inner cities and other conventional planning matters. However, in the oil business, development is vast and largely unseen. The wells are often one mile underground. Unlike a gravel pit, a well is not easily seen, and not easily quantifiable.
Once oil is struck, exploitation is rapid. It is very difficult for a local authority to stand in the way of exploitation once it is faced with a successful well. I know of no example of a county council refusing an application to exploit proven reserves of oil and gas.
It is interesting to note that in Kingston on 16 May this year the elected county councillors of Surrey county council turned down, by a majority of 20 to two, an application by Conoco for an exploratory well—not an exploitation well, an exploratory well—and this despite the recommendation of its own planning officers, who recommended that the council approve it. These elected councillors genuinely felt unable to judge the importance of the well within national terms, or the long-term implications, for Surrey, of any exploitation that would follow a successful test drill. They lacked confidence in the information before them and the informed knowledge to make that judgment. There are similar problems in Benenden in Kent. There is a great need for a Government initiative to pool knowledge that has been accrued by county councils, especially those which have benefited from expert advice.
Not only is oil exploitation largely unseen, by its very nature, but the most important planning procedures and activities of our planners—the negotiations before the proposals are put to the open forum of elected councillors—are usually carried on behind closed doors. This often creates great suspicions and fear. I do not believe that the


oil companies like it. Inevitably, they become the public whipping boys for the Government. These fears and suspicions are increased by private negotiations.
I therefore believe that it is vital that the Government think carefully about how they can increase public access to and consultation on the planning process. So far I see virtually none, despite the clear statement in the Stevens report of 1974. In chapter 19, "Summary of Recommendations", it said:
Applications for planning permissions for mineral working by county planning authorities should be notified to the Secretary of State; any such application relating to a working of significant size, or situated in an environmentally sensitive area, or liable to affect ancient monuments etc. should automatically be called in for determination by the Secretary of State.
Furthermore, in chapter II 4.6, the report said:
One of the things we found most striking during the course of our inquiry was the extent to which the necessary skills at present are completely lacking.
These feelings of fear and suspicion are fanned into frustration by a lack, sometimes apparently high-handed, of consultation in the planning process. It is a frustration at grassroots level, which is spreading across large sections of the south-east of England. I come from Winchester, and I do not have to remind you, Mr. Speaker, or my hon. Friend, of the name of Mr. John Tyme, who, out of a genuine conviction, got in the way and turned the planning process of the M3 into a farce. Today the hole in the M3 is exactly the width of my constituency.
I think that my hon. Friend would be well advised to take note of this intense feeling, which is growing among people who would otherwise be his strongest supporters. At present it is quiet, but it is simmering.
May I now humbly suggest some brief points for my hon. Friend's consideration. First, the Government must iron out publicly their own apparent conflict involving the Departments of the Environment and of Energy and make one Department responsible.
Secondly, the Government should issue a clear statement on national onshore oil policy to include guidelines on regional pooling of planning knowledge and of oil finds, so that all the information is available regionally.
Thirdly, there should be guidelines on genuine public access and consultation in the planning process, balancing needless delays against allaying fears.
Fourthly, there should be ideas set out for schemes such as performance bonds—they could be called nuisance bonds — which are entered into in the construction business.
Fifthly, there should be guidelines for contra-deals, which set out how local authorities can give some of the "action" to the local community from the large profits that can be available from onshore exploitation, in return for any damage that is done to the environment; in short, of amenities for the general good.
Finally, there should be guidelines on environmental protection itself. For example, an application was submitted recently by an American oil company to drill an oil well in the middle of Las Vegas. It was granted because the company agreed to build a house around the drill and to have it fully noise insulated.
Time is short, so, in summary, may I say that we need a clear Government statement on national policy to ensure

that the public feel that they are genuinely consulted and have access to the figures and the planning decisions that are made.
As I have said, we want oil wells that end well.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Neil Macfarlane): There will be many who will be grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Browne) for raising this most important and topical subject. It has aroused the concern of a number of other hon. Members in recent months, as I am only too well aware from the volume of correspondence that I now receive on onshore oil and gas development.
This concern has coincided with a renewed interest on the part of the industry in the prospects for oil development in some of the most attractive areas of countryside south of the Thames. I shall not take up my hon. Friend's description of how he sees the possible effect of this development throughout the rest of the United Kingdom. The concentration of this activity is presently very much based on the southern shores of England, but it is only right that it should be considered carefully, and I welcome the vigilance with which my hon. Friends are studying development proposals.
Much of the concern arises from uncertainty about what is involved in oil and gas development onshore. My hon. Friend has touched upon that and has echoed some of the concerns of his constituents. There is also concern among the constituents of my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow), who is in his place and who has approached me on this issue previously. There is uncertainty about what is involved in oil and gas development onshore and about the safeguards that are available to ensure that any such development is compatible with the protection of the environment. I understand that, and I sympathise with it. I recognise that my Department has an important role in helping to dispel such uncertainty and in assisting local planning authorities to strike the right balance between satisfying the country's energy needs and safeguarding the environment.
Although my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester suggests that there is a conflict between the Departments of Energy and the Environment, I can assure him that there is not. Both Departments have major roles to play. That is why I have announced that guidance will be issued to local authorities by the end of the year. It will seek to explain the sort of activities involved in the exploration and the development of oil and gas resources, the factors that should be considered at each stage, and where to turn for specialist advice if this is needed. That is something to which my hon. Friend attaches great importance. We shall be consulting local authorities and the industry shortly on the framing of these guidelines and I expect this to provide an opportunity for all sides to air their views.
My Department's guidance will be preceded by important changes to the licensing system for onshore oil and gas development, changes which I believe will help to clarify the respective roles of licensing and planning control. Under the existing procedures, applicants may apply at any time for an unlicensed area, subject to a maximum size of 500 sq km for an exploration licence and 250 sq km for a production licence.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy publishes the criteria against which he assesses


applications. He considers the applicant's technical and financial capability and previous licence performance, with particular reference to the applicant's approach to environmental and amenity issues. Licences now cover extensive areas of the north-west, east midlands and Yorkshire, as well as southern England. I recognise, however, the particular concerns raised by the upsurge of interest in this latter area, particularly given the positive nature of some of the early finds. I hope to say something about these proposals in a moment.
However, I cannot emphasise too strongly that the grant of a licence by my right hon. Friend does not confer any planning or access rights. That must be made perfectly clear to my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester, and to my other hon. Friends and their constituents. A licensee, like any other potential developer, needs to obtain all permissions — planning or otherwise — to conduct his operations. The Government believe that the planning control procedures are the right way to handle evironmental and amenity issues.
These issues are best considered at first hand by mineral planning authorities rather than by central Government, except in the most exceptional of cases. Planning permission for drilling in a particular area in which hydrocarbons might be present could be refused for environmental or other reasons. It might, nevertheless, be possible, say by deviated drilling, to extract the hydrocarbons from a site acceptable to the planning authorities.
For this reason, there is a general presumption in favour of awarding exploration licences for all those areas in which oil or gas companies are interested, and similarly, where the companies find the results of seismic exploration sufficiently encouraging, in favour of awarding production licences for those areas.
A review of on-shore licensing terms and conditions has recently been completed. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Energy announced on 4 April the outcome of this review—and I commend that reading to my hon. Friend — and the introduction of a new licensing regime for on-shore oil and gas. It was a most important announcement.
The essence of the new system is that the present exploration and production licences should be replaced by three new licences, for exploration, appraisal and development. A development licence will not be awarded until planning permission has been obtained—this is not the case with the current production licence. New regulations are expected to be placed before the House in early July, and to come into effect in the autumn.
My right hon. Friend emphasised that planning safeguards will be maintained under the new regime. In addition to the major change to which I have just referred, he will continue to require evidence that the planning authority has been consulted about any proposed seismic survey and that planning approval has been given before he gives his consent to any appraisal well being drilled.
Our new circular will explain these changes to the licensing system more fully, and indicate how the safeguards built into both systems are designed to ensure that the right balance is struck between short-term economic gains and the longer term implications for the countryside and for nature conservation.

Mr. John Browne: Will those proposals drive towards allowing public access and consultation in that planning process?

Mr. Macfarlane: That is inherent in the entire planning system in this country.
I turn to the proposed development at Humbly Grove in Hampshire, as my hon. Friend touched on that briefly. He will understand that I am unable to comment on the merits of the policies and particular planning applications at Humbly Grove so long as there is a possibility that the case will come before my right hon. Friend for decision at some stage.
But my officials and I are familiar with the proposed development, and I can assure him that I am monitoring what is happening there very closely indeed. It may be helpful if I describe briefly what is proposed and the latest position as I understand it.
As a result of seismic surveys in this area of Hampshire, south east of Basingstoke, promising geological structures at Humbly Grove were drilled in 1980 and hydrocarbons were found in middle Jurassic limestones. A production test gave a stabilised production of about 100 barrels a day. The commercial viability of the structures was confirmed in 1983.
Carless's proposals are for facilities which could handle up to 4,000 barrels a day. Planning applications were submitted to Hart, Basingstoke and Deane, and east Hampshire district councils, and then forwarded to Hampshire county council for decision as the minerals planning authority. These proposals are important and include eight well sites, five of which already exist; a gathering and production station at Weston Common; an export terminal at Holybourne, which I understand is in my hon. Friend's constituency; and pipelines from the wells to the gathering and production station and to the export terminal. The number of wellheads has been kept down by using deviation drilling. Up to 12 boreholes would be at each well site—with a maximum of 65 for the entire development—with equipment small enough to give a low visual impact.
The station at Weston Common would be on a site of approximately 1·7 hectares surrounded by coniferous woodland and requiring a firebreak. The terminal at Holybourne would be situated between the railway line to Alton and the A31.
Hampshire county council has publicised Carless's application widely and allowed two months for representations instead of the usual 21 days. Carless has held a number of public meetings. Although not in an area of outstanding natural beauty or an area with any other kind of designated sensitivity, the local inhabitants regard it very highly and there is considerable opposition to the proposals. A number of representations have already been received by the Department.
I understand that the application is regarded by county council officers as being in accordance with Hampshire's structure plan and its oil and gas policies. In order to make sure that the council understood the technical aspects properly, it engaged independent consultants to assess the proposals.
My hon. Friend touched upon that in his speech. He talked about the deployment of these experts and the way in which they are appointed by the authority. I think that it is important for the local authority, which is the planning


authority, to do the appointing rather than central Government. The authorities must have that impartiality and appoint their own consultants.
The consultant's report had no adverse comments from the point of view of oilfield engineering. The noise aspects were subcontracted to the Wolfson unit of the Institute for Noise and Vibration, at Southampton university, which has made certain recommendations about the noise standards to be adopted if planning permission is given. I emphasise the phrase "if planning permission is given."
The county council is still conducting extensive inquiries with Carless Exploration on the details of the application. A major package of revisions was delivered by Carless to be read in conjunction with the original application.
I understand that the council's planning and transportation committee is soon to spend two days studying the sites in question. A decision is not expected before July. I hope that my hon. Friend will agree that the way in which the county council has considered this application is a model of care and sensitivity.
My hon. Friend requested that the planning application be called in for determination by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State after a public inquiry. I have to say that on the evidence so far before me I do not think this is necessary, but I will of course continue to monitor the situation and consider all the representations made.
I now go wider. It may be helpful if I were to explain more fully the basic premises on which Government policy in respect of on-shore oil and gas currently rests—which I would expect to be expanded in my Department's advice later this year. It is an important aspect. It is clear that the Government have a prime responsibility to encourage the exploration and proving of the nation's indigenous energy resources. I was grateful for my hon. Friend's comments on that.
As the exploitation of our off-shore reserves increases, attention naturally turns to what is available on-shore. I recognise that, in common with other mineral resources, oil and gas are frequently likely to be found in areas of attractive countryside, and that a conflict of interests can often arise.
But we should not assume too readily that the terms of this conflict are self-evident. I am most anxious that we should establish for example the extent and precise location of our on-shore oil reserves so that the best environmental option might be considered at the outset should those reserves prove commercially viable.
Secondly, it must be right that decisions on whether particular proposals are environmentally acceptable should be taken wherever possible by those elected to represent the people who stand to be most affected by them. This is fundamental to our planning system, and I have no reason to believe that it will be unequal to the task presented by on-shore oil and gas developments.
I am greatly encouraged by the efforts of many local planning authorities — following much debate and discussion — to draw up sensible and constructive policies which clearly carry a wide measure of public support. There are at present 10 on-shore oilfields

producing around 0·3 million tonnes of oil a year which are as a result operating perfectly satisfactorily and, in some cases — as at Wytch Farm in Dorset — also collecting well-deserved design awards in the process. Any advice that my Department gives later this year must therefore complement and support such efforts rather than encourage blind adherence to a single "national" approach.
My hon. Friend mentioned that there is some concern about the lack of expertise available in local authorities when faced with oil and gas proposals. I understand that this can be a problem at the beginning, but it is open to an authority to employ consultants to assist in their analysis of the information provided on certain aspects of the proposed development. As I have already described, Hampshire county council has done just this in appointing consultants at Humbly Grove to advise on the proposed distribution of wellhead sites, and on acceptable noise levels. It must be done at local level and not by my Department.
I understand that in Dorset the county council likewise retains a consultant on the pollution aspects. Planning authorities can also of course require additional information from applicants to help them reach an informed decision, and I know that most oil companies are only too ready to do so. This is a practical and flexible way forward when faced with new developments of this sort.
Finally, I should like to refer briefly to some other oil and gas developments in southern England. With a Hampshire constituency, my hon. Friend is probably aware of the proposal that was made by Shell UK to drill an oil exploration well in the very sensitive area of the New Forest, and the public inquiry that was held into the submitted planning application.
In the event, it transpired that, because the affected site was Crown land, in which there was no other interest, my right hon. Friend had no jurisdiction to decide that application, but the inspector's report was published and is a useful exposition of some of the environmental problems associated with on-shore oil development.
Another recent controversial proposal has been the application by Carless Exploration to drill a well on the South Downs between Ditchling Beacon and Brighton. Indeed, it was that proposal that prompted a debate in the other place on the issue of oil exploration in areas of outstanding natural beauty some six months ago, and was referred to again in another more recent debate there on development generally in such areas. The proposal attracted considerable local opposition, but in the event East Sussex granted planning permission given the careful choice of site to minimise visual intrusion.
I am aware, too, not least because of the representations made by my hon. Friends the Members for Woking and for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith), of the great interest in certain applications for oil and gas developments in parts of Surrey and Sussex. But it is still possible that those may come before my right hon. Friend for decision at some stage, and therefore I fear that I must resist the temptation to say anything further on those applications tonight.
In conclusion, I recognise that oil and gas development is a relatively new activity in southern England. I have indicated clearly that we are keeping a very close watch


on what is happening, and have further measures in hand to ensure that we achieve the right balance between development necessary for our economic well-being and the protection of our environment. I shall consider most carefully the points made by my hon. Friend tonight, and I am most grateful to him for the way in which he has introduced this debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at three minutes to Eleven o' clock.